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About CERRE 
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recommendations related to the regulation of service providers, the specification of market rules 
and the improvement of infrastructure management in a rapidly changing social, political, economic 
and technological environment. The work of CERRE also aims to refine the respective roles of market 
operators, governments and regulatory bodies, as well as aiming to improve the expertise of the 
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1 FIRST ISSUE PAPER: GATEKEEPER DEFINITION AND 
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1 Introduction 
This paper focuses on the scope and the gatekeeper definition and designation in the DMA. 
The paper is divided into four sections: after this introduction, Section 2 summarises the process to 
determine the gatekeeper platforms which are subject to regulation. Then, Section 3 deals with the 
scope of the DMA, i.e. the definition of the Core Platforms Services. Afterwards, Section 4 elaborates 
on the criteria and the indicators to designate the gatekeeper of those Core Platforms Services. 
The proposals contained in this paper arise from discussions amongst CERRE academics and are 
intended to promote debate between participants at the private seminar series organised by CERRE. 
2 Trigger for intervention in the DMA 
The DMA Proposal foresees the following steps to determine the digital services and firms 
which are subject to the obligations and prohibitions foreseen in the Act. 
First, the scope of the DMA is limited to eight types of digital services or business models, named 
Core Platforms Services (CPS). 1 They are often (but not always) intermediation services and, 
according to the Commission, share the following characteristics: extreme economies of scale and 
scope, important network effects, multi-sidedness, possible user lock-in and absence of multi-
homing, vertical integration and data driven advantages. Those characteristics are not new in and 
of themselves, but when they apply cumulatively, they lead to market concentration, as well as 
dependency and unfairness issues which cannot be addressed effectively by existing EU laws. The 
boundaries of those services determine the scope of the DMA and, at the same time, the trigger of 
intervention at the services level. Those boundaries are defined legally directly in the DMA (or other 
EU laws) and, therefore, litigations regarding those boundaries should be resolved through a legal 
interpretation of those definitions.  
Second, the trigger of intervention at the firms level is determined by the more economic concept 
of gatekeepers. As explained below, gatekeeper power is based on three cumulative criteria: (i) a 
significant impact on the EU internal market; (ii) control of an important gateway for business users 
to reach end-users; and (iii) entrenched and durable position. This gatekeeper position is presumed 
to be held when a CPS provider has an important financial and geographical size for all its operations 
(CPS and other services alike) and when many EU end-users and business users are relying on the 
CPS. However, as size does not necessarily give gateway power, the CPS provider may rebut the 
presumption with several quantitative and qualitative indicators and show that, although it is big 
and with many users, business users are not dependent on it to reach end-users. 
On the one hand, the gatekeeper designation is made on an individual firm and individual CPS basis: 
it only concerns the CPS(s) for which the firm meets the three criteria test to be designated as 
gatekeeper, to the exclusion of other CPSs offered by the same firm and a fortiori of other digital 
services outside the CPS list. 2 For instance, if Facebook holds a gatekeeper position for social 
network services, that does mean that Facebook will also be designated as a gatekeeper for its 
marketplace services. On the other hand, the gatekeeper designation covers all the commercial 
services with are included in the legal CPS for which a designation has been made. However, we 
think that the Commission should be able to exclude some commercial services within a CPS in an 
Article 7 specifications decisions. 
It is instructive to contrast this DMA process to determine the trigger of intervention with the 
process used in other economic laws whose objectives are close to those of the DMA (see Table 1 
 
1 Indeed, those types of digital services are also referred by the Commission as ‘business models’: Commission Staff Working 
Document of 25 May 2016, Online Platforms, SWD(2016) 172. Such concept is similar to the concept of Areas of Business (AoB) 
proposed by BEREC: BEREC Response of September 2020 to the Public Consultations on the Digital Services Act Package and 
the New Competition Tool, BoR (20) 138, p.19.  
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below). In its advice for a new pro-competition regime for digital markets, the Digital Markets 
Taskforce of the UK CMA proposes the following steps.3 The new rules should apply to digital 
activities defined as “collections of products and services supplied by a firm that has a similar 
function or which, in combination, fulfil a specific function”.4 Then, the trigger at the firms level is 
determined by the economic concept of Strategic Market Status (SMS) based on two criteria: (i) 
substantial, entrenched market power in at least one digital activity (ii) providing the firm with a 
strategic position because the market power is particularly widespread or significant (for more, see 
the annex of this issues paper). 
The EU telecommunications regulatory framework applies to two categories of digital services,  
electronic communications networks and services. 5 For the asymmetric economic regulation, the 
trigger of intervention at the services level is determined by relevant antitrust markets which 
meet a three-criteria test indicating that competition law is not effective to solve market power 
issues identified on those markets.6 Then, the trigger for intervention at firms’ level is determined 
by the presence of Significant Market Power (SMP) which is equivalent to dominance in 
competition law.7  
Finally, the scope of competition law covers all economic activities. The trigger for intervention at 
the services level is determined by the definition of the relevant markets based on the SSNIP 
economic methodology.8 Then, the trigger for intervention at the firms level is determined by the 
presence of a dominant position on those relevant markets which is defined as a position of 
economic strength affording the firm the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of 
competitors, customers and ultimately consumers.9 
 





law (Art. 102 
TFEU) 












Idem scope Idem scope - Relevant market  
- Susceptible to ex-















Table 1: Comparing the intervention trigger of the DMA with other economic laws 
Interestingly, the DMA (and the CMA Advice) rely on economic analysis to determine the 
gatekeeper power (or the SMS status) without being constrained by the rigidities of 
 
3 CMA, Advice of the Digital Markets Taskforce on a new pro-competition regime for digital markets, December 2020. 
4 Ibidem, para. 4.15. 
5 For an interesting comparison between the DMA and the EU telecommunications regulation, see P. Ibáñez Colomo, The Draft 
Digital Markets Act: a legal and institutional analysis, January 2021, available at SSRN. 
6 Directive 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the European Electronic 
Communications Code, OJ [2018] L 321/36, art.64 and Commission Recommendation 2020/2245 of 18 December 2020 on 
relevant product and service markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation, OJ [2020] L 
439/23. The three criteria test are: (i) high and non-transitory structural, legal or regulatory barriers to entry are present; (ii) a 
market structure which does not tend towards effective competition within the relevant time horizon, having regard to the state 
of infrastructure-based competition and other sources of competition behind the barriers to entry; (iii) competition law alone is 
insufficient to adequately address the identified market failure(s). 
7 EECC, art. 63 and Commission Guidelines of 27 April 2018 on market analysis and the assessment of significant market power 
under the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, OJ [2018] C 159/1. 
8 Commission Notice on the definition of the relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law, O.J. [1997] C 
372/5 
9 Guidance of 3 December 2008 on the Commission's Enforcement Priorities in Applying Articles [102 TFUE] to Abusive 
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competition law methodologies.10 In particular, a relevant market definition can introduce an 
element of rigidity that might impair the effectiveness of the DMA: it results in a snapshot view of 
markets, and the EU practice tends to define narrow markets. Competitive phenomena that might 
occur outside of or beyond the relevant market(s) have proven difficult to introduce into the analysis 
at the market assessment stage.11  
This is all the more critical as the DMA deals with structural competition problems in dynamic 
markets, where part of the competitive game involves reshaping markets through disruptive 
innovation, for instance.12 Indeed, the very rationale for the DMA is to bridge gaps in the coverage 
of competition law, some of which arise as a consequence of rigidities induced by relevant market 
definition.13 
3 Services susceptible to ex-ante regulation: Core 
Platform Services 
3.1 The Commission’s proposal 
The scope of the DMA proposal covers the following closed list of eight (seven principal and one 
accessory) digital services which are named “Core Platforms Services” (CPS):14 
• Online B2C intermediation services which are defined as “information society services15 
that “(i) allow business users to offer goods or services to consumers, with a view to (ii) 
facilitating the initiating of direct transactions between business users and consumers 
regardless of whether the transaction is finally concluded offline or online and which (iii) 
provide services to business users, based on contractual relationships between the platform 
and the business user.”16 As the first part of the definition refers to consumers (and not end-
users), intermediation services do not include B2B intermediation services. This type of CPS 
includes: 
• Marketplaces which are defined as “information society services allowing 
consumers and/or traders to conclude online sales or service contracts with traders 
either on the online marketplace's website or on a trader's website that uses 
computing services provided by the online marketplace”;17 given this broad 
definition, it seems to include general marketplaces like Amazon and specialist 
marketplaces like Apple Books; 
 
10 On the difficulties of applying competition law methodologies to the platform economy, see for instance J.U. Franck and M. 
Peitz, Market definition and market power in the platform economy, CERRE Report, 2019. 
11 By way of example, see how the relevant market definition exercise prevents the Commission from perceiving what is truly at 
stake in Facebook/WhatsApp, namely the acquisition of one of the most likely springboards for disruptive innovation by the very 
powerful platform: Decision of the Commission of 3 October 2014, Case M.7217 Facebook/WhatsApp. See also LEAR, Ex-post 
Assessment of Merger Control Decisions in Digital Markets (2019) Study for the Competition and Markets Authority; Fletcher, 
Chapter 8 cautioning against the reliance on rigid market definition in the digital sectors.  
12 P. Larouche, Platforms, Innovation and Competition on the market, Competition Policy International 2020. 
13 In that respect, one could argue that the DMA would merely follow the trend already underway in merger control, where the 
horizontal guidelines in both the US and the EU put forward analytical methods that reduce the need for market definition to 
carry out a conclusive assessment in cases of monopolistic competition (markets with significant product differentiation amongst 
competitors). 
14 DMA Proposal, art.2(2) and Impact Assessment, pp.39-45. In its Response to the Public Consultations on the Digital Services 
Act Package and the New Competition Tool, BoR (20) 138, p.19, BEREC had identified 5+1 digital services: (i) app stores, (ii) e-
commerce, (iii) general search, (iv) operating systems and (v) social media and advertising services. 
15 An Information Society Services a service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at the 
individual request of a recipient: Directive 2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 September 2015 laying 
down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical regulations and of rules on Information Society services, 
OJ [2015] L 241/1. 
16 Regulation 2019/1150 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on promoting fairness and transparency 
for business users of online intermediation services, OJ [2019] L 186/55, art.2(2).  
17 Directive 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high common 
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• App stores which are defined as “a type of online intermediation service, which is 
focused on software applications as the intermediated product or service”;18 they 
include Apple App store or Google Play store. 
• Online search engines which are defined as “information society services allowing users 
to input queries to perform searches of, in principle, all websites, or all websites in a 
particular language, based on a query on any subject in the form of a keyword, voice request, 
phrase or other input, and returns results in any format in which information related to the 
requested content can be found”; 19 they include for instance Google search or Microsoft 
Bing. Given that the definition refers to searches of all websites, this CPS seems to exclude 
specialist searches. 
• Online social networks which are defined as “platforms that enable end-users to connect, 
share, discover and communicate with each other across multiple devices and, in particular, 
via chats, posts, videos and recommendations”;20 they include for instance Facebook. 
• Video-sharing platform services which are “services where the principal purpose or an 
essential functionality is the provision of programmes and/or of user-generated videos to 
the general public for which the platform does not have editorial responsibility but 
determines the organisation of the content”;21  they include for instance YouTube. 
• Number-independent interpersonal communication services which are defined as 
“services that enable direct interpersonal and interactive exchange of information via 
electronic communications networks between a finite number of persons (whereby the 
persons initiating or participating in the communication determine its recipient) and which 
does not connect with publicly assigned numbering resources;”22 they include for instance 
WhatsApp, Skype or Gmail. 
• Cloud computing services which are defined as “information society services that enable 
access to a scalable and elastic pool of shareable computing resources”; 23 presumably 
include Software as a Service (SaaS), IaaS and Platform as a Service (PaaS). 
• Operating systems which are defined as “systems software which control the basic 
functions of the hardware or software and enables software applications to run on it”; 24 they 
include for instance Google Android, Apple iOS or Microsoft Windows. It remains to be 
clarified whether this CPS includes the OS underpinning browsers. 
• Advertising services which are an accessory CPS because it will only be regulated when 
offered by a provider of any of seven principal CPS mentioned above, it includes ad networks, 
ad exchanges and any ad intermediation services such as Google Ads. 
As explained above, the Commission selects those eight digital services because they have 
characteristics which lead to market concentration, as well as dependency and unfairness issues.25 
Based on such selection criteria, the Commission did not select:26 
• Video streaming and video-on-demand services such as Netflix because of the lack 
of multisidedness, 
 
18 DMA Proposal, art.2.12. 
19 Network Information Security Directive, art.4(18). 
20 DMA Proposal, art.2.12. 
21 Directive 2010/13 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions 
laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services 
(Audiovisual Media Services Directive), OJ [2010] L 95/1, as amended by Directive 2018/1808, art.1(1aa). 
22 EECC, art. 2(5) and (7). 
23 Network Information Security Directive, art.4(19). 
24 DMA Proposal, art.2.10. 
25 In her Advice the CMA Digital Markets Taskforce recommends to initially prioritise the following 7 digital services: online 
marketplaces, app stores, social networks, web browsers, online search engines, operating systems and cloud computing 
services. 




May 2021 | Making the Digital Markets Act more resilient and effective 13/96 
• Nor B2B industrial platforms because of the absence of strong bargaining power 
asymmetry which could lead to unfairness. 
Moreover, the Commission did not select for regulation some ancillary services such as payment 
services, nor identification services.27 However, the DMA proposal prohibits anti-steering towards 
ancillary services which compete with those of the gatekeeper as well as bundling between CPS and 
some ancillary services (such as identification services),28 thereby promoting contestability for 
ancillary services provision. The DMA Proposal also grants access and interoperability rights to the 
providers of ancillary services, thereby contributing to their contestability.29  
To ensure the resilience of the law in an economic sector which is fast-moving, the DMA proposal 
contains a built-in dynamic mechanism which allows the European Commission, after a so-called 
market investigation, to propose to the EU legislative bodies that the DMA be amended to include 
new digital services in the list of CPSs.30 By implication, the list of CPSs is therefore considered to 
form an essential element of the DMA, since it can only be expanded through a legislative act (and 
not a delegated act as foreseen for the expansion of the obligations).31 In the end, that market 
investigation mechanism to expand to the CPS list does not add much to the right of legislative 
initiative already entrusted to the Commission by the TFEU.32 If anything, it constrains such right as 
it imposes to the Commission to do a market investigation before making the legislative proposal. 
3.2 Recommendations 
3.2.1 General definition and characteristics of Core Platform Services 
Core Platform Services are not defined in the DMA proposal which merely contains a list of types of 
digital service, many of which are defined in other EU instruments. On the positive side, the DMA 
proposal seeks to build on existing legislative definitions and therefore avoids reinventing the wheel. 
Furthermore, the proposal does not rely on an antitrust market definition which may prove too rigid 
to deal with holistic issues in very dynamic sectors. On the negative side, these definitions were 
elaborated over many years, in instruments that are not always entirely consistent with one another: 
throwing them in the “core platform services” basket may not provide much guidance.  
As already mentioned, a general characterization of CPS can be found in the recitals of the 
proposal: core platform services feature economies of scale, negligible marginal costs, 
strong network effects, multi-sidedness, user dependency, lock-in, lack of multi-homing, 
vertical integration and data-driven competitive advantages.33 This general definition 
could be included directly in Article 2 as a chapeau to the list. Also, this general definition 
could focus more on the intermediation of the platform.34  
3.2.2 The list of the Core Platform Services 
Not all CPSs are two-sided and perform an intermediation function. Some CPSs are inherently 
single-sided. This is the case for number-independent interpersonal communication services as 
well as cloud computing services. Moreover, those two CPS are already subject to existing EU law 
that may address some of the concerns of the Commission. Number-independent interpersonal 
communication services are covered by the EECC and subject to transparency and interoperability 
obligations.35 Cloud services are covered by the Free Flow of Data Regulation which encourages 
 
27 DMA Proposal, art.2.14 and 2.15. 
28 DMA Proposal, resp. art.5(c) and art.5(e). 
29 DMA Proposal, art.6.1(f). 
30 DMA Proposal, Art.17(a). 
31 Indeed Art. 290 TFEU provides that delegation is only possible for non-essential elements of the legislative act. 
32 TEU, Art.17(1)  
33 DMA Proposal, recitals 2 and 12 
34 OECD defines intermediation platform as “an information society service provider that facilitates interactions between two or 
more distinct sets of users (whether businesses or individuals) who interact through the service via the Internet”: 
https://www.oecd.org/innovation/an-introduction-to-online-platforms-and-their-role-in-the-digital-transformation-53e5f593-
en.htm 
35 BEREC Opinion of 11 March 2021 on the European Commission’s proposal for a Digital Markets Act: For a swift, effective and 
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codes of conducts to facilitate the porting of data and the switching between cloud providers.36 
Therefore, we recommend that number-independent interpersonal communication services 
and cloud computing services should be treated in the same manner as advertising 
services. They should be considered as accessory CPS and be regulated only when they 
are provided by a digital platform which also provides another principal CPS. 
Besides, it seems that several CPSs are in themselves essentially one-sided because the other 
‘side’ comprises another CPS. For instance, the other ‘side’ of a search engine are the websites that 
are crawled and that are presented alongside advertising services. A platform with both search and 
advertising functions can be seen as two-sided, and will have both multiple end users and multiple 
business users. But it is less obvious that this is true of each function considered in isolation. This 
may also be the case for social networks, video sharing platform services and operating systems. 
4 Criteria and indicators to designate gatekeeper of 
Core Platform Services 
4.1 The Commission’s proposal 
The DMA constitutes asymmetric regulation: its obligations do not apply to all providers of Core 
Platform Services, but only to those providers which have been designated as gatekeepers. Such 
designation is done by the European Commission based on a cumulative “three criteria test”, 
namely: 
• significant impact on the EU internal market;  
• control of an important gateway for business users to reach end-users; 
• and entrenched and durable position.37 
To facilitate and speed up the designation process, the DMA proposal establishes a rebuttable 
presumption that the three-criteria test is met when a provider of CPS is above several 
size thresholds for a certain period (in general 3 years). Those thresholds are the following: 
• for the undertaking to which the CPS provider belongs, an annual turnover in the 
EEA equal or above €6.5bn or market capitalization of at least €65bn and the 
presence in at least three of the 27 Member States of the EU; 
• and for the provided CPS, a reach of more than 45 million monthly active end-users 
in the EU (which represent 10% of the EU population)38 as well more than 10,000 
active business users on an annualised basis.39 
The Commission will adopt a delegated act to specify the methodology for determining whether 
those quantitative thresholds are met and to regularly adjust them to market and technological 
developments.40 In practice, a CPS provider should self-assess whether it meets those size 
thresholds and, when it does, it should notify the Commission, providing all the relevant information 
within three months.41 On that basis, within two months the Commission designates this CPS 
provider as a gatekeeper, unless the provider tries to rebut the presumption 42.  The Commission 
 
36 Regulation 2018/1807 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 on a framework for the free flow 
of non-personal data in the European Union, OJ [2018] L 303/59, art.6. 
37 DMA Proposal, Art.3.1. 
38 The same criterion is proposed to designate the Very Large Online Platforms which are subject to additional obligation and a 
more Europeanised oversight under the DSA: DSA Proposal, art.25.2. 
39 DMA Proposal, art. 3.2 and rec. 23. The Commission could, in a delegated act, clarify the methodology to measure the size 
thresholds in order to ensure legal predictability and could also adjust the thresholds: DMA Proposal, art. 3.5. 
40 DMA Proposal, art.3(5). 
41 DMA Proposal, art.3(3). 
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services Impact Assessment indicates that the use of those thresholds could result in the 
identification of 10 to 15 CPS providers but does not give any explanation for this range number.43 
Indeed, as the size thresholds do not necessarily indicate a gatekeeper position, a CPS provider 
which meets the thresholds can present sufficiently substantiated arguments to rebut the 
presumption and demonstrate that the three-criteria test is not fulfilled.44 Such rebuttal must rely 
on an open list of quantitative and qualitative indicators such as financial and commercial size, 
number of users, entry barriers, scale and scope effects, user lock-in and “other structural market 
characteristics”. 45 Conversely, if based on the same indicators, a CPS provider does fulfil the three-
criteria test despite falling under the presumptive thresholds, the Commission may designate that 
provider as a gatekeeper.46 
Table 2 below summarises the three-criteria test to define gatekeeper power, the size thresholds for 
the gatekeeper presumption and the quantitative and qualitative indicators that can be used to rebut 
the presumption or to designate gatekeepers which are below the thresholds. 
Three criteria 
test 
Presumptive size thresholds 
Quantitative and qualitative 
gatekeeper indicators 
1. Significant 
impact on the 
internal 
market 
Financial and geographical size 
(at firm level) 
- Annual EEA Turnover (last 3 years ) 
> € 6.5bn or Market cap (last year) > 
€ 65 bn 
- and currently provides one CPS in 
at least 3 Member States 
Size, operation and position 
 
- Very high turnover derived from 
end-users of a single CPS 
- Very high market capitalisation 
- Very high ratio of equity value over 
profit 
- High growth rates, or decelerating 






User size (at CPS level) 
- Monthly EU active end-users > 45m 
- and yearly EU active business users 
> 10 000 
Number and type users 
- Number of end-users 
- Number of dependent business 
users 
- End-users or business users lock-in, 






CPS user size is kept over the last 
three  years 
Entry barriers 
- Network effects, data-driven, 
analytics capabilities 
- Economies of scale and scope (incl. 
from data) 
- Vertical integration 
 
 Other structural market 
characteristics 
Table 2: Criteria, thresholds and indicators to designate gatekeeper 
Next to existing gatekeepers, the Commission may also designate an emerging gatekeeper when 
a CPS provider meets the two first criteria (i.e., significant impact and important gateway) and the 
 
43 Impact Assessment, para.148. Caffarra and Scott Morton calculated on a preliminary basis that the thresholds “will capture 
not only (obviously) the core businesses of the largest players (GAFAM), but perhaps also a few others. Oracle and SAP, for 
instance, would appear to meet the thresholds, as would AWS and Microsoft Azure. Conversely Twitter, Airbnb, Bing, LinkedIn, 
Xbox Netflix, Zoom and Expedia do not appear to meet the thresholds at present, and Booking.com, Spotify, Uber, Byte 
dance/TikTok, Salesforce, Google Cloud and IBM Cloud appear to meet some but not others”: 
https://voxeu.org/article/european-commission-digital-markets-act-translation. However, Oracle and SAP do not appear to offer 
CPS as they do not operate B2C platforms and do not have separate business users and end-users. 
44 DMA Proposal, art.3(4). 
45 DMA Proposal, Art.3(6) and rec 25. 
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fulfilment of the third criterion is foreseeable.47 In this case, the emerging gatekeeper is subject to 
a subset of the obligations imposed on existing gatekeepers to prevent market tipping. 
Contrary to the CMA Advice, the three-criteria test does not explicitly mention market power 
nor dominant position. There is thus no need to define an antitrust relevant market or to prove a 
dominant position to find a gatekeeper power. However, the second and third criteria implicitly 
include the presence of market power and several indicators to rebut the presumption are also linked 
to market power. This the case in particular for user lock-in or, more generally, the different types 
of entry barriers. It is also worth noting that the Commission could designate several gatekeepers 
providing the same CPS. Therefore, the competition law rationale that there is only one single 
dominance per market does not necessarily apply in the context of the DMA. On the one hand, a 
CPS is not necessarily a relevant market (e.g. operating system may include different relevant 
markets).48 On the other hand, a gatekeeper power does not necessarily coincide with a dominant 
position (e.g., while a search engine may be one relevant market, two providers of large search 
engines meeting the thresholds may have a gatekeeper power while both may not have a dominant 
position).49 
4.2 Recommendations 
4.2.1 The three criteria test to define gatekeeper power 
There is no clear definition of gatekeeper in EU law, although the concept has motivated antitrust 
and regulatory intervention. One example relates to access to technical services for digital TV which 
constituted a key capability for media firms. In NewsCorp/Telepiu, the Commission considered the 
merging parties would have been “the gatekeeper of a tool (Videoguard CAS) that may facilitate 
entry for any alternative pay DTH operator and of an infrastructure (the platform) that may ease 
the conditions for the broadcasting of pay and free TV satellite channels”  and imposed compulsory 
access to those technical services as a condition to clear pay-TV merger .50 To complement antitrust 
law, ex ante rules were also adopted to force the providers of Conditional Access Systems (CAS) 
from which broadcasters depend to reach any group of potential viewers to offer to broadcasters, 
on a FRAND basis, technical services enabling the broadcasters' digitally-transmitted services to be 
received by viewers.51 Another example relates to interoperability. The EECC imposes on providers 
of number–independent interpersonal communications services the obligations to render their 
services interoperable if those providers reach a significant level of coverage and user up-take.52 A 
definition of gatekeeper is given by Caffara and Scott Morton as “an intermediary who essentially 
controls access to critical constituencies on either side of a platform that cannot be reached 
otherwise, and as a result can engage in conduct and impose rules that counterparties cannot 
avoid.”53 The gatekeeper concept is also linked to different other concepts54 such as: 
 
47 DMA Proposal, art.15(4), rec 27 and 63. 
48 In Google Android Decision, the Commission considered that Android and iOS are part of two different relevant markets. 
49 In practice, when there are two gatekeepers for the same CPS, this will often imply that the CPS is made of several separate 
antitrust relevant markets. For instance, this may the case for app stores (Apple and Google), marketplaces (eBay and Amazon) 
or social networks (Facebook and LinkedIn). 
50 Decision of the Commission of 2 April 2003, Case M.2876 NewsCorp/Telepiu, paras 198 and 225. When those access 
commitments could not have been obtained, mergers have been prohibited: Decisions of the Commission of 27 May 1998, Case 
M.993 Beterlsmann/Krich/Premiere and Case M.1027 Deutsche Telekom/BetaResearch. The merger was prohibited because it 
would have resulted in BetaDigital and BetaResearch having a dominant position on the German market for the supply of technical 
services for pay-TV, besides Premiere strengthening its dominance on the pay-TV market and Deutsche Telekom strengthening 
its dominance on the cable networks. 
51 EECC, art.62(1) and Annex II, Part I. 
52 EECC, art.61(2c). 
53 https://voxeu.org/article/european-commission-digital-markets-act-translation. 
54 P. Alexiadis and A. de Streel, Designing an EU Intervention Standard for Digital Platforms, EUI Working Paper-RSCAS 2020/14, 
pp.2-9; Geradin D. (2021), What is a digital gatekeeper? Which platforms should be captured by the EC proposal for a Digital 
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• Bottleneck power which is “a situation where consumers primarily single-home and rely 
upon a single service provider, which makes obtaining access to those consumers for the 
relevant activity by other service providers prohibitively costly”.55 
• Unavoidable trading partner, in the digital online platform context, the Cremer Report 
has already considered that classification as an unavoidable trading partner is usually 
associated with the existence of intermediation power.56 
• Economic dependency which occurs “if and to the extent that the business faces a high 
cost from switching away from the platform to a substitute. Such switching costs can arise 
for instance if a business has made significant platform-specific investments, such as 
building its technology to be compatible with the platform’s specification; these investments 
would have to be written down (“sunk costs”) and new investments made if the business 
were to switch to a substitute. Switching costs can also arise from the fact that any 
substitutes are far inferior, such as when a single platform is a gatekeeper to a given market 
or market segment, and there are few other means of reaching that market or segment”.57  
The three-criteria test proposed in the DMA are in line with the concept of gatekeepers or 
associated concepts such as bottleneck, unavoidable trading partner or economic dependency. 
However, the test may risk being over-inclusive. This in turn may strain the monitoring and the 
enforcement process as well as negatively impact the relevance and the strengths of the prohibitions 
and obligations. In the CERRE Recommendation,58 we had proposed the introduction of a fourth 
criteria consisting of the orchestration of an ecosystem.59 We explained that this additional criteria 
could be assessed with the following indicators: presence in multiple markets or business areas 
which could be ‘tightly’ connected in the same vertical value chain or more ‘loosely’ connected, 
control of ecosystems as a web of interconnected and to a large degree interdependent economic 
activities carried out by different undertakings to supply one or more products or services which 
impact the same set of users. Under the current proposal, the orchestration of an ecosystem may 
play a role in the gatekeeper designation as it may increase the size of the platform (first criterion), 
its gateway power (the second criterion) or the entrenchment of such power (third criterion).60 
However, this may not be enough. 
During the preparation of the proposal, the Commission services envisaged a stricter test which 
would require the gatekeeper to provide at least two CPSs (instead of merely one, as finally 
proposed).61 This additional condition would have led to a more limited number of regulated 
platforms, estimated to be between 5-7 (instead of 10-15 under the DMA proposal). Such additional 
requirement has the advantage of focusing the DMA (and the limited resources for its enforcement) 
on the most obvious and pressing contestability issues. Indeed, as recognised in the DMA proposal: 
“as gatekeepers frequently provide the portfolio of their services as part of an integrated ecosystem 
to which third-party providers of such ancillary services do not have access, at least not subject to 
equal conditions, and can link the access to the core platform service to take-up of one or more 
ancillary services, the gatekeepers are likely to have an increased ability and incentive to leverage 
their gatekeeper power from their core platform services to these ancillary services, to the detriment 
of choice and contestability of these services”.62 However, some big platforms which are only 
 
55 F. Scott Morton, Bouvier, P., Ezrachi, A., Jullien, A., Katz, R., Kimmelman, G., Melamed, D. and J. Morgenstern, Committee 
for the Study of Digital Platforms, Market Structure and Antitrust Subcommittee, Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy 
and the State, 2019, p.105.   
56 J. Crémer, Y-A. de Montjoye and H. Schweitzer, Competition policy for the digital era, Report to the European Commission, 
March 2019. The ACCC Report refers to Google and Facebook as “unavoidable trading partners” for a significant number of media 
businesses, in the sense that they are important channels through which consumers access news, with many news businesses 
being dependent on them as key sources of referral traffic.   
57 Expert Group for the Observatory on the Online Platform Economy, Measurement & Economic, Indicators, 2020, p.17. 
58 CERRE Recommendation DMA, p.101. 
59 On the concept of ecosystem, see M.G. Jacobides, C.Cennamo and A.Gawer, “Towards a theory of ecosystems”, Strategic 
Management Journal 39(8), 2018, 2255–2276; M.G. Jacobides and I. Lianos, Ecosystems and Competition Law in Theory and 
Practice, UCL Centre for Law, Economics and Society Research Paper Series: 1/2021. 
60 DMA Proposal, rec.3. 
61 DMA Impact Assessment, paras.148 and 388. 
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providing one CPS will then escape regulation even though they may have the possibility to leverage 
their gatekeeper power on one CPS to other related services. 
4.2.2 The thresholds to establish the gatekeeper presumption 
The reliance on size thresholds, which are relatively easy to determine for the Commission, 
as a rebuttable presumption for the meeting of three criteria test will incentivise the 
digital platforms to disclose the quantitative and qualitative indicators for gatekeeper power that 
they know better than the Commission. However, it should be clear that such presumption is only 
based on size and that size is not directly linked to gatekeeper power. This is why it should 
be reasonably possible to rebut the presumption. In that regard the wording of the Impact 
Assessment which mentions that the gatekeeper presumption could only be rebutted in very 
exceptional circumstances is unfortunate.63  
Another issue is that, in the Commission Proposal, the user threshold should be assessed at the CPS 
level and not at the firm level. As this threshold relates to end-users and business users, it may be 
difficult to apply in isolation to a CPS which is inherently single-sided (as noted above, number-
independent interpersonal communication services and cloud computing services) because it is not 
a gateway between end-users and business users.64 This double threshold may also be difficult to 
apply to a CPS which is essentially one-sided (as noted above, search engine social networks, video 
sharing platform services, operating Systems and advertising services). To deal with such difficulty, 
the calculation of the end users and business users could be done for all the CPS in 
combination. For the CPS which are accessory to principal CPS (such as advertising services in the 
Commission proposal and also communications services and cloud services in our recommendation), 
the user threshold should be calculated on the combination of principal and accessory CPSs. 
4.2.3 The indicators to rebut the gatekeeper presumption 
The list of quantitative and qualitative indicators that can be used to rebut the presumption – or to 
designate as gatekeeper firms that fall below the presumptive thresholds – are sound and broadly 
reflect the (admittedly limited) economic literature on gatekeepers or associated concepts. However, 
some improvements to the list are possible. One of the key indicators to assess the second criterion 
(important gateway) is whether the platform controls a termination monopoly or a 
competitive bottleneck.65 This depends on the ability and the incentive of the business 
users and the end users to multi-home across several competing platforms.66 Thus, it is 
regrettable that the absence of multi-homing is only mentioned in a recital (25) of the DMA Proposal 
and not in Article 3(6). Also to assess this second criterion, the relative size of the platforms 
compared to the other platforms providing the same CPS is an important indicator to look at.  
One of the key indicators to assess the third criterion (power entrenchment) should be the presence 
of entry barriers. However, the different types of entry barriers could be clarified. The first type 
is the entry barriers to existing services and will vary according to the business models of 
the digital platforms. An important entry barrier consists of cross-group externalities and network 
effects which tend to be amplified by big data and AI technologies and increase with the development 
and the maturation of the markets. A second type is entry barriers to future services and is 
related to the control of innovation capabilities. In the digital economy, they may consist in 
control over data, key platform elements, risky and patient capital, specific data, and computer 
skills.67 
 
63 DMA Impact Assessment, para.389. 
64 Note that DMA Proposal rec.13 in fine notes that: “In certain circumstances, the notion of end users should encompass users 
that are traditionally considered business users, but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods 
or services to other end users, such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes.” 
65 M. Armstrong, ‘Network Interconnection’, Economic Journal 108, 1998, 545-564; J.-J. Laffont and J. Tirole, Competitions in 
Telecommunications, MIT Press, 2000. 
66 Geradin, 2021; Cabral L., J. Haucap, G. Parker, G. Petropoulos, T. Valletti, M. Van Alstyne (2021), The EU Digital Markets Act 
A Report from a Panel of Economic Experts, Joint Research Center of the European Commission. PPMI et al., Multi-homing: 
obstacles, opportunities, facilitating factors, Study on "Support to the Observatory for the Online Platform Economy", 2021. 
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Moreover, as the gatekeeper concept is new in EU law and the list of indicators proposed in the DMA 
remains open, the Commission could enhance legal predictability by adopting guidelines on the 
manner it will use and assess those indicators.68 Those guidelines are often adopted in 
competition law and in some economic regulation to summarise past administrative practice and 
case law.69 In this case, the situation is different as there is no existing practice and case law in the 
concept of gatekeeper. 
4.2.4 Review cycle 
A review cycle of two years for gatekeeper designation is very short given the logistical and fact-
finding pressures it imposes upon the Commission (especially in the absence of assistance from 
national authorities) and the fact the timeline for potential competition assessment in antitrust is 
generally three years. The cycle could be longer, for instance, five years as it is provided for 
in the EU telecommunications regulation70 or as it has been proposed in the CMA Advice to balance 




68 Also, Draft BEREC Report of 11 March 2021 on the ex-ante regulation of digital gatekeepers, BoR (21) 34, p.16. 
69 See for instance, Commission Guidelines of 27 April 2018 on market analysis and the assessment of significant market power 
under the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, OJ [2018] C 159/1. 
70 EECC, art.67.5. 
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Annex: Laws and proposals to the designation of digital 
platforms at national level 
Next to the DMA, several countries have adopted or proposed trigger to impose additional 
obligations of the largest digital platforms.  
Germany 
The recently adopted 10th amendment to the Act against Restraints of Competition introduces the 
threshold of paramount significance determined based on five criteria: 
- a dominant position on one or more markets; 
- financial strength or access to other resources; 
- vertical integration and activities on otherwise related markets; 
- access to data relevant for competition; 
- and importance of activities for third parties' access to supply and sales markets and related 
influence on third parties' business activities.72 
France 
The Autorité de la Concurrence proposed to introduce a threshold of structuring digital platforms 
defined as 
- a company that provides online intermediation services for exchanging, buying or selling 
goods, content or services, 
- which holds structuring market power because of its size, financial capacity, user community 
and/or the data that it holds,  
- enabling it to control access to or significantly affect the functioning of the market(s) in 
which it operates with regard to its competitors, users and/or third-party companies that 
depend on access to the services it offers for their economic activity.73 
The French telecommunications regulator ARCEP proposed a threshold of systemic digital 
platforms, defined based on 
- three main criteria: (i) the existence of bottleneck power; (ii) a certain number of users in 
the EU - or as a proxy, sufficiently high EU turnover; and (iii) the existing of integration of 
that firm into an ecosystem enabling leverage effects; 
- which are complemented by four secondary criteria: (i) gatekeeper position; (ii) access to 
many high quality data; (iii) market shares for online advertising; and (iv) the market value 





72 See Section 19a of German Competition Law on Abusive Conduct of Undertakings of Paramount Significance for Competition 
across Markets. A non official English translation is available at: https://www.d-kart.de/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/GWB-
2021-01-14-engl.pdf  
73 Autorité de la concurrence’s contribution of 19 February 2020 to the debate on competition policy and digital challenges 
available at: https://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/sites/default/files/2020-
03/2020.03.02_contribution_adlc_enjeux_numeriques_vf_en_0.pdf 
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United-Kingdom 
The Advice of the Digital Market Taskforce of the CMA75 proposes to regulate the firms with 
Strategic Market Status (SMS) which have 
• Substantial, entrenched market power in at least one digital activity; 
• providing the firm with a strategic position because the market power is particularly 
widespread or significant. This strategic position could be determined based on the following 
criteria: (i) firm has achieved very significant size or scale in an activity, for example where 
certain products are regularly used by a very high proportion of the population or where the 
value of transactions facilitated by a specific product is large; (ii) the firm is an important 
access point to customers (a gateway) for a diverse range of other businesses or the activity 
is an important input for a diverse range of other businesses; (iii) the firm can use the 
activity to extend market power from one activity into a range of other activities and/or has 
developed an ‘ecosystem’ of products which protects a firm’s market power; (iv) the firm 
can use the activity to determine the rules of the game, within the firm’s ecosystem and also 
in practice for a wider range of market participants; or (iv) the activity has significant impacts 






75 CMA, Advice of the Digital Markets Taskforce on a new pro-competition regime for digital markets, December 2020, paras. 4.7 
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1 The architecture of the Digital Markets Act 
This paper addresses the ‘architecture’ of the Digital Markets Act.  
In this paper, we first outline the key elements of the ‘architecture’ of the Act, with a specific focus 
on how obligations can be introduced and further specified by the Commission, and the implications 
which this may have for how they are enforced. These are the aspects of the proposals where we 
think there is most room for improvement, although we also make brief comments on the process 
for the designation of gatekeepers in this paper. 
In some cases, there remain differences in view amongst the CERRE academic team. We indicate 
where that is the case.  
2 The Commission’s proposal 
The Act proposes that gatekeepers will be designated and so be subject to regulation (concerning 
particular core platform services) if they satisfy the criteria of Article 3(1). This is presumed if they 
meet or exceed the quantitative thresholds in Article 3(2). The gatekeeper must notify the 
Commission that it meets the quantitative thresholds within 3 months and the Commission must 
then designate within a further 60 days. 
The gatekeeper is also allowed to advance ‘sufficiently substantiated’ arguments as to why, despite 
meeting the quantitative thresholds, it does not meet the criteria of Article 3(1), and thus should 
not be regulated (either at all or concerning a particular core platform service). The Commission 
must then investigate the arguments, taking into account the elements listed in Article 3(6). The 
Commission is required to make its decision on the merits of these arguments within 5 months 
(Article 15(3)). 
The Commission can also designate a gatekeeper that does not meet the quantitative thresholds in 
Article 3(2) after having undertaken a market investigation under Article 15. It is expected, but not 
obliged, to conclude this investigation within 12 months (and to notify its provisional findings to the 
firm in question within 6 months). In undertaking the investigation, the Commission must take into 
account the same elements in Article 3(6). 
The Commission can change its decision to designate a gatekeeper concerning any core platform 
service at any time if circumstances require. It must also review each designation every 2 years 
(Article 4). 
Gatekeepers designated under Article 3 must then comply with obligations which are specified in 
two Articles, Articles 5 and 6.  The two sets of obligations are distinguished on the basis that those 
in Article 5 are expected to be ‘self-executing’. This means that all designated platforms must comply 
with the obligations in Article 5 within 6 months of their being designated, after which the 
Commission may take appropriate enforcement action. Enforcement action may include interim 
measures (Article 22), the acceptance of commitments to bring the gatekeeper platform into 
compliance (Article 23), and/or the issuing of a non-compliance decision and directions on the 
actions required to comply (Article 25), the issuing of a fine (Article 26) or, ultimately, the imposition 
of structural remedies following a market investigation (Article 16). 
Article 7(1) requires that the measures taken by the gatekeeper to ensure compliance must be 
‘effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation’. Some guidance as to the objectives 
of each obligation appears in recitals 36-57 but the gatekeeper is expected to decide for themselves 
what measures are needed to ensure it complies with Article 5. 
The obligations in Article 6 are described as being ‘susceptible of being further specified’ by the 
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• The Commission may itself consider that the measures a gatekeeper proposes to take or has 
already taken are not compliant with the obligation in question76 and can adopt a decision 
in which the Commission specifies the measures which the gatekeeper must take. The 
Commission must issue its ‘specification decision’ within 6 months of initiating proceedings 
but must communicate its provisional views to the gatekeeper within 3 months. Any 
measures proposed by the Commission must ensure effective compliance but must also be 
‘proportionate in the specific circumstances’77. 
• Alternatively, the gatekeeper may request that the Commission initiate a proceeding to 
determine whether a measure or measures which the gatekeeper proposes to take, or has 
taken, are effective and so compliant with the obligation in question. We assume the 
Commission would also be subject to the same 6-month deadline (with 3 months for 
provisional findings) as applies when proceedings are initiated by the Commission. The 
gatekeeper may provide the Commission with a submission that explains why the measures 
it proposes to adopt, or has already adopted, are compliant. The Commission is not obliged 
to act upon the request of the gatekeeper. 
Under the Commission’s proposals, compliance with both Article 5 and Article 6 can be achieved 
through the acceptance by the Commission of commitments offered by the gatekeeper during an 
enforcement proceeding (with those commitments being offered under Article 23)78. If the 
Commission accepts commitments it may declare there are no further grounds for action. The issue 
then becomes one of compliance with the commitments. 
Although Article 23 is not entirely clear, it would appear the Commission need not accept the 
commitments offered. This would be the case if the Commission considered the commitments to be 
ineffective in terms of compliance with the obligation. But we think it might also occur in 
circumstances where the commitments would ensure compliance but the Commission nonetheless 
wished to proceed with enforcement action. This might occur, for example, if the Commission felt 
that the measures required to comply with obligations were so self-evident that the gatekeeper 
ought to have implemented them from the outset, rather than proposing them as commitments. 
That might be more likely to be the case in respect of Article 5 obligations, which the Commission 
regards as ‘self-executing’, than Article 6 obligations (although this is a presumption on our part 
that is not made explicit in the text). It might also arise if the measures the gatekeeper had taken 
fell so far short of being effective that the Commission considered that no serious attempt at 
compliance had been made79.  
Under the current proposals, both the gatekeeper and the Commission will face several different 
scenarios or what we might think as ‘paths to compliance’. These are illustrated in the Annex to this 
paper80. Some scenarios appear less likely (as indicated by the dotted lines) than others but are not 
entirely excluded and remain at the discretion of the Commission. These are: 
1. In cases of non-compliance with an Article 5 obligation (which is regarded as not requiring 
further specification) or an Article 6 obligation for which a specification decision has already 
been provided the Commission may be less likely to accept commitments and more likely to 
impose fines, even if the commitments offered would be an effective measure.  
 
76 This could be because they do not achieve the objectives, either because the gatekeeper and the Commission differ as to what 
the objective is, or because they agree on the objective but differ on whether the measures adopted will be effective in achieving 
it. 
77 There are additional requirements in Article 7(6) in relation to measures which relate to obligations under Article 6(1)(j) and 
(k) only. 
78 In this paper we use the term ‘enforcement proceeding’ to refer to procedures initiated under Articles 16 (market investigation 
into systematic non-compliance) and 25 (non-compliance) 
79 If these arrangements were to remain as currently proposed (i.e. without the presumptions which we propose) then we think 
it would be useful for the Commission to provide guidance as to when commitments might be accepted and when not 
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2. In cases of non-compliance with an Article 6 obligation for which a specification decision had 
not been provided by the Commission may be more likely to accept commitments (provided 
they are effective) and less likely to impose fines if an enforcement decision is made. 
In addition to enforcing the existing obligations in Articles 5 and 6, the Act would allow the 
Commission to import new obligations, following a market investigation, which would then apply to 
all designated gatekeepers. Although not clear from the text, we assume that the gatekeepers would 
be a given a period, perhaps the same 6 months, in which to implement measures to comply with 
the new obligations. The removal or modification of existing obligations does not seem to be 
contemplated under Article 10. In the rest of this paper, we consider some aspects of the 
Commission’s proposals which we think might be improved and discuss various proposals to achieve 
this. 
3 The process of designating gatekeepers81 (Articles 3 
and 4) 
The proposals for designating gatekeepers, including reliance on quantitative thresholds that can be 
rebutted with ‘sufficiently substantiated’ evidence, seem well designed to allow the Commission to 
apply regulatory obligations on time and give incentives to the platforms to disclose relevant 
information whilst at the same time allowing a degree of flexibility and consideration to be given to 
the specific features of particular firms or services. There are two aspects which might nonetheless 
be improved. 
The first relates to the application of the criteria in Article 3(1) and the elements of Article 3(6), both 
of which will involve applying economic concepts (including new concepts such as ‘gatekeeper’ and 
the various core platform services which are defined in Article 282) in a new and untested legal 
framework. We think the Commission should be required to produce guidelines – either 
from the outset or after having acquired the experience of applying the criteria over 
several years –to assist firms and courts in understanding how the designation process 
should be applied. This would assist those firms (whether they meet the quantitative thresholds 
or not) that may wish to present arguments challenging the intention of the Commission to designate 
them under Articles 3(4) or 3(6). 
Secondly, the requirement under Article 4 to review every designation every 2 years appears too 
burdensome. A longer period should be adopted – we suggest every 5 years.  This would 
remain alongside the Commission’s capacity to initiate a review at any time if it has reason to believe 
that the facts on which the previous decision was made appear incorrect or to have changed over 
time. As currently proposed, such a review may be requested by the gatekeeper or initiated by the 
Commission without a request. A question arises as to whether a decision by the Commission not to 
act upon a request from a gatekeeper to review its designation would be a decision that was capable 
of being appealed. If the Commission were required to review within 5 years in any event, it is not 
obvious that a right of appeal is required. We would want to avoid a situation in which the 
Commission is continually in receipt of requests from gatekeepers which may provide a basis for 
appeals if the Commission declines to act on them. We propose later that certain decisions by the 
Commission not to act upon requests from gatekeepers ought not to be capable of being appealed. 
The legal position concerning designation decisions may, however, require further consideration. 
  
 
81 This paper is concerned with architectural issues, rather than the substantive criteria of designation. CERRE has previously 
argued that an additional criterion for Article 3(1), so that only gatekeepers providing more than one core service (i.e. controlling 
an ecosystem) would be regulated, see CERRE, https://cerre.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/CERRE_Digital-Markets-Act_a-
first-assessment_January2021.pdf, p.15 
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4 The process of obtaining specification decisions on 
measures required to comply and the consequences of 
doing so (Articles 7 and 23)  
The Commission draws a hard boundary between obligations in Article 5, which it considers to be 
generically applicable and sufficiently clear to mean that the measures required for each gatekeeper 
to comply with them ought to be self-evident, and obligations in Article 6 which it accepts may 
require a further specification (but for which it is not obliged to provide a specification decision in 
every case). 
Our view is that this distinction is too sharp. We agree that there should be a presumption against 
an Article 5 obligation requiring a specification decision before a gatekeeper can be expected to 
comply and we also agree that there ought to be a presumption that the Commission will provide 
further specification concerning the Article 6 obligations. However, we would not want to exclude 
circumstances under which further specification is required for an Article 5 obligation, nor to exclude 
circumstances where the Commission thinks it already provided sufficient direction for an Article 6 
obligation such that no further specification is needed. 
We83 suggest that: 
3.  The Commission should be able to further specify measures to comply with any 
obligation in the Act (including those currently listed under Article 5) 
4. Gatekeepers should be able to request a specification decision from the 
Commission concerning any obligation in the Act, but a decision as to whether to  
provide such direction remains wholly at the discretion of the Commission  
5. The distinction between obligations in Articles 5 and 6 would be reflected in explicit 
presumptions (from which the Commission could depart in exceptional 
circumstances) that: 
o The Commission would not normally expect to provide a specification 
decision in relation to Article 5 obligations. 
o The Commission would normally expect to provide a specification decision 
in relation to Article 6 obligations. 
We also think further consideration needs to be given to the implications of allowing gatekeepers to 
request and the Commission to provide or not provide specification decision in relation to obligations.  
The first question is whether a decision by the Commission not to provide a specification decision 
when requested by a gatekeeper under Article 7(7) should be capable of being appealed. Although 
the legal options require further analysis, we think it might be argued that a decision by the 
Commission not to open proceedings would be an act which had no direct effect on the gatekeeper 
(or other affected parties) since it would not affect the obligation on the gatekeeper to implement 
effective measures to comply and nor would it affect the range of measures which are available to 
the gatekeeper to do so. This is analogous to the position taken in the European Electronic 
Communications Code and its predecessors, where the Commission may take a decision under Article 
7 to approve or reject a proposal it receives from a national regulatory authority. In that case, the 
European courts have found that the Commission’s decision is not appealable and the proposals to 
regulate have to be subsequently adopted by the national regulatory authority in order for them to 
 
83 There are some differences in view amongst the CERRE academic team about the best approach but general agreement that 
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have effect.84 The, later, decision by the national regulatory authority can be appealed.  By analogy, 
we think a decision by the Commission not to act on a request from a gatekeeper to 
provide a specification decision would (and should) not be appealable, but that 
subsequent decisions to enforce against a gatekeeper (and require them to adopt 
measures to comply) or to impose a fine, would both be capable of being appealed. 
The next question is how the provision of specification decisions under Article 7 might relate to the 
commitments process under Article 23.  The current proposals contemplate a gatekeeper being able 
to offer commitments irrespective of whether or not the Commission has already provided a 
specification decision on the measures to be taken for compliance.  
This is another aspect of the architecture where we think presumptions would serve a useful purpose. 
We suggest that if the Commission has provided direction on the specific measures to be 
taken (whether at the request of the gatekeeper or on its own initiative) then the 
presumption should be that the gatekeeper knows what it must do to comply and the 
Commission would be entitled to rely on enforcement action and fines rather than 
accepting commitments. In such circumstances, the additional benefit of having the gatekeeper 
being able to propose commitments seems difficult to justify.  
On the other hand, if the Commission has declined to provide a specification decision then 
the presumption should be that the Commission will accept commitments that are 
effective and would not pursue enforcement action or fines. We think there is also a good 
case for saying that in the first instance of non-compliance where no specification decision 
has been provided, the Commission ought not to impose a fine. But if, having issued an 
enforcement decision which directs a gatekeeper to take specified measures the Commission should 
be able to impose a fine for continued non-compliance with that decision. 
So far, we have ignored the question of when a gatekeeper might request a specification decision or 
when the Commission might provide it. Article 7(2) makes it clear that the Commission can provide 
guidance either in anticipation of non-compliance (i.e. before a designated gatekeeper is required to 
implement measures to comply 6 months after having been designated) or after measures have 
already been implemented.  Similarly, Article 7(7) refers to the gatekeeper requesting guidance 
either before it has implemented any measures to comply, or after it has done so but presumably 
thinks there is some uncertainty as to whether those measures will be considered effective. 
There are two aspects of these arrangements that require discussion. The first is that requiring the 
gatekeeper to be compliant 6 months after designation whilst also allowing the 
Commission 6 months to produce a decision on the measures required to comply does not 
seem very satisfactory. It is true that the Commission is required to share its provisional views 
with the gatekeeper after 3 months, allowing the gatekeeper to have a reasonable idea of the 
measures the Commission is likely to require them to adopt. But the final decision, against which 
compliance will be assessed, may only arrive days or hours before the gatekeeper is expected to 
comply with its obligations. Some of these measures are likely to require a further period of time 
before they can reasonably be implemented. 
This suggests two adjustments. First, the deadline for implementing measures, when the 
Commission has decided to provide a specification decision and the gatekeeper has only recently 
been designated, ought to fall after the date on which the Commission’s final specification decision 
must be issued. This would allow the designated platform enough time to implement any 
measures contained in the final decision before it is required to come into compliance.  
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The deadline for compliance with measures when the Commission has rejected a request from a 
gatekeeper to provide a specification decision (and has not initiated its proceeding) should remain 
at 6 months. This would require the Commission to make its decision about whether to 
accept or reject a request for a specification decision quickly so that the gatekeeper has 
sufficient notice of whether it can expect to benefit from a further specification of 
measures to take or not. A request for a decision must not in itself extend the deadline for 
compliance. Whether the deadline is extended beyond 6 months, and by how much, should remain 
a decision for the Commission, not the gatekeeper, to take85. 
Second, we think the Commission should state the deadline for implementation of any 
measures it specifies in the specification decision itself. This is to reflect the wide variation in 
measures that are likely to be required to be taken to ensure compliance and the variation in the 
time required to implement them. Article 25(3) already allows the Commission to specify the 
deadline for implementation of measures which are specified in an enforcement decision. The same 
should apply to measures which are specified pursuant a specification decision. 
Third, we think a useful distinction can be drawn between most of the obligations in the Act and the 
‘data sharing’ obligations under Articles 6 (i) and (j) (and possibly 6(h)86. We think these are 
likely to require both a much higher degree of specification and much longer than 6 months 
to implement87. For example, they may require the specification of technical standards to be 
adopted, which may need to be developed in consultation not only with the designated gatekeeper 
but the intended recipients of the data. It could involve the establishment of a new independent 
oversight body – itself a form of regulation - as occurred for the data-sharing obligations imposed 
on banks in the UK (for which the Open Banking Implementation Entity was created)88 and has been 
suggested by some observers.89 It may require the Commission to decide on the level of charges 
which the gatekeeper is entitled to levy for the data it is required to share and it may involve 
requiring third parties to adhere to certain obligations before they can receive data, such as 
commitments to hold the data securely and to manage it appropriately.90 Engagement and 
collaboration with other firms will take time but will be necessary if the measures are to be effective 
in achieving the objectives of the Act.  
Thus, the Commission might require more than 6 months specifying the measures required 
implementing these obligations and the gatekeeper (and others) might require a further 
significant time in which to implement them. Allowing the Commission to specify the deadlines 
for implementation would recognise these challenges, but the process of specifying the measures 
might be more akin to a market investigation than the procedure that will be used to produce 
specification decisions for the other obligations.  
Finally, the proposals include the possibility of the Commission providing a specification decision 
after a gatekeeper has already implemented measures to comply, but outside the context of an 
enforcement proceeding. This situation might arise if a gatekeeper were to request specifications of 
the measures required to comply before making changes to certain aspects of its business. Or the 
Commission, having previously declined to provide further specification, may decide that it is now 
appropriate to do so. 
 
85 This mechanism would also be required when a new obligation is adopted, since the existing designated gatekeepers cannot 
reasonably be expected to comply immediately and the 6 month deadline from designation would not apply in this context. 
86 The UK Competition and Markets Authority makes this distinction and refers to these obligations as ‘pro-competitive 
interventions’ in order to distinguish them from codes of conduct which can be more easily specified. Some of the obligations in 




89 See Prüfer, J. and Graef, I. (2021). Governance of Data Sharing: A Law & Economics proposal. Available at: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3774912  
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It could be argued that ‘ex post’ guidance of this kind is neither necessary nor appropriate and that 
the Commission ought only to specify measures before the gatekeeper is required to comply with 
the obligation in question. That would simplify the process but also reduce flexibility. It would remove 
the ability of the Commission to adjust its guidance in light of market or other developments or after 
having had the experience of how it was being implemented. 
We think that gatekeepers ought to be given incentives to pro-actively seek specific 
direction from the Commission despite having already implemented measures and despite 
already being under an obligation to comply. This would contribute to the more constructive 
and less adversarial ‘regulatory dialogue between the gatekeeper and the Commission which we are 
seeking to encourage. We are not convinced the Commission’s current proposals provide adequate 
incentives for gatekeepers to actively seek guidance from the Commission in this way. 
One way to achieve this would be to introduce a presumption that a request for further 
specification would not normally lead to the Commission taking enforcement action if it 
concluded that the measures previously adopted by the gatekeeper had not been 
effective.  A gatekeeper that was uncertain about whether the measures it had taken ensured 
compliance could request further specification from the Commission. As outlined earlier, the 
Commission could agree to act or could reject the request, with the same presumptions applying. If 
the Commission declined to provide a specification decision, the gatekeeper would remain subject 
to the same regime as before it had made the request (i.e. it would be expected to comply without 
further specification but the Commission would be expected to accept commitments if they were 
effective). On the other hand, if the Commission accepted the request and issued a specification 
decision which suggested that the existing measures have been insufficient to ensure compliance, 
the gatekeeper would be required to comply with the decision (and could be subject to enforcement 
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5 Third party interests in the process 
The current proposals envisage that the measures to be taken to comply with Article 6 may vary as 
between gatekeepers and may need to be further specified to take these differences into account. 
This seems to envisage a bi-lateral dialogue between the Commission and the gatekeeper in question 
(with Article 30 granting the gatekeeper certain rights of defence). 
We think the Commission should also be required to consult with interested third parties (which 
might include other gatekeepers). This will add some complexity and delay into the process, but 
market testing proposed measures should also help ensure that they are effective. The Commission 
should be required to consult with interested parties, both before making a specification 
decision under Article 7 and before accepting commitments under Article 23. Enforcement 
proceedings may be initiated in response to complaints from third parties and it is appropriate that 
their interests be properly represented and that their views are taken into account. The Commission 
will no doubt be alive to the risk that designated gatekeepers might intervene in each other’s 
proceedings to divert resources and attention from their own. 
We would also expect any decision of the Commission to be published, subject to the normal 
confidentiality provisions. Although a decision under Article 7, 23 or 24 will specify the measures 
required to be taken by a particular gatekeeper in a particular set of circumstances, we envisage 
that the Commission’s reasoning in many decisions would be relevant to other gatekeepers and may 
even avoid the need for them to request specification decisions of their own. Consideration should 
be given to ensuring that the decisions made by the Commission are as informative as possible, not 
only for the gatekeeper to whom it is addressed but for other gatekeepers and other parties who 
may be affected by the measures being adopted. This might include: 
6. Requiring non-confidential versions of Article 7 decisions to be published in full 
within [7] days (including decisions not to open proceedings, where the reasons for not doing 
so should be provided in full)  
7. Requiring the Commission to produce a set of guidelines, based on the decisions it has 
made, 3 years after the coming into force of the Act. This would guide gatekeepers and 
others as to the measures which would need to be taken to ensure compliance with each of 
the obligations in Articles 5 and 6. It would require the Commission to explain in detail how 
the measures achieve the objectives associated with each obligation, and what those 
objectives are. 
6 Whether gatekeepers should comply with all 
obligations  
The Commission’s proposals contain a list of eighteen main obligations.92 Some of these will not 
apply to some designated gatekeepers because the core services they provide are not of a kind that 
is addressed by the obligation in question. Obligations such 6(k) are directed at gatekeepers that 
provide app stores, 6(j) is relevant only to gatekeepers providing online search engines, 5(g) and 
6(g) relate only to those gatekeepers that supply services to advertisers and others relate only to 
those that provide operating systems as a core service, like 6(b), 6(c) and 6(e). Gatekeepers that 
do not provide these services cannot take any measures that would ensure compliance (and so, in 
these circumstances, taking no action would seem to be a ‘proportionate measure to achieve 
compliance’). 
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The more difficult question is whether there are or should be circumstances under which a 
gatekeeper which might be in a position to take measures to comply with an obligation should be 
exempted from doing so. The Commission’s proposals do not currently provide for this. 
Under the Commission’s proposals, compliance can only be secured through the implementation of 
measures which are ‘effective’ in achieving the objectives of the obligation in question. If a measure 
or set of measures are not effective (irrespective of whether they are specified by the Commission 
or proposed by the gatekeeper then the gatekeeper implementing them could be subject to 
enforcement action. If the measures are proposed by the Commission under Article 7(2) then Article 
7(5) requires that they should also be ‘proportionate in the specific circumstances of the gatekeeper 
and the relevant service.’ This appears to recognise that differences between gatekeepers should 
lead to different measures being adopted to comply with the same obligation.  Once the Commission 
is making enforcement decisions under Article 25, there is no specific requirement for the measures 
that it directs the gatekeeper to adopt to be proportionate. This appears to be an inconsistency in 
the current proposals which should be corrected. 
Although measures which the Commission specifies may need to be proportionate and some 
obligations – notably Articles 6(b) and 6(c) - have exemptions specified within them, for most 
obligations the gatekeeper may only be exempted from an obligation to comply under very 
exceptional circumstances. These are specified in Article 8, where compliance would endanger the 
economic viability of the gatekeeper in question93, or Article 9, where public health, morality, or 
security may be in jeopardy94.  
The Commission has argued against any ‘objective justification’ of conduct which would otherwise 
be prohibited under the Act, as is provided for in Articles 101/2 or in merger assessments where the 
parties can advance ‘efficiency’ claims95. In competition cases, conduct which might otherwise be 
prohibited may be tolerated where the provision of a service is not otherwise possible without the 
conduct in question (for example because the service has to be bundled with another service) or 
where contractual restrictions are required and yield benefits which outweigh any anti-competitive 
harms that might be associated with the restrictions. Similarly, in mergers, cost efficiencies which 
cannot be realised other than by the merger may, if passed through as benefits to consumers, be 
sufficient to outweigh any adverse effects arising from a lessening of competition. 
It might be argued that it would be inappropriate to include such provisions in the Act as the 
obligations that are contained in Articles 5 and 6 are generally derived from cases where the 
Commission has already rejected arguments about objective justifications96. 
On the other hand, it could also be argued that what may be harmful conduct in many circumstances 
may nevertheless be justified in some and that, given the range and variety of gatekeepers and 
business models that the Commission proposes to regulate, a prediction that exemption from any 
obligations in the Act could never be justified for any gatekeeper is too sweeping97.  
 
93 It might be argued that Article 8 would exempt a gatekeeper from having to comply if, by doing so, it was unable to provide 
the core service in question (i.e. the conduct that the obligation sought to prohibit was indispensable to the provision of the 
service). However, the focus on Article 8 appears to be the ‘operations’ of the gatekeeper as a whole and contemplates exempting 
compliance with the obligation for a number of core services at the same time (see 8(3)). On this basis, Article 8 would only be 
engaged if the economic viability of the gatekeeper as a whole was in question. 
94 In addition, only a sub-set of the obligations apply to ‘prospective gatekeepers’ that have been designated under Articles 3 
and 15 
95 The Commission’s Impact Assessment argues “they are often one-sided and do not seem to match the evidence underlying 
this Impact Assessment including the calls for regulation raised by an overwhelming majority of respondents to the open public 
consultations; they have also been rejected by the Courts as being unfounded.”, para 158  
96 This is true for some obligations (e.g. in the Google Shopping and Android cases, Google advanced various objective 
justification arguments, all of which were rejected by the Commission, see  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/40099/40099_9993_3.pdf, para 993-1008, 1155-1183, 1323-1332 
and https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39740/39740_14996_3.pdf, para 653-671) 
97 We note that the UK Competition and Market Authority proposes to exempt gatekeepers from obligations if: ‘‘for example 
that the conduct is necessary, or objectively justified, based on the efficiency, innovation or other competition benefits it 
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An alternative approach - which would be consistent with other proposals in this paper and with 
CERRE’s position in its first assessment98 - would involve allowing the gatekeeper to advance a 
relatively narrowly defined set of objective justification grounds in a request for an 
‘exemption decision’ from the Commission. This would work in the same way as requests for 
specification decisions, discussed above99. One proposal is that these requests should be made 
mutually exclusive so that the gatekeeper could either argue that it should be exempted 
from taking any measures to comply with the obligation (if it thought it had strong 
arguments for this) or it could seek further specification from the Commission on what 
measures it should take to comply (i.e. having accepted that it should do so).100  
If it sought an exemption, the gatekeeper would need to show that any attempt to comply with the 
obligation would result in a failure to achieve the objectives of promoting contestability and fairness 
over the longer term101.    
As with requests for specification decisions, the Commission could, at its discretion, open 
a proceeding to address the request from the gatekeeper and issue an exemption decision, 
or it could reject it without this decision being subject to appeal102. If the Commission 
rejected the exemption application, the gatekeeper would be expected to comply with the obligation 
without the benefit of being able to obtain further specifications from the Commission at that 
point103. It would remain open to the gatekeeper to seek further specification at some later date 
(although the Commission may wish or need to guide as to when it would be willing to consider a 
further request from the gatekeeper to avoid a repetitive cycle of requests and rejections)104. 
If the Commission accepted an exemption request105, there would be a question of how long any 
exemption decision ought to apply for. The Commission’s proposal envisages that suspensions 
granted under Article 8 should be reviewed every year. A similar requirement could apply to any 
exemption on objectively justified grounds. 
  
 
permissible or desirable as it produces sufficient countervailing benefits. We would anticipate guidance clarifying the 
circumstances when countervailing benefits might be accepted as a justification.’  See 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5fce73098fa8f54d608789eb/Appendix_C_-_The_code_of_conduct_.pdf, para 
35 
98 CERRE p. 22 
99 Other approaches are also conceivable, such as the addition a provision requiring a gatekeeper to take ‘all reasonable steps 
to comply’ with an obligation (which might allow a gatekeeper to argue during an enforcement proceeding that there were no 
reasonable steps it could take) or to rely on the Commission exercising forbearance rather than granting specific exemptions in 
cases where compliance did not appear to offer any or significant benefits.   
100 Views differ within the CERRE academic team on the merits of this proposal. Some consider that gatekeepers should be 
allowed to advance objective justification arguments alongside requests for further specification in order to avoid the risk that 
otherwise they will be advanced sequentially. However, if the Commission wished to provide further specification under Article 
7(2), having rejected a request for exemption, it would be free to do so. 
101 This would be necessary to ensure that short-term efficiencies do not frustrate the objectives of the Act, which are to safeguard 
the competitive process in digital markets over the longer term. 
102 If the Commission did reject the request to consider an exemption, it would be open to the gatekeeper to revisit this aspect 
of its claim when appealing a subsequent non-compliance decision of the Commission, should that situation arise. Therefore, a 
gatekeeper could challenge an enforcement decision from the Commission on the grounds that the measures it had taken had 
been effective in achieving the objectives of the obligation but also on the grounds that, even if ineffective, the measures ought 
not to have been required by the Commission on objective justification grounds.  
103 Assuming the obligation was relevant to the activities being undertaken by the gatekeeper in question.  
104 This point applies to any application made by the gatekeeper and rejected by the Commission – there clearly has to be some 
period of time before a further application can be made without the process becoming too inflexible or curtailing the rights of 
gatekeepers.  
105 This is further complicated by the fact that a decision to open a procedure to consider an exemption request is not the same 
thing as a decision to grant an exemption. The Commission could very well decide to examine the request for an exemption but 
conclude, after 6 months, that it was not warranted. As with proceeding relating to specification decisions on measures, the 
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7 Changing the obligations (Article 10) 
The Commission’s proposal anticipates that the list of obligations in Articles 5 and 6 may need to be 
supplemented to ensure that new forms of conduct (which may also limit the contestability of core 
platforms or maybe unfair) can be effectively addressed. Article 10 provides the Commission with 
the powers to do this, following a market investigation. There are several aspects of these 
arrangements which might be improved. 
First, it should be clear that, in addition to introducing new obligations, the Commission can also 
amend existing obligations. This might be required it were to be found that compliance was difficult 
to achieve without being disproportionate, that the obligation could otherwise be better formulated 
(e.g. to provide for some specific exemptions), or that competitive or other conditions had changed 
such that original assumptions behind the obligation no longer applied in the same way.  The 
Commission might be expressly required to review the impact of the obligations during 
the periodic review that is required under Article 38 and to propose amendments in light of these 
findings. The timing of the first review is not specified, but the Commission then envisages a review 
every 3 years. We think a 5 yearly review is likely to be more appropriate (and would be 
consistent with review cycles in other European legislation.) 
Second, we note the current proposals do not seem to anticipate the withdrawal of obligations. It 
may be that the Article 38 review just referred to would also allow the Commission to propose the 
removal of obligations in the (highly unlikely) event it thought this necessary. It is not clear to us 
that any additional procedure should be required. 
There is then a question of the process by which new obligations may be added or existing obligations 
amended106. The current proposals require the Commission to undertake a market investigation 
under Article 17 before changes can be made to the obligations in Articles 5 and 6. This provides 
designated gatekeepers with some predictability and assurance that the obligations they have taken 
measures to comply with will not be changed, or new obligations introduced, at short notice or 
without proper consideration. On the other hand, a market investigation can take up to 24 months, 
which could mean that obligations which are not fit for purpose or are difficult to enforce could 
remain in place for a significant time107. Besides, Article 10 allows the Commission to use delegated 
acts under Article 37 (without having to consult the Digital Markets Advisory Committee108) to 
introduce new obligations to pursue the objectives of the Act (contestability and fairness) which 
remain very broadly defined. Potentially, a wide variety and a large number of obligations could be 
introduced by the Commission using these mechanisms. This could represent a significant expansion 
in regulation for gatekeepers without the Commission itself being subject to much external scrutiny. 
One alternative approach would be to retain the Article 10 process for the addition of substantively 
new obligations but to allow for a more flexible approach when it comes to modification of 
existing obligations. The evidence required to justify changes of this kind ought to already be 
available to the Commission and to have been gained from its attempts to enforce compliance with 
the obligations in their current form.  Revisions to existing obligations might require 6 or 12 months 
(since they would require consultation with all existing designated gatekeepers as well as other 
affected parties) rather than 24. 
Another approach would be to forego Article 10 altogether, limiting the Commission’s 
capacity to expand the scope of the obligations to the periodic review cycle under Article 
38. The problem with this is that no specific preparatory analysis (of the kind undertaken in a market 
 
106 In addition to the issues considered here, we discussed earlier the need for gatekeepers to be given sufficient time to be able 
to implement measures to comply with new obligations before they can be subject to enforcement action. 
107 Similar concerns could arise in relation to the designation process if it takes 24 months to designate a new gatekeeper (and 
at least a further 6 months before it is required to comply with any obligations) 
108 It is odd that the Commission must consult the DMAC before adopting a decision to enforce an obligation but not before 
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investigation) would be required before a new obligation was adopted. This might be appropriate if 
the Commission had identified additional obligations in the course and as a result of other activities, 
such as extensive competition law investigations (which is the analytical basis on which the 
Commission largely relies for the obligations in the current proposals). But we should seek to avoid 
a situation in which new obligations are introduced into the Act without the Commission having 
undertaken sufficient preparatory work to ensure their applicability.  (We propose to discuss the 
interaction between competition law and the Act in a later seminar) 
The existing list of obligations could also be supplemented (or some even replaced109) by a more 
flexible approach, which may constrain the scope for expansion of regulation. The regulatory design 
of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, with its ‘three degrees of discretion’ might be a source 
of inspiration here.  Next to the detailed obligations of Articles 5 and 6, a new Article could be 
included with a more generic definition of prohibited conducts. This new Article could include 
a more generic prohibition of conduct having the object or the effect of limiting users switching or 
multi-homing, which would sit alongside the existing obligations in Articles 5(b), 5(c), 6 (e), 6(f) 
and 6(h). It could also include a more generic prohibition of conduct aimed at enveloping existing 
or potential competitors through bundling and self-preferencing, to sit alongside the detailed 
obligations in Articles 5(e), 5(f), 6 (a), 6(b), 6(c), 6(d), 6(i) and 6(j).  
These obligations would be defined more generically, would apply to all gatekeepers, and would be 
enforced in the same way as the detailed obligations. However, further thought would need to be 
given as to whether and how the Commission might provide a further specification of the measures 
required for compliance (and whether, having done so, these would then become ‘detailed 
obligations’ like the others in Articles 5 and 6).  These generic obligations would replace the Article 
10 process.    
 
109 In our first assessment, CERRE suggested that the Article 5 list be further restricted to a sub-set of obligations, with everything 
else involving the further specification of the measures required to ensure the achievement of a set of four overarching objectives 
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Annex  
The implementation and enforcement process in the Commission proposal 
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1 Introduction 
This paper considers in more detail the eighteen proposed obligations and prohibitions in the DMA 
proposal. 
The paper is in five sections: after this introduction, section 2 deals with the objectives of the 
obligations, why this is important and what each obligation is expected to do for fairness and 
contestability; section 3 examines the expected scope of each obligation in terms of the Core 
Platform Services to which it is expected to apply; section 4 examines the expected effectiveness of 
these obligations, as they currently stand, including key barriers to effectiveness, and areas where 
there is likely to be a need for further specification; and section 5 examines the risk of unintended  
harm arising from the obligations.  
2 The objectives of the obligations 
2.1 The role of the DMA objectives 
The general objective of the DMA is set out at Recital 79: 
The objective of this Regulation is to ensure a contestable and fair digital sector in general 
and core platform services in particular, with a view to promoting innovation, high quality of 
digital products and services, fair and competitive prices, as well as a high quality and choice 
for end users in the digital sector. [emphasis added] 
Thus, the two principal DMA objectives are contestability and fairness, but these are in turn 
intended to create good incentives for innovation, high quality and choice, and fair and competitive 
prices. Between them, the two principal objectives are supposed to underpin all current and future 
obligations:  
• For existing obligations, Article 7 states clearly that: 
The measures implemented by the gatekeeper to ensure compliance with the obligations 
laid down in Articles 5 and 6 shall be effective in achieving the objective of the relevant 
obligation; while 
• For new obligations, Article 10 states that:  
The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts […] to update the obligations laid 
down in Articles 5 and 6 where […]it has identified the need for new obligations addressing 
practices that limit the contestability of core platform services or are unfair in the same 
way as the practices addressed by the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6. [Emphasis 
added]. 
In addition, any implementation of the DMA would be subject to the requirements on proportionality 
under the EU Treaties, and this too is closely linked to the stated objectives. The DMA recitals (para 
33) highlight that:  
The obligations laid down in this Regulation are limited to what is necessary and justified to 
address the unfairness of the identified practices by gatekeepers and to ensure contestability 
in relation to core platform services provided by gatekeepers. 
Article 5 of the  Treaty on the European Union (TEU) itself states that: 
‘the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the 
objectives of the Treaties’.   
In practice, the case-law on proportionality under TEU suggests that assessment involves four 
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among the appropriate measures that measure which constitutes the least restrictive measure; and 
(4) not manifestly disproportionate in terms of costs versus benefits balance. 
2.2 The DMA objectives of contestability and fairness 
Given this framework, it seems vital that the meanings of the contestability and fairness concepts, 
as used in the context of the DMA, are clear. There are, however, relatively few details provided 
about what is meant by the terms ‘fairness’ and ‘contestability’.  
Article 10(2), which relates to the use of market investigation to update obligations, sets out that:  
A practice […] shall be considered to be unfair or limit the contestability of core platform 
services where:  
a) there is an imbalance of rights and obligations on business users and the gatekeeper 
is obtaining an advantage from business users that is disproportionate to the service 
provided by the gatekeeper to business users; or  
b)  the contestability of markets is weakened as a consequence of such a practice 
engaged in by gatekeepers. 
The Impact Assessment (at paras 109/110) is more forthcoming (emphasis added): 
[C]ertain digital markets may not be functioning well and delivering competitive outcomes 
due to their particular features, in particular extreme scale (or scope) economies, and a high 
degree of vertical integration; direct or indirect network effects; multi-sidedness; data 
dependency; switching costs; asymmetric and limited information, and related biases in 
consumer behaviour as well as the conduct of gatekeepers. Therefore, a specific policy 
objective is to allow identifying and addressing such market failures in respect of 
key digital markets to ensure that these markets remain contestable and 
competitive. This will contribute to digital markets delivering low prices, better quality, as 
well as more choice and innovation to the benefit of EU consumers.  
Gatekeepers’ economic strength, their position of intermediaries between businesses and 
consumers together with market dynamics fuelling gatekeepers’ growth lead to an imbalance 
in power between gatekeepers and their business users. This enables gatekeepers to impose 
unfair commercial conditions on business users, thus hampering competition on the 
platform. Such unfair behaviour does also have a negative impact on (the emergence of) 
alternative platforms since it strengthens consumer lock-in thus preventing multi-homing. 
In light of this, a specific policy objective is to lay out a clearly-defined set of rules 
addressing identified gatekeepers’ unfair behaviour, thereby facilitating a more 
balanced commercial relationship between gatekeepers and their business users, 
which would be also expected to create the right incentives for multi-homing.  
These various reference points help to discern what is intended by the terms contestability and 
fairness in the context of the DMA. However, they leave some questions unanswered. At the same 
time, while the DMA obligations are discussed both in the DMA Recitals and the Impact Assessment, 
there is no comprehensive discussion of how each obligation is intended to deliver against each 
objective. Indeed, it is also not clear whether any obligations are meant to deliver against both 
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2.2.1 What is meant by fairness? And what obligations does this relate to? 
Fairness is a term that can mean many things in different contexts. In the context of the DMA, it is 
clear that, for a commercial practice to be unfair, it must result from an imbalance of power between 
gatekeepers and business users and confers a disproportionate advantage on the gatekeeper. This 
is useful but it is not a very full explanation. 
At the same time, when regulating bilateral trading relationships between commercial parties, any 
fairness concept must be fairly tightly defined. The reason for this is well set out by Tommaso Valletti 
(then DGComp Chief Economist) in a different, but analogous, context (the debate around unfair 
trading practices regulations in the food supply chain):  
It is not obvious to determine what is "fair" or unfair" in bilateral commercial negotiations 
[…] Commercial transactions between various businesses along the supply chain typically 
aim both at (i) maximizing the total gains from the transaction (i.e. the size of the pie), and 
(ii) splitting these total gains between parties (i.e. sharing the pie). Therefore, identifying 
efficiency-enhancing commercial practices as unfair trading practices and 
prohibiting them could very well harm all parties involved […] by reducing the size of 
the pie (the total gains from the transaction) to be shared between the trading partners in 
the first place.110 (emphasis added) 
This risk is serious. It is therefore important to ensure that the concept of fairness utilised within the 
DMA is focused on enhancing overall efficiency. This is in line with Recital 79 cited above. We propose 
that a good way to do this is to focus on the fairness of commercial opportunity, rather than 
focusing on how any resulting surplus is shared out. If market actors have greater fairness of 
commercial opportunity, then a fairer sharing of the surplus should emerge anyway, without this 
being a direct objective. We have identified four possible categories of fairness that link to the idea 
of commercial opportunity, and how such opportunity might be unfairly limited due to an imbalance 
of power. Between them, these four categories appear to underpin the vast majority of proposed 
DMA obligations: 
i. Fair right to access alternative routes to market: Some of the commercial terms 
addressed by the proposed Obligations restrict business users’ use of alternative platforms or 
other routes to markets. Examples include Articles 5(b), 5(c), 6(1)(c), 6(1)(d). 
ii. Equitable treatment of third-party business users relative to the gatekeeper’s rival 
services: Some of the proposed Obligations are designed to ensure non-discriminatory 
treatment of all business users, irrespective of who owns them. Examples include Articles 
5(e), 5(f), 6(1.a), 6(1.b), 6(1.e), 6(1.f), 6(1.i), 6(1.k).   
iii. Fair transparency about the service provided and the terms of those services: This is 
addressed in the context of the advertising services by Articles 5(g) and 6(1.g). 
iv. Fair rights of expression to public authorities: The right to complain to public authorities 
is addressed by Article 5(d). 
These four categories appear well-aligned with an efficiency-focused concept of fairness. We note 
that only the first is tightly linked with the specific aim of increasing multi-homing which is 
highlighted at para 110 in the Impact Assessment, cited above, but we find the focus on multi-
homing unduly narrow. It is noteworthy that, if one includes all four of these aspects within the DMA 
concept of fairness, then this concept arguably motivates almost all of the DMA obligations (other 
 
110 Commission Staff Working Document of 12 April 2018, Impact Assessment on the  Proposal for a Directive on 
unfair trading practices in business-to-business relationships in the food supply chain, SWD(2018) 92: Annex H: 
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than Articles 5(a), 6(1.h) and 6(1)). We also note that all eighteen Obligations are described – at 
Annex 5.2.2 in the Impact Assessment – as addressing ‘unfair practices’.  
It is perhaps not so surprising that almost all of the Obligations can be justified on fairness 
grounds, given that there are direct links between unfair commercial practices, as 
described above, and contestability. Taking each of the forms of fairness identified above in 
turn: 
i. Fair right of access to alternative routes to market: Commercial practices that restrict 
business users from accessing rival routes to market inherently limit the entry and expansion 
of such alternatives to act as a competitive constraint to the gatekeepers’ core platforms. 
More generally, any barrier to multi-homing can make a service which exhibits network effects 
more likely to ‘tip’ towards being concentrated. Alternative routes to market could include rival 
platforms, but could also include direct access to market, or partial platform disintermediation, 
for example through using alternative ancillary services or using the platform for only part of 
the service offered by the business user. Such unfair commercial practices directly constrain 
platform contestability. 
ii. Equitable treatment of third-party business users relative to the gatekeeper’s rival 
services: Discriminatory commercial terms that give the gatekeeper an unfair advantage in 
related markets inherently enable it to leverage from its core market position into these 
related markets. In the longer term, such commercial practices may indirectly constrain 
platform contestability, since the most likely source of entry into a gatekeeper’s core platform 
service will often be a successful business user of the platform, either through reverse 
integration into the platform service or through fostering entry by an independent platform.  
iii. Fair transparency about the service provided and the terms of those services: 
Business users can only make informed decisions about the use of alternative platforms if they 
have a good understanding of the deal they are receiving from the gatekeeper platform. As 
such, greater transparency should foster contestability. 
iv. Fair rights of expression to public authorities: Unless firms have the right to complain to 
public authorities, the DMA (and also competition authorities) will unlikely be fully effective in 
driving up contestability. 
Indeed, the discussion of the fairness objective in the Impact Assessment (as cited above) 
emphasises the concern that, due to their economic strength, gatekeepers can impose terms on 
business users that both distort competition on the platform but also, over the longer term, limit 
contestability to the platform. 
We note that, as currently described within the DMA proposal, the concept of fairness 
relates purely to the treatment of business users. This might seem odd, given that some of 
the obligations appear to relate to the fair treatment of end-users, not just fairness to business 
users. In particular, Articles 5(a), 5(e), 6(1.b) and 6(1.h) would seem at least partially motivated 
by the fairness objective for end-users relating to data protection and data control.  
However, it may be that the Commission fears that incorporating fairness to end-users would open 
up the fairness concept too far, and move too far in the direction of consumer protection. This may 
be right, and we note that the obligations we identify can also be motivated by other fairness and/or 
contestability considerations. If the DMA is successful in achieving its core objectives, this should 
create a fairer situation for end users too, without this needing to be explicitly incorporated within 
the DMA’s fairness concept.111  
 
111 We note that Recital 12 does appear to refer to end-users, but – given the language used elsewhere in the 
DMA – perhaps this is intended in this indirect way. “Weak contestability and unfair practices in the digital sector 
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2.2.2 What is meant by contestability? And what obligations does this relate to? 
As regards the contestability objective itself, the paragraphs cited above are clear that this is 
intended to relate to the contestability of regulated Core Platform Services (CPS) only. This 
is a relatively narrow approach, in that it arguably excludes two important forms of 
contestability. 
First, it is not clear whether the DMA concept of contestability encompasses platform 
disintermediation. This can take two forms: either business users moving to direct supply (as 
opposed to an alternative platform); or partial disintermediation, whereby business users utilise an 
alternative provider for some – but not all - parts of the CPS service(whether this will be contracting 
out ancillary services to a third party, or dealing directly with end users). Platform disintermediation 
may not lead to the entry or expansion of a full-service rival to the gatekeeper but can provide an 
important competitive constraint on it. We would suggest that platform disintermediation should be 
recognised as an element of contestability. 
Second, it is not clear whether the DMA concept of contestability encompasses contestability of 
related markets, and therefore addresses unfair leverage by a gatekeeper from the 
regulated CPS into related markets. In this context, we note that the Furman Report (and others) 
identified two key problems with digital platform markets: first, that they have a tendency to tip to 
being highly concentrated and hard to contest; and second, that the incumbent platforms then tend 
to leverage their position into related markets. The current contestability objective encompasses the 
former concern, but not the latter.  
An argument could be made that leverage into related markets does, over the longer term, indirectly 
limit core platform contestability, since a likely source of entry into a gatekeeper’s core platform 
service will often be a successful business user of that platform service. In this case, a focus on the 
contestability of regulated CPS only still arguably be used to justify obligations that address leverage. 
However, it is far from clear from the wording in the DMA proposal that this is intended. 
There is an exception, in which the narrow DMA contestability objective, as it stands, does appear 
to address leverage, but this is the very specific instance where a gatekeeper has multiple regulated 
CPS, some of which are effectively business users of others. For example, Google Search could be 
viewed as a ‘business user’ of the Android OS. In this situation, leverage from one regulated CPS 
service would directly impact the contestability of another regulated CPS, and this would fall within 
the narrow formulation of contestability.   
However, significant concerns about leverage into related markets extend beyond situations where 
both CPS already constitute an important gateway for the gatekeeper, in the terms of Art 3(1.b). 
Moreover, despite the narrow drawing of the contestability objective to contestability of 
regulated CPS markets, there are in practice several obligations which appear to reflect 
concerns about both the leverage into related markets, and barriers to platform 
disintermediation as shown in Table 1. 
  
 
platform services have emerged most frequently as gatekeepers for business users and end users with far-
reaching impacts, gaining the ability to easily set commercial conditions and terms in a unilateral and detrimental 
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5a No data fusion without user consent x  x 
5b No wide MFN/parity clauses x   
5c No anti-steering x x  
5d 
No prevention of raising issues with 
public authorities 
x x x 
5e 
No tying to business users from CPS 
to ID services 
x x 
x (into ancillary 
services 
5f No tying from CPS to other CPS x  
x  (but only into 
regulated CPS) 
5g Price transparency for ads x x   
6.1a 
No use of data related to business 
users to compete against them 
x*  x 
6.1b 
Allow un-installing of apps, unless 
essential to OS/device 
x*  x (into apps) 
6.1c 
Allow ‘side loading’ of third-party 




x x (into apps) 
6.1d No self-preferencing in rankings x* x* x 
6.1e 
No technical restriction of switching 
or multi-homing across apps using 
OS 
x*   x (into apps) 
6.1f 
Access and interoperability for 
business users and ancillary services 
to OS should be as for proprietary 
ancillary services 
 x* x 
x (into apps and 
ancillary 
services) 
6.1g Performance transparency for ads x x   
6.1h 
Provide real-time data portability for 
end-users 
x     
6.1i 
Provide real-time data sharing for 
business-users 
x   x 
6.1j 
Data sharing obligation: FRAND 
access to click and query data 
x 
(Search) 
    
6.1k 
Fair and non-discriminatory terms of 
access to app stores 
x x  x (apps) 
* For these, the CPS contestability narrative only appears to holds in specific instances where the 
gatekeeper has a regulated CPS in both a platform market and a related business user market 
Table 1: Apparent ‘contestability’ objectives of the obligations 
This table sets out our view on the expected impact of each obligation in relation to each of these 
categories of contestability. We note that: 
- While all of the obligations can be viewed as promoting direct CPS contestability, there 
are (at least) five cases where the primary focus appears to be on limiting leverage. An 
impact on direct CPS contestability only arises for gatekeepers that have at least two 
regulated CPS and one is a business user of another. 
- Around seven of the obligations appear intended to promote platform disintermediation, 
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- Around 12 out of the obligations would be expected to limit leverage by the gatekeeper from 
a regulated CPS into a related market (whether or not it is a regulated CPS in that related 
market). As discussed above, limiting such leverage would be expected to directly promote 
the contestability of the related market, but only indirectly (if at all) to promote 
contestability in the core CPS market. 
Why do we see a focus on leverage into related markets, even though it is not part of the 
contestability objective? As was highlighted above, it seems that leverage concerns are 
effectively addressed within the DMA via the fairness objective. If this reading of the DMA 
proposal is correct, it implies a slightly odd situation, in that a potentially important strand of 
contestability issues – leverage which harms contestability in related markets - are being addressed 
under the fairness objective.  
Of course, it could be argued that it is appropriate for the DMA to be cautious about limiting leverage 
by the gatekeepers into related markets, or even that this is not a suitable objective for the DMA. 
After all, there is a risk that obligations which are designed to limit leverage could have an ambiguous 
impact on contestability in these markets: 
• On the one hand, if regulation were to unduly restrict the ability of gatekeepers to enter and 
expand in new markets, then this could harm contestability in these related markets, rather 
than enhancing it.  
• On the other hand, if it is unduly easy for gatekeepers to enter and expand in related 
markets, then this will limit the ability and incentive for independent third parties to do so, 
reducing contestability in these related markets. In this case, regulation which limits such 
leverage would enhance contestability in these related markets.  
Given this balance to be struck, the DMA would ideally balance these concerns by not 
preventing gatekeepers from entering or expanding into related markets, but limiting 
them from doing so by unfairly leveraging from their position in their regulated core 
platform services. But there is a fine line to be drawn here between fair and unfair market 
entry/expansion. It could be that this is the line that the Commission is trying to draw when 
describing obligations which appear to relate to leverage as reflecting the fairness 
objective. But if so, it would be useful to be more explicit about it. 
Linked to this, another reason for the DMA adopting a relatively narrow concept of contestability 
may be that there is currently no potential for firms to make an objective justification defence for 
breaching an obligation. In this situation, it may make more sense to avoid obligations which could 
have positive or negative implications for contestability, and thus this could lie behind the currently 
narrow contestability concept.  CERRE has previously recommended that objective justification 
should be possible, albeit on the relatively narrow grounds that compliance would in fact harm 
fairness and/or contestability, and thus act contrary to the objectives of the regulation.112 If such 
an objective justification were to be incorporated within the DMA, this would arguably 
strengthen the case for a more expansive concept of contestability, which more fully reflects 
the competition concerns highlighted by the Furman Report and others.  
A final point on contestability. It cannot be expected that the DMA (and certainly not any specific 
obligation) can be truly effective in ensuring contestability in CPS markets, as the Recitals suggest. 
Contestable markets – as envisaged by Baumol (1982) – are a theoretical construct. They require 
extremely strong assumptions, which more or less never hold in reality, and certainly do not hold in 
markets characterised by strong economies of scale and scope, network externalities, and consumer 
behavioural biases. No one seriously expects the DMA to be able to ‘ensure’ contestable 
markets. Rather, it is hoped that the regulation will ‘enhance’ contestability, in the sense 
of lowering barriers to entry and expansion and thereby better enabling and incentivising third 
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parties to compete and innovate.113 This concept of contestability is more of a spectrum: a market 
can exhibit less or more contestability, depending on the size of the barriers to entry and expansion. 
Does this mean that the wording needs to change? 
2.3 Recommendations 
It would be useful to spell out more fully within the DMA itself what is meant by the contestability 
and fairness objectives, how the two interact, and what are the limiting principles in relation to both 
concepts? However, we have also noted that the contestability objective appears unduly narrow. 
This leads us to the following recommendations. 
- Recommendation (a): The concept of fairness in the DMA should be clarified 
In terms of fairness, the discussion above suggests that the DMA fairness concept excludes both 
fairness to end users and the fair sharing of surplus between commercial firms. These may well be 
indirect benefits of the DMA, but they are not direct objectives. This could usefully be made more 
explicit. One way of clarifying the precise formulation of fairness would be to add in a focus on 
commercial opportunity. For example, Article 10(2.a) might be reworded: 
“There is an imbalance of rights and obligations on business users, which restricts the 
commercial opportunity open to the business user, and so confers an advantage on the 
gatekeeper that is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business 
users” 
The Recitals might also usefully set out the four ways we highlight above in which an imbalance of 
power might feed into unfair commercial terms.  
- Recommendation (b) The concept of contestability in the DMA should be widened 
Serious considerations should be given to widening the contestability objective to include both 
platform disintermediation and limiting unfair leverage by gatekeepers into related 
markets. It seems inappropriate to introduce obligations which have these objectives under cover 
of the fairness objective. Such a widening may be less risky if the Commission also accepts the 
separate CERRE recommendation to introduce a narrow form of objective justification. In the 
alternative, if the contestability objective is not widened, the DMA should be more explicit about how 
leverage is addressed by the fairness objective.  
Also, given the discussion of contestability above, we would recommend changing the wording 
around the objectives of the DMA from ‘ensuring’ contestability to ‘enhancing’ contestability. 
- Recommendation (c): Matching obligations with objectives 
It would also be useful for the DMA to set out more clearly how each obligation is intended to 
deliver contestability and/or fairness. This would better enable the assessment under Article 7 
of the effectiveness of each obligation in achieving its objectives. It may also be useful in further 
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3 The scope of the obligations 
3.1 The Commission’s proposal 
Another issue concerning the obligations is that their likely scope, in terms of the Core Platform 
Services covered, is not always entirely clear. Table 2 below provides an initial assessment on which 
Obligations apply to which core platform service. The letters used for identifying CPS are based on 
the Article 2(2).  
Our assessment shows: 
- 8 of the 18 Obligations are (more or less) focused on one or two particular CPSs. Of 
these, obligation 5b, which restricts wide MFNS and exclusive dealing, is explicitly restricted 
to online intermediation services, but it is not entirely clear why. The exclusive dealing 
provisions, in particular, seem likely to be of value in other CPS too. 
- A further 4 of the 18 appear to be targeted to one or two particular CPSs, but their 
applicability is ambiguous, and they could in theory apply more widely. Of these, Obligation 
6(1)(d) on self-preferencing is theoretically of wide applicability, but in practice may only be 
relevant to a subset of CPS. But this is ambiguous. 
- 4 of the 18 Obligations are effectively ecosystem-wide provisions, in that they relate to 
gatekeepers with any type of CPS. Of these, obligation 5(f), relating to tying between CPS, 
is also of wide applicability, in that it can apply to any CPS, but only applies between two 
‘relevant’ CPS (i.e. CPS which are themselves ‘important gateways’).  
- App stores are likely subject to the vast majority of Obligations (arguably 14 out of 18). 
Operating systems and marketplaces are each likely subject to around 9 out of 18. If one 
combines search engines (b) and their associated advertising services (h), then they are 
likely subject to 9 out of 18, and on the same basis social networks are subject to 8 out of 
18. 
- By contrast, some other individual CPS are likely subject to just 4 or 5 Obligations. In 
particular, this is relevant to number-independent communications services (e) and cloud 
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Ob. Summary of the obligation CPS relevant? Comments 




No wide MFN/parity clauses or exclusive 
dealing 
a (app stores and 
marketplaces) 
Clear (NB interesting 
that scope so narrow) 
5c No anti-steering 
a (app stores and 
possibly 
marketplaces) 
Fairly clear, although 
could apply more 
widely in theory 
5d 












No tying from regulated CPS to other 
regulated CPS 
All, but needs at 
least two regulated 
CPS.  
Clear (once related CPS 
have been clearly 
identified) but will be 
different for each 
gatekeeper 
5g Price transparency for ads h Clear 
6.1a 
No use of data related to business users to 
compete against them 
a (app stores and 
marketplaces) 
Ambiguous. Could 
apply more widely, e.g. 
to: b and h. 
6.1b 
Allow un-installing of apps, unless essential 
to OS/device 




Allow ‘side loading’ of third-party apps or 
app stores, unless threatens integrity 
a (app stores) and 
f 
Clear 
6.1d No self-preferencing in rankings 
a, b, c and possibly 
f 
Ambiguous. Could 
apply more widely in 
theory. 
6.1e 
No technical restriction of switching or 
multi-homing across apps using OS 
f (and arguably 
also a (app stores)) 
Ambiguous. Could 
apply more widely in 
theory. 
6.1f 
Access and interoperability for business 
users and ancillary services to OS should 
be as for proprietary ancillary services 
f 
Ambiguous. Could 
apply more widely in 
theory. 
6.1g Performance transparency for ads h Clear 
6.1h 




wide, but probably not 
h in practice. 
6.1i 
Provide real-time data sharing for 
business-users 
a (app stores and 
marketplaces) 
Ambiguous. Could 
apply more widely, e.g. 
to: b, c, d, g or h. 
6.1j 
Data sharing obligation: FRAND access to 
click and query data 
b Clear 
6.1k 
Fair and non-discriminatory terms of 
access to app stores 
a (app stores) Clear 
Key: a – online intermediation services; b – online search engines; c – online social networking 
services; d – video-sharing platform services; e – number-independent interpersonal 
communication services; f – operating systems; g – cloud computing services; and h – advertising 
services. 
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3.2 Recommendations 
- Recommendation (d): Consideration should be given to regulating number-independent 
communications services and cloud computing services on the same basis as advertising 
services, that is only if ‘provided by a provider of any of the [other] core platform services’. 
Very few obligations apply to number-independent communications services and cloud computing 
services, and no obligations apply uniquely to them. Where a gatekeeper provides these CPS 
alongside other CPS (such as Facebook and WhatsApp), it may make sense to include these within 
the overall regulatory scope. However, for firms which solely provide these services, it is far from 
obvious that it is proportionate to bring them into the regulatory fold on the basis of such limited 
regulatory coverage. 
As explained in the issues paper on designation, the DMA could provide that number-independent 
communications services and cloud computing services would be regulated as CPS only 
where gatekeepers were designated on the basis of another CPS – and that they cannot be 
used for gatekeeper designation in their own right. This is effectively already the case for advertising 
services which are only categorised as a CPS in their own right if provided by a provider of any of 
the other core platform services listed.114  
- Recommendation (e): The presumption should be that obligations apply to all of the services 
provided by a gatekeeper within a regulated CPS 
A final recommendation relates to gatekeepers who are designated as having an important gateway 
CPS for one of the CPS categories, but also have other services within that CPS category. An example 
might be Apple, which could be designated as an intermediation service for its app store, but which 
also has e-book and e-music intermediation services. This raises an obvious question: does the 
regulation relate to all services within this CPS category or just the service which forms the basis of 
the designation? 
Given the potential for services to change their precise nature rapidly in the digital realm, there is 
certainly an argument for CPS-wide designation. Moreover, it is in the nature of digital ecosystems 
that market power over a particular service also tends to confer a degree of competitive advantage 
over nearby services. At the same time, however, it may be disproportionate to impose all obligations 
on services which are included merely because they fall under the same CPS category.  
On balance, the best option might be to include all services within a designated CPS by default 
but for the Article 7 specification process to allow for the removal of non-core services 
from the scope of some or all obligations on grounds of proportionality. We note, though, 
that this does not solve the problem for Article 5 obligations, where Article 7 does not apply. This 
would be solved if the distinction between Articles 5 and 6 were removed. Alternatively, it may be 
worth allowing for a narrow form of specification – on scope only – for Article 5 obligations. 
- Recommendation (f): Consideration should be given to explicitly narrowing the scope of 
specific obligations 
In some cases, it does not necessarily matter that the scope of an obligation is wider than the 
obvious CPS at which it is targeted. If there is no chance of the obligation applying to a particular 
CPS, then there is no work to be done in meeting the obligation. And if the obligation genuinely has 
general applicability across all CPS, then there may be a benefit in keeping the scope wide. This 
might potentially be true of Article 5(c) which prohibits anti-steering, for example, and appears to 
apply only to online intermediation services but might be a reasonable obligation to impose on any 
CPS to which it might apply. 
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However, there are other obligations where the potential breadth of applicability, in terms of scope, 
seems potentially problematic. Narrowing the scope is likely to be especially merited where 
the potential applicability of the obligation runs far wider than the core service which 
provided the original rationale (see Table 2 in the Impact Assessment). Certainly, it is not 
obvious that the Commission has considered the proportionality of each obligation in relation to each 
CPS where it could potentially apply. Where this is true, it would seem appropriate and proportionate 
to explicitly narrow the scope of applicability.  
In the alternative, given that this lack of clarity on scope primarily applies to Article 6 
obligations, it should be made explicit that the scope of application can be narrowed 
through the specification process. Article 6(1h) on end-user data portability may be an example 
of an obligation where it would make sense to keep the scope of applicability broad in principle, but 
where it would be proportionate to narrow this through the specification process to specific CPS 
where data portability will make a real difference to contestability. 
- Recommendation (g): Consideration should be given to widening the scope of Obligation on 
MFN 
Obligation 5(b) on MFN is arguably more narrowly scoped than could be justified, especially 
for the element which bans exclusive dealing.  
4 The expected effectiveness of the obligations 
The eighteen proposed obligations within the DMA are currently not entirely clear, several could be 
achieved in a variety of different ways, and some involve managing explicit tensions, for example 
between contestability and privacy. As such, the issue arising for gatekeeper firms is not so much 
whether or not to comply with the obligations (clearly they must), but rather the manner of 
compliance.  
Table 3 in the Annex sets out, for each of the 18 proposed obligations, some initial thoughts on: 
(i) The likely effectiveness of each, and the factors that might limit this. 
(ii) Practical issues likely to arise either upfront, via clarifying the obligation or through the 
specification process, or in the ongoing assessment of compliance. 
(iii) Risk of any unintended harm arising from the Obligations, assuming that they are effective 
in achieving their primary aim (and excluding any risks that arise purely due to having 
lower revenues or higher costs, due to the regulation). 
It would be useful to receive views at the workshop on the views and factors identified. 
However, based on this preliminary table, we have drawn the following conclusions. 
4.1 Expected effectiveness and practical issues arising 
Based on the assessment in Table 3, we identify significant concerns over the effectiveness of several 
of the eighteen obligations in their current form. There are at least ten obligations where it 
would be useful if the DMA could provide additional clarity upfront, either within the 
Recitals or through reformulation of the objective. Being as clear as possible upfront does 
create a risk of drawing the scope of the obligations too narrowly. However, it carries a huge benefit 
in terms of legal clarity (for both gatekeepers and business users) and in terms of the resources that 
will be required within the Commission to provide further specifications. In any case, the vast 
majority of Article 6 obligations are likely to require at least some further specification, at least as 
currently written. 
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A risk that certain obligations may be unduly narrowly drawn and thus limited in its 
effectiveness. In particular, Article 5(f) prohibits tying between regulated CPS markets. This 
limits leverage between CPS activities where gatekeepers already have gateway power. While this 
is valuable, it is arguably rather narrow. Drawing from the discussion above about the merits of 
limiting leverage from core markets into related markets, there may be merit in extending this 
obligation to tying from regulated CPS markets into any related markets, not just other regulated 
CPS markets. This would be especially true if there were greater potential for (narrow) objective 
justification. Also, this obligation appears to be partially influenced by the Google Android case, but 
it is far from obvious that the obligation would have any effect on agreements between Google and 
OEMs, unless the latter are classed as ‘business users’. 
For the core data-sharing provisions, there is currently a lack of specificity about the 
requirements which could hamper effectiveness. 
• For Article 6(1.h), relating to end user data portability, it is good that the provision 
specifies that data must be continuous and real-time.115 However, as currently framed, there 
is no explicit requirement on gatekeepers to utilise Open APIs or to provide data 
in a consistent format over time. Nor any requirement for the direct transfer of 
data to third parties, rather than via the end user. Nor any requirement for the 
gatekeeper to keep track of consumer consents, on a readily accessible basis, and 
enable consent to be re-confirmed or revoked. The provision does set out that 
portability needs to be ‘effective’, so all this may be implicit, but it would usefully be made 
explicit. The reliance on the definition of data portability under GDPR also means that there 
is also no clarity as to whether the data to be ported would include observed data, and not 
just input data. For the provision to have significant contestability benefits, it needs to 
include both input and observed data. 
• Likewise, for Article 6(1.i) relating to business user data access, the obligation requires 
the provision of aggregated or non-aggregated data, but it is not clear who decides which. 
Can the gatekeeper simply decide to provide aggregated data only, or is it constrained to 
doing so only where there is a GDPR issue and a lack of consumer consent?  
• For Article 6(1.j) relating to search data sharing, there is likewise no requirement to adopt 
a consistent or open approach to data-sharing (unless this is implicit with the requirement 
of FRAND terms), and there is no explicit requirement that data be real-time or even 
recent. Nor is there an explicit requirement to give access to all queries, click and view 
data, as opposed to a subset of such data. Finally, it is not clear how much the usefulness 
of data will be limited by the required anonymisation process. 
There are also risks that certain obligations are too widely applicable. For example, 
• Article 6(1.f) requires gatekeepers to allow business users and providers of ancillary 
services access to and interoperability with its OS/hardware/software on the same basis 
as its own services. This obligation appears to be influenced by the payment services market, 
with business users wishing to utilise alternative payment service providers, and payment 
service providers seeking to access the mobile payments market. But it is in practice not 
constrained – indeed, it is not even constrained to ancillary services (whatever they are). 
This potentially introduces a very extensive duty to provide access and 
interoperability across a whole range of different aspects of the gatekeepers’ core 
platform services. It is not obvious that this breadth of applicability is intentional, it may 
well not be proportionate, and it may anyway be difficult to make effective. 
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• Articles 6(1.h) and 6(1.i) provide similarly extensive requirements around data portability. 
Experience from the UK Open Banking initiative suggests that it takes years, not months, to 
implement even a relatively simple data portability provision. Admittedly, the archaic 
banking infrastructure was part of the problem here, but the ambition here is far greater, 
and the scope very wide. If it is to be effective (see below), data portability and sharing 
are complex and resource-consuming exercises.116 It is far from obvious that it is 
appropriate to require data portability in all circumstances, with no clear limiting principles. 
It is unlikely to be effective in enhancing contestability and could reduce the attention given 
to making data portability work well in those areas where it could make a difference. There 
may be a serious need for prioritisation of those instances of data-sharing that will have the 
greatest impact on contestability, rather than trying to do everything at once. 
There are incentive-based risks around the effectiveness of provisions which seek to ensure fair-
treatment between the gatekeeper’s proprietary services and those rival third-party 
business users. For example: 
• Article 6(1.d) prohibits self-preferencing in rankings, but ‘self-preferencing’ can be hard 
to define in practice. This is especially true in paid-for rankings, where the gatekeeper can 
always pay more for rankings, given that it keeps the proceeds.117 It is also hard to assess 
whether the criteria utilised for ranking are genuinely objective. Moreover, even genuinely 
objective criteria can potentially be exclusionary – an example being Amazon giving 
preference in rankings to products which are ‘fulfilled by Amazon’ because it can be confident 
in speedy and reliable delivery; or Google giving higher rankings to sites which use Google 
Accelerated Mobile Pages because it can have confidence that they will load quickly. It is not 
clear that these examples will be addressed by this obligation. 
• Article 6(1.k) requires that gatekeepers apply fair and non-discriminatory terms of 
access to app stores. Similar concerns arise here, especially if app stores charge for 
prominence (and there is nothing in the DMA that prohibits them from doing so). While 
Recital 57 provides some details on the benchmarks to be used as a yardstick for assessing 
the fairness of access conditions, it is not clear that these benchmarks would fully 
prevent a gatekeeper from charging an unduly high price to both a third party 
business and its rival service.  
Consumer behavioural considerations: consumer inertia, consumer trust issues, over-
willingness to sign up to unfair privacy consents, susceptibility to influence through choice 
architecture. Also, the fact that the gatekeeper is typically in control of the interface design will 
determine the choice architecture facing end users and can utilise A/B testing techniques to 
increase the impact of this choice architecture, potentially in ways that most suits its interests.118 
A risk that GDPR requirements could limit effectiveness and that this could be exacerbated 
by gatekeepers acting with excessive caution in respect of GDPR, although this risk is partly 
addressed by the anti-circumvention provision in Article 11(2). There is also a question as to what 
constitutes active consumer consent in this context. Arguably consumers need to be given more 
than a ‘take it or leave it’ option whereby they are denied access to a service unless they give up all 
control over their data. But it is not clear whether this is required under the relevant obligations (or 
under the GDPR). 
The Commission may face difficulty in assessing the evidence provided in relation to technical 
exceptions, e.g. in assessing the essentiality of apps in relation to obligation 6(1.b) or threat to 
integrity in relation to obligation 6(1.c). 
 
116 CERRE, Data sharing for digital markets contestability, Towards a governance framework, September 2020. 
117 See CERRE (2019), fn. 118. 
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There are significant risks that effective implementation is not likely to be feasible in six 
months, and indeed that there could be a trade-off being speed and effectiveness. This is especially 
true for the interoperability and data-related obligations.  
There also significant issues around how to monitor some of the obligations, especially around 
the use of data: breach (or circumvention) may not be apparent to either business users or end 
users. 
Finally, we note that there has been no serious attempt by the Commission to assess how 
effectively the group of obligations will work as a package, and we have also not tried to do 
this. However, we note that there is no restriction on self-preferencing beyond ranking 
services/products, and that there are no provisions that ban the purchase, or requirement, of 
exclusive or preferential positioning. As such, it is not obvious that the obligations, as they stand, 
would have fully addressed the EC’s Google Shopping or Google Android cases.  
More generally, there is a question to be addressed about the extent to which – where relevant – 
the Obligations apply to current contracts or just new ones? If current, does this change 
termination rights – that is, does this mean that contracts can be entirely renegotiated? Would there 
be any exception for technical issues, for example if it were to prove technically impossible to enable 
already installed apps to be suddenly capable of being uninstalled? 
4.2 Recommendations 
The above issues give rise to a variety of recommendations. Note that we have not endeavoured 
here to propose precise revised wording, but rather to highlight the areas which merit further 
consideration. 
- Recommendation (h): Clarify or narrow down some obligations 
Given the concerns highlighted above in relation to obligations being too narrowly drawn, some 
obligations require greater upfront clarification, within the Recitals, or even reformulation.  
It should be made clear, for instance in the DMA Recitals, that incentivising conduct, for example 
through offering higher rankings/prominence for firms that behave as desired by the gatekeeper, 
will be viewed as seriously as specific behavioural requirements.119 
Moreover, as already recommended in section 3, the concerns highlighted above in relation to 
certainly obligations being too widely applicable, it should be made explicitly possible for 
applicability to be refined and narrowed through the Article 7 specification process. 
- Recommendation (i): In relation to choice architecture for consumer consent and other 
choices 
There needs to be regulatory oversight of the choice architecture put in place by the 
gatekeepers and overarching principles for what is expected. One option would be to require the 
gatekeepers to design their choice architecture so that it best reflects the decisions that consumers 
would make if making fully deliberative choices based on complete information. This should be 
testable via A/B testing. It would be useful to make explicit that the Commission can require 




119 CERRE, Effective remedies for anti-competitive intermediation bias on vertically integrated platforms, October 2019 made 
the recommendation that a ban of pay-for-prominence is not proportionate, but it may need to come with heightend transparency 
standards vis a vis the regulator. 
120 This recommendation is also made in CERRE, Effective remedies for anti-competitive intermediation bias on vertically 
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- Recommendation (j): On data protection 
Given that there are likely to be significant issues of GDPR interpretation, the Commission, as the 
DMA enforcer will liaise on these with the system of data protection regulation.121 The 
Commission should consider clarifying that active consumer consent requires that the gatekeeper 
provide a genuine choice, not a ‘take or leave it’ offer, and that consumers should be readily able to 
both give and revoke consent.122 
- Recommendation (k): On technical risks associated with the speed of implementation 
To limit the undue risk of technical error, there should be some potential for the regulator to, at its 
discretion, provide additional time for implementation. 
The Commission needs to give thought to how it will deal with the more technically complex aspects 
of the regulation. It may need to arrange access to technical ‘Special Advisors.’ 
- Recommendation (l): Effective obligation and implementation 
More fundamentally, it is unlikely that the Obligations are going to be perfect. We consequently need 
a better system for good and EU interpretation of the obligations as well as a better feedback loop 
whereby learning from experience is brought into implementation improvement. For 
instance, a regular evaluation of the effectiveness and proportionality of the measures specified in 
Article 7 decision should be provided with the possibility for the Commission to re-specify the 
obligations if needed. More fundamentally, the list of Obligations in Articles 5 and 6 should be 
assessed at regular intervals with possibilities to add new obligations (as already foreseen in the 
Proposal) but also the possibility to remove obligations. 
Finally, not discussed above, but while the obligation not to prohibit firms from raising issues with 
public authorities is welcome, it is unlikely to be fully effective until the Commission can offer a well-
designed whistleblowing function, whereby complaints can be made in a way that protects the 
complainant’s anonymity. Also, it would be useful to make explicit that the anti-circumvention 
element of the DMA (Article 11) implies that gatekeepers are prohibited from any retaliation against 
complainants or whistle-blowers, even if there is no explicit non-complaint clause in their contract. 
5 Risks of unintended harm 
In a previous paper, we proposed that there should be some potential for firms to make an objective 
justification defence for breaching an obligation, but on the relatively narrow grounds that 
compliance would harm fairness and/or contestability, and thus act contrary to the objectives of the 
regulation. Arguments based on the impact of the firm having lower revenues or higher costs, due 
to the regulation, would not be included. 
In Table 1 above, we set out that many Obligations appear to be at least partially targeted at limiting 
unfair leverage into related markets (even if this is done via the fairness objective). As discussed 
above, if this unduly restricts the ability of gatekeepers to enter new markets, then this 
has the potential to harm contestability in these related markets, rather than enhancing 
it. This is a key risk to a core objective of the DMA. However, it is arguably addressed by our earlier 
recommendation.  
Besides, drawing on the analysis in Table 3, there are many other possible risks of unintended 
harm arising from one or more obligations. These include: 
 
121 This recommendation links to the recommendation in the CERRE issues paper on institutional design which called for more 
involvement of national authorities, including data protection authorities. 
122 We have made both recommendations (that consent needs to be fine granular and that consent should be more standardized) 
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- Risk to the effectiveness of targeted advertising. 
- Risk to innovation, due to overly restrictive technical requirements. 
- Risk that the ‘consumer journey’ is less smooth than currently. 
- Risk that prices increase for some elements of service. These could potentially fall 
disproportionately on vulnerable consumers, for example, if device prices increase or fees 
are introduced for currently free services. 
- Risk of increased refusal to deal with particular business users and further integration 
into related markets. 
- Risk to privacy and data protection.  
- Risk of harm to system integrity.  
The latter two categories of risk are largely mitigated by the formulation of the obligations, and the 
Article 9 public interest exemptions. Concerning the remaining risks, a degree of mitigation is 
provided by the proportionality requirement under TEU, which requires that the objectives of the 
DMA are achieved in the least restrictive way possible. The risks above would presumably be relevant 
to assessing the extent to which different measures for meeting DMA obligations are restrictive. That 
said, it is not clear why integrity is not included as a condition in Article 6(1)(f), and this would be 
useful to change. 
There is also a general risk that these obligations, which involve substantial system change, could 
lead to programming errors and a worse service to all users, including potential security risk. 
This risk is exacerbated by the required speed of change. The incentives of the gatekeepers are 
aligned with their users in this area, and they will endeavour to mitigate this risk so far as possible. 
But mistakes could happen. This risk may be mitigated by recommendation (n) above, under which 
the Commission would have the discretion to provide longer timescales for implementation. 
Finally, the much-stated free rider concerns relating to these various obligations would seem to 
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Practical issues for specification 
and assessment 
Risk of unintended harm 
5a 
No data fusion 
without user 
consent 
Likely for fairness, although noting the 
need to ensure that consent is genuine. 
Gatekeepers are in control of requesting 
consent and will have an incentive to design 
choice architecture to encourage it. Consent 
may not be meaningful if the choice is ‘take 
it or leave it’. Also, should consumers be 
required to give consent to each data source 
separately.  Otherwise, risk that they do not 
express their true preferences. E.g. they 
may be happy sharing data with Google 
generally, but not their Fitbit data.  
Maybe for contestability. Risk that user 
consent will still be given fairly easily, and 
thus there will be no real impact on data-
driven platform envelopment. 
Clarity issue: Specification not 
allowed, but a key clarity question 
will be what constitutes active 
consent for this obligation, and how 
to assess whether consent choice 
architecture is appropriate.   
 
Ongoing compliance supervision 
issue: How to assess whether data 
is being shared across services, in 
contravention of consumer consent, 
in practice. 
Risk that consent process makes 
consumer journey less smooth. 
 
Risks harming contestability where 
gatekeepers are the most likely 
entrants into new, or currently 
monopolised, markets, since it 
removes an efficiency benefit related 
to such entry. If effective in limiting 
data aggregation, the downside could 
be less effective online advertising, 
which in turn could limit contestability 




clauses and no 
exclusive 
dealing 
Likely. MFNs make it harder to 
enter/expand via offering lower 
prices/different terms. Note that the ban 
does not relate to narrow MFNs, which 
reduces the potential for increasing 
contestability via platform disintermediation 
in the form of direct supply. The exclusive 
dealing provisions would arguably be 
valuable beyond the narrow scope of online 
intermediation services. 
Ongoing compliance supervision: 
How to identify circumvention - e.g. 
via giving higher 
ranking/prominence to business 
users who don't price lower 
elsewhere. 
Some risk that loses a benefit of MFNs 
in relation to preventing exploitation of 
greater willingness to pay off, e.g., 
Apple device users. But unlikely to be 
a major issue if plenty of competition 
between business users. Some risk of 
increased incentives for a gateway to 
vertical integrates in the business user 
market itself, which could be bad for 
contestability. NB: Only limited risk of 
free-rider effects undermining 
viability, so long as applicated limited 










Likely for fairness. Maybe for 
contestability. In practice, steering may be 
limited by consumer inertia - they may 
simply find it easier to transact/contract via 
the CPS. Consumer’s trust in the CPS may 
also limit consumers from engaging with 
business users outside the CPS. 
Clarity issue: The examples in the 
Impact Assessment relate to the app 
stores. Not sure if/how the second 
half of the obligation applies to 
marketplaces. The first half 
potentially could, but not clear, but 
does this mean the first half doesn't 
either? Also, presumably the second 
half is only required if a subscription 
is also available through the app 
store. Otherwise, could this require 
investment in extra functionality? 
Timing question: Any potential for 
time extension? Could be technically 
risky to do in 6 months. Ongoing 
compliance supervision: how to 
identify circumvention, in the form of 
the gatekeeper offering incentives to 
achieve the same end.  
If this were to apply to 
subscriptions/services/offers not 
available on the app store, this might 
be technically complex, creating risks 
of technical errors. Risk that this might 
increase incentives for a gateway to 
vertically integrate into the business 
user market itself, which could be bad 
for contestability. NB: Only limited risk 
of free-rider effects undermining 
viability, so long as applicated limited 









Upfront issue: Need to establish 
clear, anonymised whistleblowing 
processes. Users may otherwise still 
be cautious about raising issues. 
Also, clarify that gatekeepers are not 






May 2021 | Making the Digital Markets Act more resilient and effective 61/96 
  
5e 
No tying to 
business users 
from CPS to ID 
services 
Likely for intermediation services, 
subject to no significant GDPR issue arising. 
Maybe for social log-in services, since 
even absent tying, business users may still 
have an incentive to offer popular social log-
ins since this potentially widens their user 
base. 
Clarity issue: The Impact 
Assessment refers to both social 
login services like "login with 
Facebook" and also the requirement 
by intermediation services that 
business users utilise their user ID. 
But if the latter is in scope, are there 
no GDPR issues that need 
addressing, or is the purchase 
process tantamount to giving 
consent for the associated data 
sharing? 
Risk of less smooth consumer journey: 
Less easy sign-in for consumers if 
gatekeeper ID service is not an option. 
Risk that third-party ID services are 
less trustworthy. Risk that requiring 
consumers to use additional 
passwords deters usage of third-party 
sites, thus reducing contestability. 
5f 
No tying from 
CPS to other 
CPS 
Likely for business users. Maybe for end 
users, since they may well just sign up 
anyway – that is, the process of signing up 
may be a relatively small inhibitor, especially 
if only need to sign up to each CPS once.  
 
NB Not clear that it applies to agreements 
between gatekeepers and OEMS, even 
though it seems to derive from the Google 
Android/Google Play concern. 
Clarity issues: Does this 
requirement cover CPS pairs for 
which it makes little sense (e.g. app 
store and OS)? Hard to see how an 
end user could sign up to an app 
store without signing up to the OS. 
Also, does it cover OEMs (are they 
business users?). If so, for new 
contractual agreements with OEMS 
or existing ones?  
Risk of Less smooth consumer 
journey: End users don't like the 
requirement to sign up to services 
separately. Also, if effective in 
separating end user decisions on 
search/social networks from decisions 
to receive advertising, then could 
reduce effectiveness of online 
advertising, which could in turn limit 





Likely, although risk that pricing provides 
limited benefit for advertiser decision-
making, as it is inherently only evident after 
the event, and the past may not be a good 
guide to the future. But should still help a 
rival CPS to prove its relative value for 
money. 
Clarity issue: Specification not 
allowed, but may need some 
oversight of format for disclosure. In 
particular, there are various stages 
in the ad tech supply chain, some of 
which are more contestable than 
others. If this obligation is to open 
these up, prices for each stage need 
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6.1a 





Maybe, albeit may be hard to police in 
practice. 
Ongoing compliance supervision: 
Identifying and evidencing such use 
of data is very hard. 
Could be argued that there is a risk of 
limiting competition in the business 
user market by restricting 
entry/expansion by the gatekeeper. 
But not very credible – this obligation 








Maybe. Key benefit is that it is likely to 
incentivise gatekeepers to include the app in 
the app store, which in turn brings additional 
requirements. Also, ability to uninstall could 
reduce default effects (“if it has to stay, I 
might as well use it”). But consumer inertia 
may well limit effectiveness in practice, as 
may ‘essentiality’ condition. The ability to 
uninstall may also address privacy concerns 
around tracking/surveillance. 
Specification issue: How to assess 
what is required for OS to function. 
Ongoing compliance supervision: 
How to assess circumvention when 
an obvious route would be to move 
elements of OS into apps, to make 
these indispensable for the 










Maybe, but risk that limited by consumer 
inertia. Risk that integrity concerns could be 
overstated (after all side-loading is possible 
on desktop). 
Specification issue: How to assess 
integrity concerns. 
Risk of lack of coordination between 
third-party apps and gatekeepers 
resulting in weaker app performance 
and/or harm to innovation (in apps or 






Maybe, but EC cases show that ‘self-
preferencing’ can be hard to define in 
practice, especially in paid-for rankings, 
where the gatekeeper can always pay more 
for rankings given that it keeps the 
proceeds. Not clear that obligation will bite 
on Amazon giving preference to sellers who 
are ‘Fulfilled By Amazon’ (FBA) or Google 
giving preference to Accelerated Mobile 
Pages (MP) in search rankings. 
Specification issue and ongoing 
compliance supervision: Guidance 
on how to ensure that ranking 
criteria used are genuinely fair and 
how to ensure that ‘paid for’ rankings 
are not distorted by gatekeepers 
being active on both sides of the 
market. 
Risk that could limit innovation if can't 
give prominence to new proprietary 
products without established history, 
but this could appear as bias. Also 
could limit benefits of free fast delivery 












Likely, although possible there may still be 
non-technical restrictions.  
Clarity issue: Would this include the 
ability for consumers to change 
defaults within OS – e.g. changing 
default map for Apple calendar to 
Google Maps? Ongoing compliance 
supervision: How to identify a 
technical restriction?  
Possible risk to innovation if it makes 
gatekeepers less willing to introduce 
new functionality for some apps, 
because they would also have to 








services to OS 




Likely for payment services, albeit 
possibly a problem that no obligation on the 
pricing of access, and a risk that Art 9(2) 
public security concerns are overstated. 
Maybe for other business users and 
ancillary services, but what are these? 
Should this provision apply to all apps that 
come pre-installed? 
Clarity issue: Why no reference to 
integrity concerns here? Also is 
Commission able to limit applicability 
to particular ancillary services 
through the specification process? 
Ongoing compliance supervision: 
Complexities of assessing access 
price. Art 9(2) public security 
concerns likely to be raised - how to 
assess these? 
Risk that interoperability requirement 
unduly limits innovation, especially if 






Likely, except risk that GDPR implications 
are overstated, which limits independent 
validation. 
Specification questions: May need 
to oversee format. In particular, 
there are various stages in the ad 
tech supply chain, some of which are 
more contestable than others. If this 
obligation is to open these up, 
performance at each stage needs to 
be disclosed, not the performance of 
the bundle. Further specification 
needed on who gets to see what - 
e.g. do content providers on 
YouTube get to see what adverts are 
placed, or just the associated 
revenues? For external validation, 
data sharing formats and APIs need 
to be developed.  Ongoing 
compliance supervision: 











Maybe. As currently framed (unless the 
word 'effective' is doing a lot of work), there 
is no requirement to use Open APIs or to 
provide data in a consistent format over 
time. No requirement for direct transfer of 
data to third parties, rather than via end 
user. (Unless all of this done via specification 
process.) More generally, risk of consumer 
inertia and lack of consumer trust. Might be 
helped if a clear requirement for the 
gatekeeper to have an easily accessible 
dashboard of consents, with easy 
cancellation – but this is not currently 
required.  GDPR arguably only requires 
portability for input data, but contestability 
needs observed data too. 
Clarity issue: Obligation needs 
strengthening along the grounds in 
the previous column. Also, is it 
required to ensure portability of all 
data – it is arguably 
disproportionate? Can this be 
narrowed through the specification 
process? [NB How to fit with data 
portability requirement for cloud 
services in Free Flow of Data 
Regulation (for Iaas/Paas).] 
Specification question: Oversee 
format for data porting, and 
potentially agree on what data are in 
scope. Timing question: Any 
potential for a time extension for 
delivery - could? Could be technically 
risky to do in 6 months. Is it required 
to ensure portability of all data – it is 
arguably disproportionate?  
Risk that consumers give uninformed 
consent, and privacy is compromised. 
Risk of data leaks or abuse by third 






Maybe. GDPR requirement and gatekeeper 
control over the consent process could mean 
only aggregated data is available, and it is 
unclear how useful this will be. 
Clarity issue: What does 'or' mean 
- can gatekeeper just provide 
aggregated data if it fancies? 
Specification question: Oversight 
of format for data sharing. And 
potentially of what data are in scope. 
Ongoing compliance supervision: 
Risk that gatekeepers make the 
process too cumbersome, despite 
the requirement that data access is 
‘high quality’. Oversight needed over 
consent process? Timing question: 
Any potential for time extension? 
Could be technically risky to do in 6 
months. 
Risk that consumers give uninformed 










to click and 
query data 
Likely, albeit some questions around 
effectiveness. How much the usefulness of 
the data would be harmed by fact that there 
is no requirement to adopt a consistent or 
Open API approach to data-sharing (unless 
this is implicit with the requirement of 
FRAND terms), and no explicit requirement 
that data be real-time or even recent? Or by 
there not being an explicit requirement to 
give access to all queries, click and view 
data, as opposed to a subset Also not clear 
how much usefulness of data will be limited 
by anonymisation process. 
Clarity issues: Is 'reasonable' 
element in FRAND sensible to include 
(NB missing in 6.1k)? Addressing 
effectiveness issues around 
requirements. Specification 
issues: Oversight of any 
anonymisation process. Guidance on 
how to set FRAND terms?  
Risk that anonymisation is not 




terms of access 
to app stores 
Maybe. Not clear how to define 'fair and 
non-discriminatory. Risk that still effectively 
favours own apps - e.g. in setting fees, and 
other terms of access, it is hard to overcome 
the incentive effects of gatekeeper acting on 
both sides of the auction. 
Specification issue: What is meant 
by fair and non-discriminatory terms 
in specific circumstances? (E.g. is it 
okay to charge nothing to free 
apps?) More thought is needed on 
how to ensure that terms of access 
are ‘fair’ in the context of the 
gatekeeper being active on both 
sides of the market. 
Risk of harm to business users (and 
their customers) that currently get a 
good deal (e.g. free apps who pay 
nothing). Risk of consumer harm due 
to free apps ceasing to be free if fees 
to them increase. Could impact 
vulnerable consumers. Some risk of 
app stores deciding not to carry 
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1 Introduction 
This paper focuses on the enforcement and the institutional arrangements in the DMA. 
The paper is divided into five sections: after the Introduction, Sections 2 and 3 deal with public 
enforcement, its modes, and its degree of centralisation; then Section 4 focuses on private 
enforcement; and finally, section 5 elaborates on the relationship between the DMA and competition 
law enforcement. The purpose of each section is to tease out ways in which the proposal may be 
improved.  
2 Public Enforcement: Design and Modes of intervention 
2.1 Enforcement pyramid after Article 7 
2.1.1 Regulatory design and enforcement pyramid 
Gatekeepers have six months after designation to comply (Article 3.8 DMA). In the first issue paper, 
we suggested that the gatekeeper may seek guidance from the Commission, which would come in 
the form of a specification decision for Article 6 obligations (building on Article 7.7 DMA). The 
Commission may also intervene by decision at this early stage without prior notification by the 
gatekeeper and prescribe a specification (Article 7.2 DMA). 
This initial step in compliance (the so-called “regulatory dialogue” referred to in several recitals of 
the DMA) is the major first step in fixing the way a gatekeeper should comply with the obligations 
arising from Articles 5 and 6. The procedures in Article 7 possibly denote the principal step 
in setting out obligations that respond to the policy goals of the DMA, but at the same 
time, ensuring that they are designed in a manner that does not unduly hamper the 
business freedom of the gatekeeper. As we explained in the first discussion paper, this procedure 
should be reformed to make the regulatory dialogue more effective. 
In this section, we discuss the steps that are set to take place after this initial regulatory dialogue 
has been concluded. The DMA draws on a mix of competition law enforcement features and 
enforcement styles found in other regulatory fields. However, its regulatory design is unclear. A 
helpful and widely adopted paradigm in designing enforcement structures is that of responsive 
regulation.123 This is contrasted with a punitive enforcement structure that we find in antitrust 
laws. The responsive model matches somewhat the enforcement design in the DMA. Under this 
framework, the regulator sets up an enforcement pyramid (see Figure 1 below). If the legislator had 
intended this for the DMA, then the enforcement pyramid would have entailed the following 
elements: 
• The assumption that serves as the base of the pyramid is that the gatekeeper wishes to 
comply; so the regulator engages with the gatekeeper to secure clarity as to what is 
expected of it; 
• If there is a failure to comply, the regulator climbs up the pyramid and has ever-stricter 
sanctions at its disposal that may be imposed on the gatekeeper to secure compliance; 
• At the top of the pyramid is the harshest penalty, a so-called benign big gun (i.e. a remedy 
which is very intrusive but serves as a credible threat so that its use is only necessary in 
cases of extreme failures to comply). 
The enforcement structure is portrayed as a pyramid because it is expected that most of the 
enforcement occurs in the lower steps, with fewer cases moving up. The smart regulator will move 
up and down the pyramid in response to how the gatekeepers react to its signals. The figure below 
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is taken from the work of Ayres and Braithwaite who have pioneered this regulatory style and we 
have superimposed the enforcement framework of the DMA. 
2.1.2 Enforcement steps in the DMA 
Turning from the pyramid to the DMA, the Commission’s proposal does not correspond precisely to 
the responsive model outlined above. 
Figure 1: enforcement pyramid in the DMA. 
(1) The first step is the regulatory dialogue where we expect most of the compliance efforts to be 
devoted. However, already at this stage, the Commission is empowered to impose, unilaterally, a 
specification for how a gatekeeper is to comply with Article 7 even when the gatekeeper does not 
request a specification. This unilateral imposition is premature. It is a step we would expect to be 
used at the third level of the pyramid, but not here. Instead, Article 7 should allow the gatekeeper 
to offer commitments. The absence of a commitment path may just be an oversight because the 
Commission, before adopting a decision, is expected ‘to explain the measures it considers to take or 
it considers the provider of core platform services should take in order to effectively address the 
preliminary findings.’124 This appears to be an invitation to make commitments.125 In sum, the 
regulatory dialogue under Article 7 should only allow for a consensual conclusion where 
the gatekeeper has a say in the design of compliance. The intensity of this dialogue 
remains up for discussion: 
• A minimalist approach is that parties seeking specification provide the Commission with a 
proposal, which the Commission may accept or vary; 
• An intermediate solution is that parties seeking specification provide the Commission with a 
proposal, which the Commission may deem insufficient to comply with the gatekeeper’s 
Article 6 obligations, at which stage the gatekeeper may offer commitments; 
• A maximalist approach is that parties and the Commission engage in a co-regulatory process 
where the design of the compliance path is more cooperative. This could be inspired by the 
approach in the DSA discussed below. 
 
124 DMA, Article 7(4). 






(commitments or behavioural 
remedies)
Non-compliance decision (Art 25) 
(commitments or fines)
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The gatekeeper should be able to make commitments during an Article 7 procedure when 
the Commission initiates it.126 As delineated in the first issue paper, this step would also help 
clarify the cases when the Commission is unlikely to accept commitments (e.g. in cases where 
compliance was straightforward, the Commission may consider that a fine is an appropriate 
remedy).127 To compare, commitments in competition law are said to be acceptable to the 
Commission only for instances where it does not intend to impose a fine.128 
Also, the Commission should learn its lessons from the commitments procedure in competition law. 
Early on the process was unstructured and it was noted that parties might either make commitments 
that were more than necessary to remove the concerns just to ensure regulatory clearance or exploit 
the asymmetry of information to make insufficient commitments. A best practice soft law 
document similar to those drafted by some national competition authorities can assist in making 
the process clear for the parties as well as for third parties who should be involved in a market 
test. Alternatively, the DMA could itself be more explicit on the different procedural steps 
to be followed by the Commission before accepting commitments as it is the case in the new 
Electronic Communications Code.129  
(2) The second step empowers the Commission to commence a non-compliance procedure, which 
may be closed by the parties offering commitments. If none are presented or if the commitments 
offered are rejected, the remedy is a cease and desist order to which a penalty may be added.130 In 
keeping up with the spirit of communication, even in cases of an infringement decision, the 
gatekeeper is obliged to provide ‘explanations on how it plans to comply with the decision.’131  
In this second step, the Commission threatens a punitive measure but remains open to the 
gatekeeper offering commitments and avoiding the fine. As we suggested in the first paper, however, 
it may be preferable that the option to offer commitments at this second stage is reserved 
for parties who have not received a specification decision during the first step, i.e. the 
regulatory dialogue. 
(3) In the third and fourth layers of the pyramid, the Commission may step up enforcement if there 
is systematic non-compliance. This is defined both formally (there must have been three non-
compliance or fining decisions in the past five years) and by reference to the effects of the conduct 
in question (‘where its impact on the internal market has further increased, its importance as a 
gateway for business users to reach end-users has further increased or the gatekeeper enjoys a 
further entrenched and durable position in its operations.’)132 In these situations, the Commission is 
still open to receiving commitments but if none are forthcoming then it may ‘impose on such 
gatekeeper any behavioural or structural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement 
committed and necessary to ensure compliance with this Regulation.’133  The big stick of 
behavioural or structural remedies, however, may only be levelled after a market 
investigation has been undertaken and it looks like a decision that is far down the line 
given all the options for compliance that the gatekeepers are offered. Structural remedies 
are only available when behavioural ones are unsuitable (Article 16.2). 
Given the two layers of non-compliance, we would expect lower fines for the first offences, 
so that the higher levels of fine would only be for instances where the gatekeeper does 
not comply with behavioural remedies imposed after a market investigation for systemic 
non-compliance. Conversely, as suggested in the first discussion paper, we would also expect that 
 
126 An alternative could be that the Commission’s power to initiate an Article 7 procedure is removed, after all, it seems unlikely 
that the Commission will know ex-ante what gatekeepers are planning to do to comply. 
127 First discussion Paper, points 13 and 25 
128 Regulation 1/2003, Recital 13. 
129 EECC, Article 79. 
130 DMA, Articles 25(3) and 26. 
131 DMA, Article 25(3). 
132 DMA, Article 16(3) and (4) respectively. 
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the Commission would be open to commitment decisions in lieu of fines when parties have not 
obtained a specification decision. 
It may be argued that systemic non-compliance should prevent the gatekeeper from making 
commitments. At this stage, the gatekeeper has revealed an unwillingness to be bound and it may 
appear overly generous to allow it to make commitments this late in the game. Perhaps the 
settlement submission found in competition law (whereby parties agree to a specified 
compliance path in exchange for a reduced fine) would be a more appropriate mechanism 
in the DMA at this final stage.134 This would retain the responsive element by encouraging 
gatekeepers to explain how they will change their conduct to comply as well as a punitive element. 
2.2 Enforcement modes 
The oversight of the digital gatekeepers and the enforcement of the DMA will be extremely difficult 
because the digital sector is complex and fast-moving, the asymmetry of information between the 
Commission and the gatekeepers tends to be large and the deadlines for action are tight. Therefore, 
oversight and enforcement need to be modelled on regulation rather than antitrust.135 DMA 
enforcement could be made more collaborative (without, however, leading to regulatory 
capture) and based on an “ecosystem of enforcement” where the regulator orchestrates 
the meeting of the public interest and the supervision of the rule by the platforms and 
their (business and end) users.136 To achieve such modes, DMA has a lot to learn from the 
companion DSA proposal.137 
The DMA proposal already provides for some rules that incentivise the regulated gatekeepers 
to cooperate with the Commission. The gatekeeper presumption based on financial and users 
size incentivises the platforms to disclose to the Commission relevant information (for instance, on 
their users lock-in or the entry barriers) if they want to rebut the presumption. Similarly, the 
specification of the obligations encourages the Article 7 regulatory dialogue. Also, the enforcement 
pyramid with graduated sanctions in case of violation of the obligations encourages compliance.  
However, given the difficulty of oversight and enforcement, those rules may not be enough and need 
to be complemented with other tools. As suggested in the first issue paper, the specification 
process of the obligations should more explicitly and clearly involve the regulated gatekeepers. The 
DMA could also explicitly provide that the Commission can request that a gatekeeper tests different 
designs for measures or remedies (A/B testing) and report on their effects so the Commission could 
decide what are the most effective measures or remedies.138 Moreover, the DMA could impose more 
internal compliance mechanisms as has been proposed in the DSA. Those mechanisms may include 
the requirement to perform regular risk assessment of the corporate practices,139 perform a regular 
independent audit,140 or to appoint compliance officers.141  
Next to the regulated gatekeepers, the Commission could also be supported by the other 
stakeholders, in particular the business users of the regulated gatekeepers as well as 
 
134 This was introduced in CASE AT.39759 ARA Foreclosure (2 September 2016). It has been used in a number of instances of 
vertical restraints, dealing with geo-blocking and resale price maintenance. For discussion, see Monti, ‘Keeping Geo-Blocking 
Practices in Check: Competition Law and Regulation’, TILEC Discussion Paper 2021-04. 
135 Regulatory modes are well summarized in Draft BEREC Report of 11 March 2021 on the ex-ante regulation of digital 
gatekeepers, BoR (21) 34, Annex IV. The differences between antitrust and regulator enforcement are well explained P. Larouche, 
Competition Law and Regulation in European Telecommunications, Hart, 2000. 
136 See A. de Streel and M. Ledger, New Ways of Oversight for the Digital Economy, CERRE Issue Paper, February 2021; French 
regulators, New regulatory mechanisms – data-driven regulation, July 2019; World Economic Forum, Agile Regulation for the 
Fourth Industrial Revolution A Toolkit for Regulators, 2020. 
137 Proposal of the Commission of 15 December 2020 for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Single 
Market For Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and amending Directive 2000/31, COM(2020) 825. 
138 A/B testing was proposed by R. Feasey and J. Kramer, Implementing effective remedies for anti-competitive intermediation 
bias on vertically integrated platforms, CERRE Report, November 2019 for implementing effective remedies for anti-competitive 
intermediation bias on vertically integrated platforms. 
139 DSA Proposal, art.26. Also GDPR, art.35. 
140 DSA Proposal, art.28. 
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digital platforms providing substitute or complementary services.142 Currently, the DMA 
Proposal is silent on the very useful role that those stakeholders could play.  
The DMA could clarify how and when business users may lodge confidential complaints without 
fearing retaliation by the gatekeeper on which they depend, with a process based on the Regulation 
773/2004 for competition law infringements.143 It is vital that a formal channel of communication is 
established between the Commission and those who wish to signal an infringement. This allows the 
Commission to design a procedure for making complaints, it gives interested parties the right to 
participate in proceedings (if they intend to do so) and they can also be informed whether and why 
their complaint was not followed upon. As opposed to a formal channel, informal means of complaint 
would damage the integrity of the legal system. The DMA could also give a role to business users 
and end-users, as well as to providers of substitute and complementary services in the specifications 
of the obligations, in the market testing of commitments proposed by the gatekeepers and in the 
design of remedies in case of non-compliance. 
The Commission also proposes to appoint ‘independent external experts and auditors to assist 
the Commission to monitor the obligations and measures and to provide specific expertise or 
knowledge to the Commission.’ This expert can assist in monitoring compliance with ‘Articles 5 and 
6 and the decisions taken pursuant to Articles 7, 16, 22 and 23.’144 This is a welcomed development 
as it will strengthen the Commission’s capacity to secure compliance.145 In order to facilitate such 
cooperation, the DMA could include a similar provision on data access and scrutiny than the one 
foreseen by the DSA proposal.146 
3 Public enforcement: Degree of centralisation 
3.1 Justifications for the Commission’s central role 
The Commission is the sole agent in charge of the application of the DMA. This model is also found 
in other EU legislation. For instance, the Commission has exclusive competence for concentrations 
that have an EU dimension (subject to some exceptions).147 The European Central Bank has 
exclusive competence to supervise systemically significant banks.148 There are clear legal bases in 
the EU Treaties for these two domains.149 The Code of Conduct on Computerised Reservation 
systems for airline tickets also operates in this way, with the Commission auditing compliance.150  
There is a list of arguments in favour of opting for a centralised model when it comes to 
the DMA.151 
• First, several gatekeepers are likely to operate globally, making the EU the most effective 
level of governance. It is not easy to see how the principle of subsidiarity could lead to a 
different approach. 
• Second, big platforms operate broadly the same systems across all Member States (and 
indeed globally), due to the economies of scale involved in designing and operating these 
systems. Therefore, if different National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) were to require 
different tailor-made remedies, it would risk leading to a decrease in effectiveness and may 
 
142 BEREC Opinion on the European Commission’s proposal for a Digital Markets Act: For a swift, effective and future-proof 
regulatory intervention, BoR (21) 35, section 2.1. 
143 Commission Regulation 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to 
Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, O.J. [2004] L 123/18, as amended. 
144 DMA, Article 24. 
145 It is helpful to inscribe this in law to avoid the problem that arose in Microsoft v Commission, Case T-201/04, EU:T:2007:289 
where the Court quashed the part of the Commission decision requiring the appointment of a monitoring trustee as the 
Commission had no such powers. 
146 DSA Proposal, art.31. 
147 Council Regulation 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ L24/1. 
148 Council Regulation 1024/2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the 
prudential supervision of credit institutions [2013] OJ L287/63. 
149 Articles 103 and 127(6) TFEU respectively. 
150 Regulation (EC) No 80/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 January 2009 on a Code of Conduct for 
computerised reservation systems OJ L 35, 4.2.2009, p. 47 Articles 13-16. 
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be impossible to justify based on proportionality. Decentralisation would require investing in 
mechanisms to prevent divergence whose operation may delay the imposition of remedies 
further. 
• Third, monitoring compliance is likely to be costly and may require careful large-scale data 
analysis or direct review of algorithm design. It is highly unlikely that individual national 
regulators will be well set up to do this, and even if they were it would be highly redundant 
to do it more than once. This seems to be reflected in the weakness of some national 
authorities that apply the General Data Protection Regulation.152 
• Finally, the targets of this regulation will be a fairly small number of firms.153 Moreover, a 
single regulator can benefit from managing a set of cases in parallel and learn across the 
different dossiers. 
With the adoption of the DMA, the Commission will acquire substantial new regulatory powers. As 
explained in the CERRE Recommendation Paper, if the Commission wants to share the same 
characteristics that the EU law imposes upon regulatory authorities at the Member State 
level, it should have sufficient budgetary and human resources. The Commission foresees a 
team of 80 FTE in 2025154 but that may not be sufficient given the strict deadlines that the 
Commission will be subject to.  
Moreover, a key feature of the DMA is to give to the Commission extensive investigation powers 
on database and algorithms. Those new powers will be very useful given the importance of data 
and algorithms in the conducts and the impact of the gatekeepers. However, these investigation 
powers could only be exercised effectively if regulators have the human and technical 
capability of analysing and interpreting the large volumes and variety of data provided by 
the platforms.155 Regarding human capabilities, the Commission could set up in-house dedicated 
teams of data analysis and AI specialists as national authorities are increasingly doing.156 Regarding 
technological capabilities and following the Commission White Paper on AI,157 regulators may 
also develop their own AI tools to process the data to be analysed. In practice, AI techniques are 
increasingly used by financial regulators158 and are starting to be used by competition agencies.159 
The Commission should also be independent of the regulated platforms but also from political 
power: this independence requirement may be in contrast with the geopolitical role that the 
Commission is increasingly eager to play; thus the old debate on the political independence of DG 
COMP and the need to create an independent EU antitrust agency may come back with a vengeance 
as the Commission acquires more regulatory power and, at the same time, wants to become more 
political. And lastly, the Commission should be accountable: this may imply more hearings of the 
Commission department in charge of the DMA before the Parliament and strict judicial review of its 
decisions. 
The new DMA powers will also have to be combined with the existing competition powers and the 
new DSA powers. The Commission should maximise the synergies between its different 
 
152 Accessnow, Two Years Under the EU GDPR: An Implementation Progress Report (2020). 
153 The Commission suggests 10 to 15 but the basis of this estimate is questioned. See CERRE, above n 4, p.13. 
154 Commission Explanatory Memorandum to the DMA Proposal, p.11. 
155 For instance, in the Google Shopping antitrust investigation, the Commission had to analyse very significant quantities of real-
world data including 5.2 Terabytes of actual search results from Google (around 1.7 billion search queries): Commission Press 
Release of 27 June 2017. 
156 For instance, the French authorities have set up the Pôle d'expertise de la régulation numérique which offers digital expertise 
to the French regulatory administrations and the French Competition Authority has established a digital unit. In the UK, the CMA 
has set up CMA’s a Data, Technology and Analytics (DaTA) unit and Ofcom has created an Emerging Technology directorate and 
data science team. 
157 Communication White Paper of 19 February 2020 on Artificial Intelligence - A European approach to excellence and trust, 
COM(2020) 65, p.8. 
158 See for instance the Data Science/Artificial Intelligence (Datalab) excellence hub created in 2018 within the French financial 
regulator. See also the Conference organised by the Club of Regulators in cooperation with the OECD Network of Economic 
Regulators, RegTechs: Feedback from the First Experiments, available at: http://chairgovreg.fondation-dauphine.fr/node/708. 
159 See T. Schrepel Computational Antitrust: An Introduction and Research Agenda, Computational Antitrust project at Stanford 
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powers (which are based on different legal instruments) especially when they apply to the same 
digital platforms while being clear and predictable about how those powers will be applied 
and combined. As explained below, the Commission should clarify how it will apply its concurrent 
existing antitrust and new regulatory powers when a designated gatekeeper also enjoys a dominant 
position. The DSA proposal will also confer important new investigation and sanctioning power to 
the Commission against Very Large Online Platforms which may include some gatekeepers. The DMA 
- and then the practice Commission - should clarify how the information received during a DSA 
investigation could be used for a DMA investigation. It should also explicate how the obligations 
which could be imposed under the DSA (especially the new transparency requirements on online 
advertising and on recommender systems)160 will complement and support the objectives and 
obligations imposed under the DMA.161  
Given those synergies with the DSA enforcement and the hybrid character of the DMA (which is a 
regulatory tool with complementary objectives to those of competition law and with many obligations 
determined on the basis of past antitrust cases), the best solution might be that, within the 
Commission, a joint task force composed of DG CONNECT, COMP and GROW is in charge of 
enforcing the DMA.162 
3.2 The role of Member States 
Having said that, two countervailing considerations arise. First, the general pattern of EU Law 
enforcement is decentralised, thus the DMA belongs to the ‘minority’ of EU rules that are applied 
centrally. Second, it is not always clear why a particular institutional architecture is chosen.163 The 
functional rationales offered above may not play a determinative role as the DMA is negotiated: 
Member States may prefer more powers for national agencies as a means of exerting control, or 
they may favour centralising matters in the hands of the Commission to signal a commitment to 
regulation. It remains to be seen whether the Council or the European Parliament will plead for a 
decentralised system. In the Commission proposal, the role of Member States is limited to 
three main tasks. 
• First, three or more Member States may request that the Commission open a market 
investigation to determine if a core platform provider should be designated as a 
gatekeeper.164 
• Second, Member States partake in the Digital Markets Advisory Committee (DMAC) which is 
to be instituted to assist the Commission.165 However, this committee only comes into 
operation rather late in the process (e.g. in a market investigation or enforcement actions) 
which may well play a marginal role in the day-to-day supervision of gatekeepers if they are 
willing to comply.166 
• Third, if the Commission adds new obligations and prohibitions with a delegated act, the 
standard dual control by the Member States on the adoption of delegated acts applies: before 
the adoption of the act, representatives of the Member States should be consulted by the 
Commission and after the adoption of the act, the Council of the Ministers of the EU may 
oppose to such an act.167 
 
160 Prop DSA, arts.29 and 30. 
161 Although the Impact Assessment (at paras. 410-413) calls for separation of the two enforcement mechanisms because of 
different objectives, competences and level of centralisation. 
162 Similar to the joint Article 7 task force with CONNECT and COMP in telecom in 2003-2006. See also P. Marsden and R. Podszun, 
Restoring Balance to Digital Competition – Sensible Rules, Effective Enforcement (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V. 2020) ch.4. 
163 See the illuminating discussion by L. Van Kreij, ‘Towards a Comprehensive Framework for Understanding EU Enforcement 
Regimes’ (2019) 10 European Journal of Risk Regulation 439. 
164 DMA, Article 33. The logic behind this is that gatekeepers should provide a core platform service in at least three Member 
States, see Article 3(2)(a). 
165 DMA, Article 32. 
166 This committee will advise, with non-binding opinion, the Commission on the following implementing decisions: designation 
of gatekeepers; suspension and exemption of obligations; imposition interim measures; acceptance of gatekeeper commitments; 
and condemnation for non-compliance or systematic non-compliance. 
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The involvement of the national authorities through their participation in the DMAC or the 
ex-ante and ex-post control of delegated acts may not be sufficient given the considerable 
difficulty of enforcing the DMA obligations effectively. If greater role was sought after by 
Member States, then a national authority would be entrusted with discharging this role. Two main 
models are possible. 
In the minimalist model (which seems to be favoured by BEREC),168 DMA remains enforced 
centrally by the Commission and the national authorities come in support of the 
Commission. National authorities may be particularly helpful for the following tasks for which they 
may have a comparative advantage vis-à-vis the Commission.  
• First, national authorities are more localised than the Commission, hence may receive 
complaints more easily from small and local business users. The national authority may 
receive such complaints and, when justified, forward them to the Commission for further 
action.  
• Second, national authorities may have expertise and experience which can usefully support 
the Commission in specifying the obligations. Indeed, several national authorities have 
expertise in dealing with digital platforms as well as data and algorithms; they also have 
experience in implementing some of the obligations of the DMA proposal such as 
interoperability, access to data or data portability.  
• Third, national authorities may be closer to the ‘field’ and more easily monitor the correct 
implementation of the imposed obligations.169 Essentially, as suggested by BEREC, the 
national authorities may play a key role in running a mechanism to resolve the dispute 
between the designated gatekeepers and their business users.170 
In the maximalist model (which has been supported by some NCAs), the DMA would be enforced 
centrally by the Commission but it could also be enforced locally by the national 
authorities. Under this model, the DMA will be enforced in the same manner as EU competition 
law. Different versions of this model are possible:  
• National authorities can apply all measures of the DMA in parallel with the Commission, 
hence they may designate gatekeepers (under article 3) and apply and specify obligations 
(under articles 5-7);  
• National authorities can apply and specify obligations (under articles 5-7) in parallel with 
the Commission, but the Commission keeps the monopoly of gatekeeper designation; 
• National authorities only enforce infringements - so the Commission is exclusively 
competent to make the specifications in Article 7 or commitment decisions in non-
infringement procedures; once obligations are specified the Commission or NCAs can police 
these together. 
The more powers are given to the national authorities, the greater the risk of divergence and the 
more investment has to be made in building up cooperation networks, which may be costly to be 
set up. It also assumes that all national authorities are equally capable, well-resourced and 
independent to apply the DMA. Furthermore, it is not clear whether a national authority would be 
able to impose a fine or a remedy outside its borders. Granting enforcement powers to national 
authorities means that the country of origin principle should apply, by which one national authority 
would have powers to enforce the DMA against the gatekeeper based established in its Member 
State, but the remedies would be  EU-wide. 
 
168 BEREC Opinion on the European Commission’s proposal for a Digital Markets Act, section 3. 
169 As it has sometimes be practiced under the Merger control: NewsCorp/Telepiu, Decision of 2 April 2003, Case M.2876, para. 
259. 
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Conversely, the less power is given to the national authorities, the fewer incentives they may have 
to invest time and resources in the DMA implementation. To work effectively, the national regulators 
would have to be empowered to enforce the DMA against firms directly, with the concomitant need 
for coordination mechanisms. 
Finally, it is key that the national authorities supporting the Commission are independent of 
political power to alleviate a politicisation - or a perception of it – of the interventions 
against the digital gatekeepers. While such independence is expected by the Commission,171 it 
is by no means guaranteed by its proposal because the DMAC is a comitology committee whose 
members should be representatives from the Member States, but not necessarily from their 
independent authorities.172 In practice, national representatives in comitology committees are often 
coming from Ministries. To deal with such issue, some EU sector-specific regulation such as 
telecommunications, provides for two different networks of national authorities, one comitology 
committee and another one composed of independent authorities.173 In the same vein and as 
advocated by BEREC,174 the DMA could establish, next to the DMAC, a network of 
independent national digital authorities. It would then be up to the Member State to decide 
which (existing or new) national authorities should be designated as their National Digital Authority 
in such network. 
4 Private enforcement 
4.1 The role of private enforcement in P2B relations 
The P2B Regulation, which applies horizontally to the providers of two types of Core Platforms 
services: intermediation services and search engines, is based on a similar philosophy to the DMA: 
securing fair relations between platforms and businesses. In order to achieve this, the P2B 
Regulation foresees private enforcement. 
• Online intermediation service providers shall provide an internal system for handling 
complaints, and it is expected that the majority of cases are resolved with this 
procedure;175  
• Failing this, the terms and conditions should specify a mediation procedure;176  
• Enforcement may also be by representative organizations or public bodies which may take 
action in national courts;177  
• The Regulation also encourages the development of codes of conduct.178  
In addition, the P2B Regulation requires amendments or additions to national laws. Member States 
should ‘lay down the rules setting out the measures applicable to infringements of this Regulation 
and should ensure that they are implemented. The measures provided for shall be effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive.’179 However, there is no expectation that new enforcement bodies are 
established, nor that states are required to provide for public enforcement and fines.180 Some 
 
171 Impact Assessment (at paras. 192 and 409) refers to independent national authorities as member of the Digital Markets 
Advisory Committee. 
172 Regulation 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general 
principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers OJ [2011] 
L 55/13, art.2.  
173 EECC, art.118 establishing the Communications Committee (CoCom) which is a comitology committee and Regulation 
2018/1971 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the Body of the European Regulators 
for Electronic Communications, OJ [2018] L 321/1. 
174 BEREC Opinion on the European Commission’s proposal for a Digital Markets Act, section 3.  
175 Regulation 2019/1150 on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation services [2019] OJ 
L186/57, Article 11, recital 37. 
176 P2B Regulation, Articles 12 and 13. 
177 P2B Regulation, Article 14.  
178 P2B Regulation, Article 17. 
179 P2B Regulation, Article 15 
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Member States may opt for public enforcement, but it suffices that courts are empowered to 
impose ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’ remedies.181 
Arguments in favour of relying on private enforcement in the DMA claim that the 
gatekeepers are best situated to internalise the obligation and adjust their commercial 
practices to secure compliance, while their clients are in the best position to see if there 
is non-compliance. Private law remedies would serve to deter such conduct (by the award of 
damages) and would also facilitate compliance (by the issuance of injunctive relief). In many spheres 
of EU Law, enforcement is left to private actors who serve as private attorneys-general. The Court 
of Justice of the EU takes the view that private enforcement serves to safeguard both the subjective 
rights of the victim and the general interest pursued by EU Law.182  
However, one of the longstanding enforcement problems in B2B relations is that the two contracting 
parties are often reluctant to use formal rules to enforce contracts.183 In some instances, businesses 
prefer informal methods to solve disputes to maintain good relations between each other,184 while 
in others, one of the two sides might have a weaker bargaining position and be concerned of reprisals 
if it complains (the so-called fear factor).185 Positions may differ in the kinds of markets outlined in 
the paper, however.186 We have seen that some undertakings are quite vocal in asserting their 
position as to how major platforms are hampering their growth.  
4.2 Private enforcement in the DMA 
As EU Regulations are directly applicable under Article 288 TFEU, it is clear that claimants may use 
the DMA to seek remedies in private law (damages or injunctions). The DMA may benefit 
from an amendment with a provision modelled on the P2B Regulation to confirm the role of national 
courts: requiring Member States to ensure ‘adequate and effective enforcement’ and ensuring that 
courts are able to provide remedies that are ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive.’187 
We are agnostic about whether the DMA should also require a set of informal internal or external 
mechanisms for solving disputes, however, when specifying some of the Article 6 obligations, 
the gatekeeper arguably might decide that it is expedient to create an internal dispute-settlement 
system which could provide a speedy way to address minor issues. As suggested by BEREC, the 
DMA could also include external dispute resolution mechanisms, which have proved to be useful in 
telecom regulation.188 
When we speak of private enforcement in EU competition law, it is helpful to distinguish between 
stand-alone actions and follow-on damages claims. The latter is the most frequent and are used in 
cartel damages claims: the claimant may rely on a competition authority’s infringement decision for 
a finding of infringement and this facilitates claims considerably. This distinction can prove helpful 
in discussing private enforcement in the DMA. 
4.2.1 Follow-on claims 
Follow-on claims will be based on infringement decisions made by the Commission (under Article 
25) and possibly also following a decision that results from a market investigation for systemic non-
 
181 P2B Regulation, Article 15(2). A research from Cullen International done in July 2020 in 14 Member States shows that: 
national courts are given the role of enforcing the regulation in 11 Member States; the Ministry of Economy will enforce the 
regulation in France; in the Czech Republic enforcement has been entrusted to the national telecoms regulator; and in Ireland 
enforcement will be dealt with by the competition and consumer authority. 
182 Francovich and others v Italy, Joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, EU:C:1991:428 para 33, Courage v Crehan, Case C-453/99, 
EU:C:2001:465 para 27. 
183 See CEPS, Legal framework covering business-to-business unfair trading practices in the retail supply chain, (Study for the 
European Commission 2014). 
184 H. Beale and A. Dugdale, “Contracts Between Businessmen” (1975) 2 British Journal of Law and Society 45. 
185 As discussed in Impact Assessment Accompanying the document Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation services, SWD(2018) 138 final 
(part 1/2) p.26. 
186 This is also why the prohibition of restricting business users from raising issues related to gatekeepers practices with publ ic 
authorities included in art.5(d) of DMA Proposal is key. 
187 P2B Regulation, Article 15. 




May 2021 | Making the Digital Markets Act more resilient and effective 78/96 
compliance (under Article 16). No provision is made to state that non-compliance decisions by the 
Commission bind national courts and the constitutional traditions among Member States differ as to 
whether national courts are bound by administrative acts. However, under the principle of sincere 
cooperation of Article 4 TEU, national courts are expected not to issue rulings that conflict with 
Commission decisions. In other words, the national court cannot declare that conduct does 
not infringe the DMA when the Commission has ruled that it does and, conversely, cannot 
declare that a conduct does infringe the DMA when the Commission has ruled that it does 
not. This might be strengthened by a provision worded like Article 16 in Regulation 1/2003, 
providing that national courts ‘cannot take decisions running counter to the decision adopted by the 
Commission. They must also avoid giving decisions which would conflict with a decision contemplated 
by the Commission in proceedings it has initiated.’ This would ensure uniformity.189 
The major stumbling block for damages claims will be showing a causal link between the 
infringement and the harm, but it seems premature to build presumptions of harm at this stage, as 
was done in the Damages Directive.190 
4.2.2 Stand-alone claims 
Some stand-alone claims appear relatively risk-free for the claimant. The blacklisted clauses of 
Article 5 are meant to be self-executing so there is nothing that prevents a business who 
considers that these have not been complied with to use the courts. A specification decision 
under Article 7 will also serve to crystallize the manner by which the gatekeeper should behave. 
In these settings, private enforcement would appear fairly straightforward: the affected business 
can easily show that the conduct of the gatekeeper is out of line with the conduct that is required.  
However, when the Commission resolves an issue with a commitment decision, or where 
there is no specification decision, then matters are not as straightforward. In competition 
law, commitment decisions are not binding on national courts, they have persuasive value only.191 
One would expect the same to apply here.  
While it is not impossible for a claimant to run a stand-alone claim for breach of Article 6 of the DMA, 
this is likely to be costly so we may not expect a significant amount of cases. Moreover, litigation in 
these instances could yield the risk of divergent interpretations of the DMA. A national court may 
find an infringement of Article 6 in settings where the Commission might not, or vice versa. In the 
medium term, we might expect that the Commission issues Guidelines to explain its position on 
Article 6 and how parties are expected to comply but this does not bind national courts. An amicus 
curiae provision (like that found in antitrust law) might serve to ensure alignment between the 
position of the Commission and national courts. However, no hard law alignment is possible in 
instances where the Commission has not issued a decision. 
A further consideration is that a claimant could bring an action using both the DMA and competition 
law. For example, self-preferencing is also (possibly) an abuse of dominance. This may lead to a 
situation where the national court rules that there is no breach of the DMA (e.g. the court considers 
the commitment decision persuasive) but finds an infringement of Article 102 TFEU. This finding 
may run counter to the Commission’s expectation that the conduct at hand falls within the DMA. 
5 Relationship with competition law 
5.1 Commission concurrent powers 
Once the DMA is adopted, the Commission will have concurrent regulatory and competition powers. 
To intervene against the conducts of the digital gatekeepers which will (already) be 
 
189 A national court uncertain of the soundness Commission decision may make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the ECJ. 
190 Directive 2014/104 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions 
for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European 
Union, O.J. [2014] L 349/1. 
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regulated by the DMA, the Commission should rely on its DMA powers as the obligations and 
prohibitions are compulsory.  
The interesting question, however, is which route the Commission will follow when 
intervening against courses of conduct that are not (yet) covered by the DMA. Given the 
concurrency of powers, the Commission should choose between competition law or the 
DMA. Under the former, the Commission would open an abuse of dominance case and should build 
a theory of harm to the requisite legal standard imposed by the EU Courts. Under the latter, the 
Commission would launch a market investigation and then adopt a delegated act to add the course 
of conduct under consideration to the list of the DMA obligations. In order to do so, the Commission 
should prove that such conduct weakens market contestability or creates an imbalance between the 
rights and the obligations of the gatekeeper and its business users. This standard of intervention will 
have to be interpreted by the Courts but, on first analysis, it seems to be lower than the legal 
standards under competition law. This difference in legal standards is not surprising, as the DMA 
aims to facilitate and speed up intervention compared to competition law, for a subset of firms 
designated as gatekeepers of core platform services.  
However, given such difference in the applicable legal standard, it is reasonable to expect that the 
Commission will choose between its competition and DMA powers, not only according to the type of 
gatekeeper conduct at play but also to the function of the ease of intervention. As the DMA standard 
is lower than the competition standard, we may reasonably expect the Commission to favour market 
investigation under the DMA over competition law enforcement when intervening against designated 
gatekeepers. Again, this is not a problem as such, since the regulated platforms have significant 
market power in their role as gatekeepers. Nonetheless, two important safeguards are necessary to 
ensure that the Commission does not abuse its extensive concurrent powers and to maintain legal 
predictability. 
To prevent the risk of abuse of power and regulatory creep, the standard of intervention 
to propose a delegated act expanding the DMA list of obligations should be based on sound 
economic interpretation of market contestability and B2B fairness. To ensure legal 
predictability, the Commission should explain in advance the criteria it will use to choose 
between its regulatory and competition powers.192 To do that, the Commission may, for 
instance, rely on the criteria it uses to select markets for ex-ante regulation in 
telecommunications.193 Such selection is based on three criteria, and the third one, in particular, 
indicates that: ‘Competition law interventions are likely to be insufficient where for instance the 
compliance requirements of an intervention to redress persistent market failure(s) are extensive or 
where frequent and/or timely intervention is indispensable. Thus, ex-ante regulation should be 
considered an appropriate complement to competition law when competition law alone would not 
adequately address persistent market failure(s) identified’.194 
The Commission could also rely on the criteria proposed by Motta and Peitz to determine when a 
new EU market investigation tool (the so-called New Competition Tool) would be a better route than 
an Article 102 TFEU enforcement action. This may be the case when a competition law assessment 
is long, complex and uncertain or when a competition law assessment would not solve a generalized 
problem, but just deal with one specific conduct or firm.195 On those bases, possible criteria to favour 
 
192 In the UK where most of the regulators have concurrent power, they have concluded MoU with the competition authority 
which clarify how concurrent powers will be exercised. See for instance, Memorandum of understanding of 8 February 2016 
between the CMA and Ofcom on concurrent competition powers. Also Crocioni, Ofcom’s Record as a Competition Authority: An 
Assessment of Decisions in Telecoms, EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2019/93. 
193 In telecommunications regulation, the three criteria test placing the frontiers between competition law and regulation is used 
to select markets for regulation but not the obligations which are imposed on those markets. In the DMA, the criteria should be 
used to select the obligations to be imposed but not the markets (or Core Platforms Services) on which those obligations will be 
imposed. 
194 EECC, Article 67(1) clarified by Commission Recommendation 2020/2245 of 18 December 2020 on relevant product and 
service markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex-ante regulation, OJ 2020 No. L 439/23, recital 17. 
Never and Preissl, The three-criteria test and SMP: how to get it right, International Journal of Management and Network 
Economics, 2008, 100. 
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a DMA over competition law enforcement could comprise the recurrence or the prevalence a conduct 
by different types of gatekeepers, or the need to intervene quickly or with remedies that require 
extensive monitoring.196  
Adopting such criteria would be useful to ensure legal predictability, but cannot undercut the 
responsibility of the Commission to apply EU competition law. Indeed, competition law – which is 
primary law – cannot legally be sacrificed on the altar of the DMA – which is secondary law. More 
fundamentally, given that the initial list of obligations and prohibitions found in the DMA appears 
largely based on experience in competition law enforcement, it may seem appropriate to continue 
to use competition law as the first line of intervention, in order to build up experience and “test-
drive” theories of harm in actual cases before courses of conduct are enshrined in the DMA list of 
prohibitions and obligations.  
5.2 Relationship with national competition law 
While the DMA proposal prohibits the Member States from imposing further obligations on designated 
gatekeepers to ensure contestable and fair markets, it does not impede Member States to impose 
obligations on the basis of EU or national competition rules.197 Specifically, any obligation imposed 
on designated gatekeepers under national competition law is allowed provided this is compatible 
with Regulation 1/2003.198 For instance, the parallel imposition of obligations under the DMA 
and under the newly adopted Section 19a of German Competition Law199 which targets 
similar platforms is possible. In case of parallel applications of both the DMA and competition 
law, the Court of Justice of the EU has already judged that there is only a very limited regulated 
conduct defence which is merely applicable when compliance with regulation forces the regulated 
firms to violate competition law.200 EU Institutions have also adopted a very narrow understanding 
of the ne bis in idem principle which allows the same corporate conduct to be condemned under two 
different regulatory instruments, such as the DMA and competition law, if they protect different legal 
interests.201 
Such parallel imposition, at best, undermines the internal market and, at worst, leads to 
inconsistency. In order to avoid such pitfalls, good coordination between the Commission as a DMA 
enforcer and the NCAs is essential. However, there is no obvious existing forum where such 
coordination should take place. In particular, the ECN and the coordination mechanisms of 
Regulation 1/2003 are not appropriate because the DMA is not a competition law tool. Thus, a new 
permanent cooperation forum where the Commission and the NCAs (possibly with other 
independent national authorities) meet to discuss the enforcement of the DMA could be 
established. Such forum would reduce the risk of divergent or incompatible decisions adopted by 
the Commission under the DMA and by an NCA under competition law. Such forum would also, as 
explained earlier in Section 3, allow the NCAs to bring their expertise and legitimacy in support of 
the enforcement of DMA.  
While the establishment of a cooperation forum between the Commission and the NCAs may reduce 
the risks of divergent or incompatible decisions, it may not alleviate it completely. Therefore, a 
conflict rule needs to be in place. In that regard, a narrow rule based on the concrete actions of the 
respective authorities is preferable to an absolute hierarchical rule based on “fields” or 
 
196 Those criteria may also be inspired by the reasons mentioned by the Commission services for the insufficiency of competition 
law in dealing with some structural competition problems in the digital economy: Impact Assessment Report on the DMA Proposal 
(fn.138), at paras. 119-124. 
197 DMA Proposal, art.1.6. 
198 Council Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 
and 82 of the Treaty, O.J. [2003] L 1/1, as amended, art.3(2) provides that: “(…) Member States shall not under this Regulation 
be precluded from adopting and applying on their territory stricter national laws which prohibit or sanction unilateral conduct 
engaged in by undertakings”.  
199 See Section 19a of German Competition Law on Abusive Conduct of Undertakings of Paramount Significance for Competition 
across Markets. An non official English translation is available at: https://www.d-kart.de/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/GWB-
2021-01-14-engl.pdf 
200 Case C-280/08P Deutsche Telekom, EU:C:2010:603. 
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“competences”.202 On that basis, both competition law and the DMA could apply concurrently, 
unless their concurrent application puts the regulated gatekeeper in a situation where it 
cannot comply with both regimes at the same time. Such cases should be exceptional. There 
would thus be no conflict if, under one regime, the gatekeeper platform is put under a regulatory 
obligation, whereas under the other regime, analysis led the platform not to be subjected to any 
obligation. In such a situation, the platform can comply with both regimes. To the extent that the 
two regimes are complementary, there should not be any significant proportionality issue, since the 
respective interventions of each authority are presumably necessary and proportionate to the aims 
of the respective regimes. Under such a narrow conflict rule, the emphasis would be on institutional 
mechanisms for the Commission and the NCA to cooperate and coordinate their actions so as to 
avoid a situation where the regulated platform is put in an impossible bind.  
In spite of the point outlined above, should a firm find itself in a position where it cannot comply 
with one regime without breaching the other, then we would suggest the following conflict rule. Our 
starting point is the preservation of the single market (which is the objective of the DMA) while 
respecting the hierarchy of law (i.e., EU competition law – but not national competition law going 
further than EU law- prevails over the DMA). Therefore, in case of an incompatibility between 
an obligation imposed by the Commission under the DMA which apply across the EU and 
a remedy imposed by an NCA under national competition law going further then EU law 
which apply only to one Member State, the DMA obligation should  prevail. Alternatively, it 
may be claimed that under the principle of sincere cooperation of Article 4 TEU, a Member State 
cannot impose an obligation which undermines EU law. Thus, should a national competition authority 
impose to a designated gatekeeper an obligation which contradicts the DMA, the gatekeeper could 
refuse to implement such obligation by claiming that the Member State imposing such obligation 
violates EU law.203  
 
 
202 As explained by P. Larouche and A. de Streel, Interplay between the New Competition Tool and Sector-Specific Regulation in 
the EU, Expert Study for the European Commission, October 2020. 
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These recommendations have been prepared by a group of CERRE academics204 on the basis of a 
series of four issue papers prepared by the group, which are annexed to this report, as well as four 
internal workshops in which CERRE members participated.205 The recommendations aim to 
contribute to the current legislative negotiations between the European Parliament and the Council 
and to improve the European Commission’s proposal for a Digital Markets Act in order to make the 
new rules more resilient and effective.206  
After an explanatory statement which develops the main rationale of our recommendations, the next 
section provides the list of the recommendations with a short justification and follows the order of 
the Articles of the Commission proposal.  
1 Explanatory statement 
Our recommendations aim to improve the Commission’s proposal in five main dimensions. The 
first dimension is to clarify the objectives that the DMA aims to achieve and, in doing so, the 
logic behind the prohibitions and obligations. While the Commission proposal refers to three 
objectives (contestability, fairness and internal market), the meaning of contestability and fairness 
is not fully clear and the relationships between the objectives and the obligations are not always 
obvious. Moreover, the underlying logic and theories of harms (to contestability or fairness) behind 
the list of the 18 obligations in Articles 5 and 6 is not obvious. Our first recommendation (on Article 
1) aims to clarify the meaning of contestability and fairness to increase legal certainty and to 
facilitate the enforcement of the DMA, thereby contributing to its effectiveness. 
The second dimension is to ensure that the scope of the DMA minimises the risks of under-
inclusiveness and over-inclusiveness. The first type of risk may be costly because the conduct 
of some digital platforms which are detrimental to contestability or fairness could not be effectively 
policed by the DMA. The second type of risk may also be costly as the limited enforcement 
capabilities should be concentrated on platforms’ practices which are the most determinantal to 
contestability and fairness. Moreover, there is a link between the scope of the DMA and the 
obligations that may be imposed. Our recommendations (on Articles 2 and 3) aim to find a good 
balance between the two risks. 
The third dimension is to ensure a good balance between the administrability and the 
flexibility of the DMA. On the one hand, in these markets, where gatekeeper positions are already 
entrenched and risk being extended further, there are serious risks associated with inaction, and a 
need for rapid intervention. This in turn requires rules which are not too open-ended, so that they 
are straightforward both for firms to comply with and for the regulator to enforce. On the other 
hand, digital markets are complex, full of trade-offs, rapidly changing and contain a wide variety of 
digital platforms with different business models and characteristics. Therefore, rules cannot be ‘quick 
and dirty’ with an excessively high risk of type 1 (over-enforcement) and type 2 (under-enforcement) 
errors. There is thus a difficult balance to be found. Overall, while we think that maintaining 
compliance and, if necessary, rapid enforcement is essential, our recommendations (on Articles 6a, 
6b, 7 and 9a) aim to maintain the straightforward rules proposed by the Commission but to 
complement them by moving the cursor a little towards increasing flexibility, thereby reducing error 
risks and recognising individual circumstances.  
The fourth dimension is to include more explicit mechanisms and processes in the DMA with 
which the authorities enforcing the DMA can learn from experience and improve 
 
204 This academic team was coordinated by Alexandre de Streel and composed of Richard Feasey, Jan Kramer and Giorgio Monti. 
We also greatly benefit from the very useful comments of Amelia Fletcher. 
205 See the previous CERRE contributions on the DMA at: https://cerre.eu/publications/the-european-proposal-for-a-digital-
markets-act-a-first-assessment/ and https://cerre.eu/publications/digital-markets-act-economic-regulation-platforms-digital-
age/ 
206 Proposal of the Commission of 15 December 2020 for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
contestable and fair markets in the digital sector (Digital Markets Act), COM(2020) 842; also Impact Assessment Report of the 
Commission Services on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on contestable and fair 
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regulation over time. In every sector the economy, regulation needs to improve over time, but 
this is particularly the case for the DMA. Given the novelty and the complexity of the business models 
and the competitive dynamics of the digital economy, the current design of the rules is bound to be 
imperfect and enforcers are bound to make mistakes, even though it would be a bigger mistake not 
to do anything. While errors in the design and the enforcement of the rules are inevitable, it is of 
the utmost importance that the DMA contains internal mechanisms to help improve rules and 
enforcement over time as more is known through research and enforcement. Our recommendations 
(in particular on Articles 6b, 7 and 38) aim to make those mechanisms more explicit. 
Finally, the fifth dimension is to ensure a good institutional design and allocate regulatory 
tasks according to the comparative advantages in terms of competence and capacity of 
each EU or national institution. As foreseen in the Commission proposal, there is an undeniable 
merit in centralising enforcement at the EU level to avoid divergence and to ensure effective 
European wide enforcement of the DMA. However, national authorities have some advantages: 
knowledge of local conditions and proximity to businesses or expertise in designing remedies. Our 
recommendations (on Articles 18, 33, 33a, 33b) aim to increase the role of national independent 
authorities and judges in supporting the Commission in centrally enforcing the DMA. 
2 Recommendations for improvements 
2.1 Chapter I: Subject matter, scope and definitions207 
2.1.1 New Article 1a: Objectives 
The current Article 1(1) should be developed as a stand-alone article clarifying the three objectives 
of the DMA: contestability, fairness and internal market. The objective of contestability should not 
be limited to contestability on the Core Platform Services (CPS) but should extend to related services 
and markets. Therefore, contestability should be widened to include both platform disintermediation 
and limiting unfair leverage by gatekeepers into related markets. Alternatively, if the contestability 
objective is not widened, the DMA should be more explicit about how leverage is addressed by the 
fairness objective. 
Justification: The Commission proposal seems to relate to the contestability of regulated 
Core Platform Services (CPS) only. This is a narrow approach which seems to exclude two 
important forms of contestability. First, it is not clear whether contestability encompasses 
platform disintermediation which is an issue when users lack choice. This can take two forms: 
either business-users moving to direct supply; or partial disintermediation, whereby 
business-users utilise an alternative provider for some – but not all - parts of the CPS service. 
Platform disintermediation may not lead to the entry or expansion of a full-service rival to 
the gatekeeper but can provide an important competitive constraint on it. Hence, we suggest 
that platform disintermediation should be recognised as an element of contestability. 
Second, it is not clear whether contestability of related markets - and therefore unfair 
leverage by a gatekeeper from the regulated CPS into related markets – is covered. In this 
context, we note that two key problems with digital platform markets have been identified: 
first, they tend to tip, being highly concentrated and hard to contest frontally; secondly, the 
incumbent platforms may leverage unfairly their position into related markets. The 
contestability objective in the Commission proposal encompasses the former concern, but 
not the latter (at least directly). However, as competition in the digital economy often comes 
from adjacent markets, it is important that those adjacent markets remain open and 
contestable.  
The objective of fairness should be clarified by focusing on commercial opportunity and 
reformulated (from the proposed art.10.2a) in the following manner: “an imbalance of rights and 
obligations on business-users, which effectively restricts the commercial opportunity open to the 
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business-user, and so confers an advantage on the gatekeeper that is disproportionate to the service 
provided by the gatekeeper to business-users.” If so, it could also be clarified that commercial 
opportunity relates to (i) fair right of access to alternative routes to market, (ii) equitable treatment 
of third-party business-users relative to the gatekeeper’s rival services, (iii) fair transparency about 
services provided and the terms of those services and (iv) fair rights of expression to public 
authorities. 
Justification: The concept of fairness in the DMA should be clarified to increase legal certainty 
for the designated gatekeepers and their users, as well as to facilitate enforcement by the 
Commission and the judiciary. This is especially important given the expectation of self-
execution of the DMA. It seems that the DMA fairness concept excludes both fairness to end-
users and the fair sharing of surplus between commercial firms. These may well be indirect 
benefits of the DMA, but they do not appear to be direct objectives. This could usefully be 
made more explicit.  
2.1.2 Article 2: Definition of Core Platform Services 
Number-independent interpersonal communication services and cloud computing services should be 
treated in the same manner as advertising services. They should be considered as “accessory” 
CPS and be regulated only when they are provided by a digital platform that also offers another 
“primary” CPS.208 
Justification: Core Platforms Services are two-sided while communications services and some 
cloud services are inherently single-sided. It is far from clear how the wording in Article 3.1.b 
applies to these services, since they typically act as gateways between end-users or between 
business-users but not between one group and another. In addition, communications services 
and cloud services are the CPSs that are subject to the lowest number of obligations currently 
foreseen in Articles 5 and 6.209  
2.2 Chapter II: Gatekeepers210 
2.2.1 Article 3: Designation of gatekeepers 
Concerning the criteria to designate a gatekeeper, the wording in Article 3(1b), ‘service which 
serves as’ should be changed to ‘service or services which serve, individually or jointly, as’.  
Justification: Some CPS are effectively one-sided networks in themselves but form part of 
an overall gateway between business users and end-users. For example, it might be said 
that the CPS of social networks primarily has end-users, while the associated services 
provide the business users.   
Moreover, a fourth criteria for gatekeeper designation should be provided in Article 3(1). To 
be designated as gatekeeper, a digital platform should control at least two primary or 
accessory CPSs and not merely one as currently proposed by the Commission. 211 
Justification: This additional condition, which was envisaged by the Commission in preparing 
the DMA proposal,212 has the advantage of focusing this first-generation DMA (and the 
 
208 In later reviews of the DMA, the scope might be expanded to include other CPS, or to move ‘ancillary’ CPS to ‘primary’ status. 
209 Moreover, those two CPS are already subject to existing EU law that may address some of the concerns of the Commission. 
Number-independent interpersonal communication services are covered by the EECC and subject to transparency and 
interoperability obligations: Directive 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing 
the European Electronic Communications Code, OJ [2018] L 321/36. Cloud services are covered by the Free Flow of Data 
Regulation which encourages codes of conducts to facilitate the porting of data and the switching between cloud providers: 
Regulation 2018/1807 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 on a framework for the free flow of 
non-personal data in the European Union, OJ [2018] L 303/59, art.6. 
210 On this matter, see the first Issue Paper on gatekeeper definition and designation. 
211 In later reviews of the DMA, the scope might be expanded to gatekeeper providing on CPS only. 
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limited enforcement resources) on the most pressing problems in the digital economy and 
which have their roots in entrenched control of ecosystems. 
The application of the size presumptive threshold in Article 3.2 to accessory CPS should relate to 
the number of business users or the number of end users and not, as foreseen in the proposal, to 
both business and end users.213 
Justification: As the user threshold relates to end-users and business users, it may be 
difficult to apply each threshold in isolation to an accessory CPS which is inherently single-
sided and not a gateway between end-users and business-users. 
The indicators in Article 3(6) which can be used to rebut the gatekeeper presumption should 
explicitly include the presence of effective and meaningful multi-homing for business users and end-
users. Moreover, the Commission should adopt guidelines on the manner it will use and assess those 
indicators. 
Justification: Multi-homing is one of the key criteria to determine gatekeeper power and 
therefore should be included in an Article of the DMA and not merely in a Recital.214 
Moreover, as the gatekeeper concept is new in EU law and the list of indicators proposed in 
the DMA remains open, the Commission should enhance legal predictability by adopting 
guidelines on the manner it will use and assess those indicators. Those guidelines are often 
adopted in competition law and in some economic regulation. 
The Commission designation decision should list the commercial services which are covered by 
a specific CPS to which the gatekeeper designation applies and which are to be subject to the 
obligations and prohibitions of the DMA.215 
Justification: One specific legal CPS may cover several commercial digital services. To ensure 
legal certainty and proportionality, the Commission should list, in its designation decision, 
which commercial services will be subject to the DMA prohibitions and obligations. The 
selection of commercial services should be done on the basis of the user size threshold of 
Article 3(2b), ensuring that only CPS services which meet or exceed these thresholds will be 
subject to obligations. 
2.2.2 Article 4: Review of the status of gatekeepers 
The review of the gatekeeper designation should be undertaken every 5 years rather than every 
2 years. However, firms designated as gatekeepers could request that the Commission undertake 
an ad hoc review at any time during this period, but the Commission would be under no obligation 
to accede to such a request. 
Justification: A review cycle of two years for gatekeeper designation is very short given the 
logistical and fact-finding pressures it imposes upon the Commission and the fact the timeline 
for potential competition assessment in antitrust is generally three years. The cycle should be 
longer, for instance, five years as it is provided for in the EU telecommunications regulation216 
 
213 Moreover, concerning Article 3.7, the criterion for designating an accessory CPS should be slightly different. 
It should not be Article 3.1.b alone, but rather whether the accessory CPS either satisfies Art 3.1.b or serves as 
an important gateway between end users or between business users. 
214 In the Commission proposal, multi-homing in only mentioned in recital 25. 
215 Alternatively, obligations apply to all of the services provided by a gatekeeper within a regulated CPS, whether or not they 
would also justify regulation in their own right, but it should then be possible for the Commission to narrow the scope further 
through the Article 7 specification process where the specification decision could exclude some commercial services from the 
obligations, again on the basis of the user size threshold of Article 3(2b). This seems especially justified where services might 
not be seen as gateway service in their own right but would in combination with another service within the same CPS category 
(e.g., Instagram). 
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or as it has been proposed in the CMA Advice to balance sufficient time for the effect of 
regulation to be observed, with the need to ensure the designation remains appropriate. 
2.3 Chapter III: Practices of gatekeepers that limit contestability or are unfair217 
2.3.1 Articles 5: Obligations for gatekeepers 
In relation to the anti-steering prohibition (art.5.c), it is not currently clear whether the 
prohibition (art.5.c) applies only to online intermediation services or to other CPSs or how it would 
apply to another CPS if so. It is also not clear whether the second part of the obligation (to allow 
users to access items through the platform, even if bought through an alternative route) is limited 
to items that are also available via the platform, and if not, whether the platform would be expected 
to invest in any functionality that may be required to enable this.  
Justification: Some Article 5 obligations need to be clarified or fine-tuned, especially given 
that these are intended to be broadly self-executing.  
In relation to the prohibition of MFNs (art.5.b), we note that this currently covers online 
intermediation services only. Its applicability could usefully be extended to other CPSs, not least 
because the first part of this obligation effectively limits exclusive dealing as well as broad MFNs. 
Also, given the entrenched market position of the gatekeepers, consideration should be given to 
widening this art.5.b obligation to prohibit narrow as well as broad MFNs. 
Justification: Wide MFNs are effectively prohibited under competition law, so it seems 
strange to limit the scope of that aspect of this obligation. The exclusive dealing element 
(the first part of the obligation) would also be useful more widely; while exclusive dealing 
can have pro-competitive benefits, it is highly likely to be unfair and to contribute to a lack 
of contestability when imposed by a large gatekeeper platform with an entrenched market 
position. The same is true for narrow MFNs; they can have efficiency benefits but are highly 
likely – on balance – to harm fairness and contestability for those firms subject to the DMA. 
2.3.2 Article 6: Obligations for gatekeepers susceptible to being further specified 
Several Article 6 obligations merit greater upfront clarification, within the Recitals, or even 
reformulation. There are certain obligations where the wording is simply unclear, or where greater 
specification would be helpful. For example: 
- Does the self-preferencing prohibition (art.6.1d) relate to ranking ‘services and products’ 
(i.e. ranking services and ranking products) or ranking services and (any sort of) products?  
- For end user data portability (art.6.1h), it would be useful to make explicit that the 
requirement for ‘effective’ data portability implies a requirement that data should be directly 
portable, with the end user’s consent, to a third party business via an open API (as opposed 
to having to be downloaded by the end user and reuploaded), and also that end users should 
have ready access to an appropriate system for viewing and revising their consents. 
- For business user data access (art.6.1i), the obligation requires the provision of 
aggregated or non-aggregated data, but it is not clear who decides which.  
There are other areas where the scope is ambiguous, in terms of which CPSs are expected to be 
covered, and arguably extend beyond the particular CPS raising the concerns which motivate the 
obligation, and therefore could provoke undesirable side-effects. Some of these should be 
narrowed, not least because they do not necessarily make sense in relation to every CPS potentially 
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covered. Examples could include Art 6.1a (on use of data related to business users), 6.1d (on self-
preferencing in ranking), 6.1e (on device neutrality) and 6.1f (on user data portability).218  
Other obligations may be broadened either directly in Article 6 or through the adoption of a new 
article with more generally defined prohibitions of certain types of conduct that limit contestability 
and fairness (see below, proposed new Article 6b). 
Justification: Such modifications aim to ensure a better balance between administrability, 
legal certainty, and proportionality, as explained in the third issue paper on obligations and 
prohibitions. 
Finally, more security and integrity safeguards should be provided for in specific obligations, 
particularly in relation to technical restrictions on switching/multi-homing (art. 6.1e) and ancillary 
service interoperability (art.6.1f). Where integrity safeguards are included, they should be widened 
to protect against all types of malware, irrespective of whether it ‘endangers the integrity of the 
hardware or operating system’. At the same time, it should be made clear that the gatekeeper has 
a responsibility to address security and integrity issues, and that it bears the burden of showing that 
application of the safeguard is justified, necessary and proportionate.219  
Justification: The imposition of Article 6 obligations must not reduce adversely platforms' 
security and integrity to the detriment of end-users. Therefore, the safeguard clause which 
is provided for app installing (art. 6.1.b) and side loading (art. 6.1.c) should be extended to 
other obligations. Given the importance the DMA places on guaranteeing user safety, the 
interplay between these obligations and the ability of platform operators to protect users 
against illegal content and fraud should also be taken into consideration. 
2.3.3 New Article 6a: Access obligations that always need to be specified 
A new Article 6a subject to a particular specification process should be added with some of the 
obligations currently in Article 6. They relate to interoperability obligations (art.6.1c and art.6.1f) 
as well as data access and portability (art.6.1j, art.6.1i and 6.1h).220 In addition, those access 
obligations should be applied on a gatekeeper by gatekeeper basis, rather than being universally 
applicable as in Articles 5 and 6. In particular, there should be potential for the Commission to 
narrow the application of these obligations to specific CPSs and specific use cases where 
interoperability and data portability would genuinely increase contestability. 
Justification: We propose to develop further the clustering of the obligations according to 
the specification mode which has already been initiated in the Commission proposal. 
Therefore, we recommend moving to a new separate Article the obligations currently in 
Article 6 which aim at supporting entry and at pro-actively supporting competition.221 Those 
obligations are different in nature from the other Article 6 obligations, are potentially very 
wide-reaching and if applied extensively, may impose substantial costs and bring limited 
benefit. They have to be targeted to where they are most needed. Therefore, unlike Article 
6 obligations, those obligations will need to be specified in all cases before being enforceable 
and such a specification process may take longer than the six months proposed for other 
obligations. It will also be crucial that the specification process (as described below in Article 
7) should be effective and rapid in order not to undermine the effectiveness of Article 6a 
obligations which are key to ensuring contestability and fairness. 
 
218 If the proposal below in relation to a new Article 6a is not taken forward, consideration should also be given to narrowing the 
scope of 6.1f, 6.1h and 6.1i. 
219 In that regard, we note that messages for users highlighting security and integrity risks may be more proportionate than an 
outright ban (e.g. on side-loading). Any such messages would in turn need to be proportionate to the risks; otherwise, they 
would likely constitute circumvention under art.11. 
220 Moreover, for the search data access obligation (art 6.1j), it would be useful to clarify that the requirement covers all query, 
click and view data, and not just a subset thereof. 
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2.3.4 New Article 6b (replacing Article 10): Generic prohibitions that always need to be specified 
Next to a new Article 6a focused on access obligations, another new Article 6b should be inserted in 
the DMA that will be focused on more generally defined prohibitions. This Article would 
‘generalise’ some of the main conduct targeted by Articles 5 and 6. Thus, it could prohibit conduct 
having the object or the effect of preventing business users or end users from switching or multi-
homing. It could also prohibit conduct aimed at the unfair envelopment of new markets, to the 
disadvantage of existing or potential competitors, through bundling and self-preferencing. In 
particular, this would broaden the prohibition of tying between two CPSs for which a gatekeeper 
designation has been made (art.5.f) and apply it to unfair leverage beyond regulated CPS markets. 
Alternatively, this new Article could prohibit the conduct which limits the commercial opportunity of 
business users, by reducing (i) fair right of access to alternative routes to market, (ii) equitable 
treatment of third-party business users relative to the gatekeeper’s rival services, and (iii) fair 
transparency about services provided and the terms of those services.  
The prohibition being defined in more general terms should correlate to the gatekeeper having more 
possibilities at their disposal to bring a contestability and fairness defence when it comes 
to the obligations foreseen in Article 6b, than the gatekeeper would have under the detailed 
obligations in Articles 5 and 6222. Also as the prohibitions are more general, the scope of the 
obligations and the measures to be taken will need to be specified by the Commission before being 
enforceable against individual gatekeepers. As for Article 6a, those general prohibitions should be 
applied on a gatekeeper by gatekeeper basis, rather than being universally applicable. 
Justification: The current proposed Article 10 could be interpreted narrowly because the 
prohibited conducts are an essential element of the DMA that cannot be changed with a 
Commission delegated act. In this case, it limits the Commission’s ability to add new 
obligations to conduct already foreseen in Articles 5 and 6. With such a narrow interpretation, 
Article 10 could be redundant with the anti-circumvention clause of Article 11. Alternatively, 
Article 10 could be interpreted more broadly. In this case, it allows the Commission to add 
new obligations which contribute to contestability and fairness. With such a broad 
interpretation, Article 10 gives very large discretion to the Commission. At this stage, it is 
not clear which interpretation will prevail. Our proposed new Article 6b constitutes a middle 
ground between those two interpretations or, in other words, between (too) narrow and 
(too) broad Commission discretion. To do so, we propose to “generalise” some prohibitions 
already foreseen in Articles 5 and 6. Thereby, it will enable the Commission to specify 
additional measures, beyond those required to comply with Articles 5 and 6, as new forms 
of problematic conduct emerge following the implementation of the DMA. Such a 
specification process could be done under Article 6a or with a market investigation procedure 
as the Commission had envisaged for Article 10. 
2.3.5 Article 7: Specification decision 
The Article 7 process under which a gatekeeper can request a specification decision (or the 
Commission issue one at its initiative) should apply to obligations in Articles 5, 6, 6a and 6b. The 
Commission would only be expected to issue a specification decision in relation to Article 5 
obligations in very exceptional circumstances. It would enjoy broad discretion in deciding to specify 
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The specification process should be the following: 
- A request for a specification decision could be made by a gatekeeper within [3] months of 
its designation and should include details of the proportionate measures which the 
gatekeeper proposes to take and which it considers would ensure effective compliance with 
the relevant obligation. 
- The Commission should respond to a request for a specification decision within [14] days of 
receipt, confirming whether or not the Commission will initiate a proceeding. A decision by 
the Commission to decline a request for a specification decision should not be capable of 
being appealed.  
- The Commission should be required to issue the specification decision with proportionate 
measures within 6 months of opening a proceeding for all obligations except those in Articles 
6a for which the specification process can be longer given its complexity. In doing so, the 
Commission may accept commitments from the gatekeepers in its specification decision. 
- Within the timeframe foreseen for its specification decision, the Commission should consult 
with gatekeepers but also with third parties as well as national independent authorities on 
its preliminary findings regarding the design of the measures it deems effective and 
proportionate to achieve the obligations. 
- If the Commission declines a request for a specification decision from a recently designated 
gatekeeper, the gatekeeper will be expected to comply within 6 months of being designated. 
If the Commission issues a specification decision, it should specify the date by which any 
measures in the specification decision must be implemented. 
- The Commission should publish a non-confidential version of the specification decision within 
[14] days of it being issued. 
This specification process needs to consider consumer biases generally, and more specifically 
ensure that the choice architecture put in place by the gatekeepers are designed in the users’ 
interest. One option would be to require the gatekeepers to design their choice architecture so that 
it best reflects the decisions that consumers would make if making fully deliberative choices based 
on complete information. To do so, the Commission should be able to require, when proportionate, 
gatekeepers to engage in such A/B testing and to provide the results of any such testing to the 
Commission, including in support of commitments. Therefore, the specification process will require 
behavioural economic expertise. 
Also, the Commission should publish a report after 3 years - and every 3 years thereafter - 
summarising the specification decisions it has made and any wider guidance which it considers 
gatekeepers should derive from them, such as how specific measures relate to specific objectives of 
contestability, fairness and internal market. 
Justification: Such a process aims to ensure a better balance between administrability, legal 
certainty, and proportionality than the Commission proposal. To ensure administrability, the 
Commission keeps its discretion to adopt a specification decision (except for art.6a 
obligations and art.6b prohibitions). To ensure legal certainty and proportionality, the 
designated gatekeepers of a CPS have a clearer right to request specification. If the 
Commission does not issue a specification decision and then opens a proceeding for non-
compliance, the Commission should be expected to accept commitments when offered by 
the gatekeeper and when they are effective in complying with the DMA obligations and the 
Commission should be expected not to impose a fine. 
If, as we proposed under Article 4, the designation process happens every 5 years (instead of 2 
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this 5-year interval, measures appear not to be effective or proportionate in achieving the goals of 
the obligations.   
Justification: This process allows the Commission to learn from their enforcement experience 
and improve measures over time as well as adapt them to technology and market evolution. 
2.3.6 New Article 9a: Exemption decision223 
Gatekeepers should be able to request an ‘exemption decision’ from the Commission in relation 
to any obligation under Article 6 if: 
- The obligation is not applicable to the Core Platform Service for which the applicant has been 
designated as a gatekeeper (e.g. art.6.k is inapplicable because the gatekeeper does not 
provide a software application store). 
- The obligation is potentially applicable, but the particular circumstances of the gatekeeper 
or the CPS mean that adherence to it would severely undermine contestability or fairness 
rather than contribute to their achievement.  
Moreover, a request for an ‘exemption decision’ from the Commission in relation to any obligation 
under Articles 5 or 6 should also be possible if the cumulative effects of the application of all the 
obligations foreseen in Articles 5, 6, 6a and 6b to a specific gatekeeper make the imposition of such 
an obligation unnecessary or disproportionate for achieving the objectives of contestability or 
fairness. 
An application for an exemption decision would be subject to the same process as for 
specification decisions taken under Article 7.  
Justification: The exemption option would broaden the possibilities of not applying DMA 
obligations currently foreseen by Articles 8 and 9 (suspension and exemption). This is 
necessary given the numerous obligations foreseen and the diversity of business models to 
which those obligations apply. However, exemption decisions should be limited, on the one 
hand, to gatekeepers’ conduct which does not impede contestability and fairness and, on 
the other hand, to DMA obligations which would not be effective and proportionate in 
achieving contestability and fairness. Hence, this exemption possibility does not introduce 
in the DMA an efficiency defence as applied in competition law. 
2.3.7 Article 11: Anti-circumvention 
Article 11 currently relates to the circumvention of the obligations. Depending on precisely how the 
scope of the CPS to be regulated is defined, there may also be merit in addressing circumvention 
of designation under Article 3. 
Moreover, the recitals linked to Article 11 could include wording that makes explicit that firms may 
not seek to replace proscribed contractual clauses by other practices. 
Justification: The circumvention clause needs to be improved. For example, it should not be 
possible to circumvent the ban on MFN clauses with the possibility to offer higher rankings 
to suppliers that do not charge lower prices on their own website. 
 
223 Alternatively, Article 7 could itself be expanded to ensure that a specification decision could include a decision to exempt a 
gatekeeper from having to comply with the obligation on the two sets of grounds suggested above. These would sit alongside 
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2.4 Chapter IV: Market investigation 
2.4.1 Article 16: Systematic non-compliance 
No commitments should be available in Article 16 procedures, hence the reference to commitments 
in Article 16(6) should be deleted.224 
Justification: See justification under Article 23. 
2.5 Chapter V: Investigation, enforcement and monitoring powers225 
2.5.1 New Article 18a: Complaint mechanism 
A formal procedure should be established by which business users, end users or competitors226 
can make complaints to the Commission or the national independent authority when they consider 
that a gatekeeper has infringed its obligations under the DMA. Moreover, the Commission or national 
authority receiving the complaint should offer a well-designed whistleblowing function, whereby 
complaints can be made in a way that protects the complainant’s anonymity.227 
Justification: There is no procedure for complaints in the Commission proposal and this limits 
the Commission’s capacity to secure information about how the obligations are applied in 
practice and how businesses are affected, as well as identifying other forms of conduct which 
may be addressed under our proposed new Article 6b. Our recommendation can also 
facilitate setting enforcement priorities for the Commission. Moreover, while the obligation 
not to prohibit firms from raising issues with public authorities (in art.5.d) is welcome, it is 
unlikely to be fully effective until the Commission can offer a well-designed whistleblowing 
function. 
2.5.2 Article 23: Commitments 
The designated gatekeepers should be allowed to offer commitments already during the Article 7 
specification procedures. Moreover, the Commission should take account of whether or not an Article 
7 specification decision has been issued in relation to a particular obligation and gatekeeper when 
considering whether or not to accept commitments under Article 23 during a non-compliance 
proceeding. 
Justification: The DMA appears to be based on a model of responsive regulation by which 
the starting point is an assumption that parties wish to comply and the role of the 
Commission should be to indicate a compliance path (the regulatory dialogue). Non-
compliance with the obligations leads to increasingly punitive measures as well as to the 
unilateral imposition of remedies, however, the Commission proposal provides too many 
options for designated gatekeepers to offer commitments when not complying with their 
obligations. Our recommendation gradually reduces the option of offering commitments as 
the gravity of the infringement escalates. At the same time, it affords gatekeepers the option 
of offering commitments early in the process during the Article 7 procedure, in line with the 
expectations that gatekeepers at this stage wish to comply.  
The Commission should consult with third parties, in particular business users, end users and 
competitors of the designated gatekeepers, before accepting or rejecting commitments. 
Justification: Third parties are affected by the conduct of gatekeepers and are well-
positioned to comment on whether a gatekeeper’s proposed course of conduct is likely to 
 
224 Recital 67 contains an error: it should read systematic non-compliance, as this is the term used in Article 16. 
225 On this matter, see the fourth Issue Paper on enforcement and institutional arrangements. 
226 A competitor may be defined in Article 2 in the following manner: ‘Competitor to the gatekeeper’s core platform service’ 
means any natural or legal person acting in a commercial or professional capacity providing a core platform service in the same 
category as the one of the gatekeepers). 
227 Also, it would be useful to make explicit that the anti-circumvention element of the DMA (Article 11) implies that gatekeepers 
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achieve the aims of the DMA. The market test procedure found in antitrust commitment 
decisions seems like a model to be followed.228 It can be set out in a soft law Notice, but 
reference to a third-party role should be included in the DMA. 
2.5.3 Article 24: Monitoring of obligations and measures 
The Commission should be able to rely on information - even confidential information - 
collected under other investigations, in particular under competition law or Digital Services Act 
(DSA) enforcement, to monitor the compliance of the DMA obligations and measures. Moreover, the 
Commission should be able to share confidential data with vetted researchers while respecting EU 
rules on confidentiality and trade secrets.229 
Justification: The Commission will have multiple enforcement powers against the same 
digital platforms under different EU legal rules (in particular, competition law, DMA and 
DSA). It is key that the Commission is able to maximise the synergies between those 
different powers while guaranteeing the fundamental rights of the digital platforms. 
Therefore, a specific legal basis allowing the exchange of confidential information across 
enforcement powers is necessary. It is also important that the Commission is able to rely on 
the support of vetted independent experts to analyse the databases and the algorithms of 
the designated gatekeepers. For this support to be effective, the researchers should have 
confidential access to those databases and algorithms. 
2.5.4 Article 26: Fines 
The Commission should take account of whether or not an Article 7 specification decision has 
been issued in relation to a particular obligation and gatekeeper when considering whether to impose 
a fine and the level of the fine to be imposed. 
Justification: Such a process aims to ensure a better balance between administrability, legal 
certainty, and proportionality than the Commission proposal. If the Commission did not issue 
a specification decision, the Commission should be expected to accept effective 
commitments when offered by the gatekeeper and not to impose a fine. 
2.5.5 New Article 31a: Alternative dispute resolution 
The DMA should establish an external alternative dispute resolution mechanism between the 
designated gatekeepers and their users under the responsibility of a national independent authority. 
The national authority can refer the disagreement to the Commission to consider enforcement 
proceedings. 
Justification: Mediation is already provided in the P2B Regulation230 but is applicable to all 
big and small platforms covered by the P2B Regulation and it may not be effective enough 
when applied to the gatekeepers designated under the DMA. Alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms have proved to be useful and effective in other EU regulatory frameworks such 
as the one applicable to electronic communications.231 
2.5.6 Article 33: Role of national independent authorities 
The role of national independent authorities should be augmented in the following ways: (i) 
as an institution to which complaints may be made (new Article 18a) and (ii) as an institution 
responsible for facilitating alternative dispute resolution (new Article 31a). Moreover, an EU network 
of independent authorities (as per new art.33a) could play a bigger advisory role during the 
specification procedure (Article 7) and market investigations (Articles 14-17).  
 
228 DG Competition, Antitrust Manual of Procedures (2012) ch.16. 
229 As foreseen in art. 31 of the DSA Proposal. 
230 P2B Regulation, art.12. 
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It should be left to the Member State to designate which national authorities should have those roles 
provided they meet minimum requirements which should be defined in the DMA, in particular 
regarding competence, resources and independence. Thus, it may be existing authorities (such as a 
competition agency, telecom regulator, privacy regulator, cyber-security agency …) or new ones. 
Different authorities may be involved in different issues.  
Justification: There is merit in centralising enforcement in the Commission to avoid 
divergence and to ensure effective EU-wide enforcement of the DMA. However, national 
independent authorities have some advantages: knowledge of local conditions and proximity 
to businesses suggests that they would be well-placed to receive concerns and facilitate 
alternative dispute resolution. The expertise that some national authorities have gained in 
digital markets can be used by the Commission in designing remedies. For instance, the 
Commission should liaise with the system of data protection regulation given that several 
DMA obligations are likely to be significant issues of GDPR interpretation. 
2.5.7 New Article 33a: EU-network of independent national authorities 
The DMA should establish, next to the Digital Markets Advisory Committee (DMAC) foreseen in Article 
32, an EU network of independent national authorities. It would then be up to each Member 
State to decide which (existing or new) national authorities should be part of such a network. 
Justification: It is key that the national authorities supporting the Commission are 
independent of political power. While such independence is expected by the Commission, it 
is by no means guaranteed by its proposal because the DMAC is a comitology committee 
whose members should be representatives from the Member States, but not necessarily 
from their independent authorities.232 In practice, national representatives in comitology 
committees often come from Ministries. To deal with such an issue, several EU sector-specific 
regulations provide for two different networks of national authorities, one comitology 
committee and another one composed of independent authorities.233 
2.5.8 New Article 33b: Private enforcement 
The DMA should include more clarification on private enforcement. It may require the Member 
States to ensure ‘adequate and effective enforcement and ensure that courts can provide remedies 
that are ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive.’234 The same provision should prevent national 
courts from issuing decisions incompatible with actual or contemplated decisions of the 
Commission.235  
In parallel, some more precise safeguards should be included in the DMA. First, national judges 
should have no ability to assume designation for a platform that the Commission had not designated. 
Second, for the obligations that need to be specified by the Commission, private enforcement actions 
should only be possible after a Commission specification decision has been issued. This is particularly 
important for our newly proposed Article 6a on access obligations and Article 6b on general 
prohibitions. 
Justification: While the involvement of national judges is inevitable if a business wishes to 
complain, there is also a risk that private enforcement undermines the flexibility of the 
 
232 Regulation 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general 
principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers OJ [2011] 
L 55/13, art.2.  
233 For instance, in telecommunications: EECC, art.118 establishing the Communications Committee (CoCom) which is a 
comitology committee and Regulation 2018/1971 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 
establishing the Body of the European Regulators for Electronic Communications, OJ [2018] L 321/1. 
234 P2B Regulation, Article 15. 
235 Alternatively, revise Article 1(7) to include national courts. For reference, this is the language in Article 16 of Regulation 
1/2003: “they cannot take decisions running counter to the decision adopted by the Commission. They must also avoid giving 
decisions which would conflict with a decision contemplated by the Commission in proceedings it has initiated. To that effect, the 
national court may assess whether it is necessary to stay its proceedings. This obligation is without prejudice to the rights and 
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Commission in relation to the Article 7 specification process. Several safeguards need to be 
created: (i) building on the duty of sincere cooperation (art.5 TEU) to ensure that national 
courts are reminded of their obligation not to issue decisions that actually or potentially 
contradict Commission decisions; (ii) ensuring that national judges can only apply the DMA 
against CPS providers that have been designated by a Commission decision as having a 
gatekeeper position and (iii) preventing access to courts for obligations which require a 
specification decision by the Commission. Moreover, the ADR option (in Article 33a) offers a 
faster and cheaper alternative to courts. 
2.5.9 Article 38: Review 
The Commission should be able to add but also to remove obligations if regulatory experience, 
market developments, or technological evolution make existing obligations either no longer relevant 
or no longer effective and proportionate in achieving market contestability and B2B fairness. Also, 
the review should be undertaken every 5 years instead of every 3.  
Justification: The review of some obligations should be more ‘symmetric’ as regulatory 
experience and digital markets evolution may require that some obligations are added to 
the DMA, but also that some obligations are removed. Moreover, given the length and the 
complexity of the EU legislative process, such a “full review” should only be done every five 
years. To deal with the more rapid technology and market evolutions, our recommendations 
propose quicker but more limited adaptation clause with Article 6b (the more generic 
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